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INTRODUCTION
1. The empire strikes back? Liberal imperialism & imperial policing
Since 2001, and the US response to international terrorism by  launching an ill-defined and 
open-ended ‘Global War on Terror’, a striking debate (re)emerged within the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) about the global nature of American power, more specifically 
about the imperial character of the exercise of that power. In a discipline such as IR, forged 
on the heels of colonialism (cf. Schmidt 1998: 123-150, Long & Schmidt 2005), it is 
somewhat surprising that for several decades, little work had been produced within its 
mainstream on the topic of empires and imperialism1. Whatever the causes of this, two 
events were to change that sad state of affairs. One was the publication and unexpected 
success of the book Empire by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Hardt  & Negri 2000), 
which received an unusually broad array  of acclaim and critique, and became something of 
a global phenomenon in sales, slowly  achieving that rare status of a ‘theory’ best-seller. 
The other trigger, barely a year apart, was September 11th and its aftermath. The response 
of the US government under George W. Bush helped re-launch the debate, and made 
empire a political buzzword once again (Eakin 2002, Ricks 2001). This was compounded 
by the influence of the so-called neo-conservatives within his administration – some of 
them vocal proponents of an imperial set of policies towards the rest of the world (Boot 
2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Kagan 1998). To borrow Michael Cox's ironic and apt 
phrase, the empire was back in town (Cox 2003).
  
1 Except in the sub-field of International Political Economy (IPE), where scholars of a broad Marxist 
persuasion have always discussed the relevance of empire/imperialism – from the work of Samir Amin 
(1977), or Barratt Brown (1963, 1970, 1972, 1974),  to the overviews by Anthony Brewer (1980, 1990) or 
Ronald Chilcote (2000). For two early exceptions within more mainstream IR approaches, see Michael 
Doyle's theoretically informed contribution – from a socio-historical, comparative perspective – to the 
study of empires and imperialism in IR (Doyle 1986), and Jack Snyder's work on the impact of imperial 
expansion on international security (Snyder 1993).  Of course there were many more authors who have for 
decades examined the interplay between imperial structures and processes of colonialism, and the 
international system, but they have tended to hail from other disciplines (history most notably, one tends 
to think of the seminal works of D. K. Fiedlhouse, Norman Etherington, Peter Cain and Anthony G. 
Hopkins on British imperialism, or of key American historians such as William Williams or Charles 
Maier), and their contributions had until 2001 – unfortunately – made little mark on the core debates at 
the heart of mainstream IR. After 2001, one of the key moments in reviving the theorizing of empire in IR 
was the discussion which took place in the pages of the journal Millennium, around Tarak Barkawi and 
Mark Laffey's initial article “Retrieving the imperial: empire and international relations” (Barkawi & 
Laffey 2002, Callinicos 2002, Shaw 2002, Walker 2002)
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The discipline of IR responded accordingly, and within months began churning out a host 
of books, chapters, articles, conferences and seminars on the matter. What was for so long 
the preserve of historians of US foreign relations and a few (neo-)Marxist scholars harking 
back to the polemics of the Cold War years was now at the centre stage of the discipline. 
However, as with so many other fads, this one, too, was short-lived. A mere 6 years later, 
while there is still the odd reference to US and empire in scholarly circles in IR2, it is no 
longer as a part  of a lively, ongoing debate. Nevertheless, some excellent work on the 
imperial nature of U.S. foreign policy has endured throughout, which breaks away from 
the ontological and ethical stalemates that have bedevilled discussions of American 
empire3, and pushes the study of U.S. and the dynamics of empire in new, productive 
directions. On the one hand there are a host of studies looking at the interplay between 
imperial politics and the structure of international society, promoting a historically 
informed, comparative, and theoretically rich approach (cf. Chua 2007; Colas 2007; 
Cooley  2005; Ferguson 2005; Ikenberry  2002, 2006; Khanna 2008; Layne and Thayer 
2006; Maier 2006; Nexon & Wright 2007); on the other hand, contributions which are also 
historical and comparative, but move away from grand debates and promote instead an 
analysis of the micro-practices of imperial power and imperial administration, often 
teasing out important links between metropolis and (post-)colony (Cooper and Stoler 1997: 
1-56), between liberal government and colonial tutelage. 
Among the latter, several important clusters of research have emerged, concerned with the 
formation and deployment of technologies of imperial power – one thinks of post-colonial 
work on gender and sexuality  (Briggs 2003; Levine 2004; Stoler 2002, 2006; Sneider 
2008), the analysis of race in imperial practices (Kramer 2006; Love 2004), colonial 
science and medicine (Anderson 2003, 2006; Arnold 1989; Bashford 2004), the rise of a 
specific branch of political science devoted to “colonial administration” (Schmidt 1998: 
123-150; Long & Schmidt 2005), or the links between the geography and empire (Driver 
2001; Smith 2003), and the literary  and museological expressions of imperial culture (e.g. 
  
2  For instance, ISA’s International Studies Perspectives published a number in 2008 devoted to the analysis 
of empire and U.S. foreign policy, which contained some superb contributions (cf. Ferguson 2008, Lake 
2008; Nexon 2008; Saull 2008; Spruyt 2008).
3  By ontological stalemates I mean the tendency of debates on American empire to bog down in 
increasingly retrenched discussions of what exactly is an empire, and whether the U.S. is one. By ethical 
stalemates I mean the tendency to debate the notion of American empire around the issue of its 
desirability, that is to say, the question of whether an empire is – without putting too fine a point on it - a 
'good' or a 'bad thing'.
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Conn 2004; Kaplan & Pease 1993; Rowe 2000), to name but a few4. 
Through that lens, one of the most interesting such technologies is colonial or imperial 
policing but while considerable work exists on British imperial policing (Ahire 1991; 
Anderson and Killingray 1991; Arnold 1986; Clayton and Killingray 1989; Deflem 1994; 
Gupta 1979; Jeffries 1952; Killingray 1986, 1997; Sinclair 2006)5, there is surprisingly 
little scholarship  on this topic regarding the U.S.6. By contrast, the historical scholarship on 
British practices of empire and colonial administration – especially concerning governance 
through security  and justice/criminal law - is much more developed and has produced a 
significant body of literature. This scholarship raises important points, and helps illuminate 
crucial aspects of the rationalities driving British imperial ventures, the practices that 
underpinned them, and the mutually constitutive logic of both. Crucially, it also illuminates 
policing as a sort of imperial ‘dual-use technology’, where it is both an instrumental of 
imperial social control – often resorting to the use of force to discipline subject populations 
in a variety of contexts -, and a productive technology of liberal government. Thus, 
imperial policing helped to implement, manage and expand in colonial territories such 
liberal logics of rule as the rule of law.
One of the key  claims this dissertation seeks to underscore is precisely that a similar logic 
is at play  in contemporary  American strategies of post-intervention policebuilding. That is 
to say, American foreign policy  similarly  relies on policing as a tool for effecting liberal 
governance over distant  populations. As shall be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapters, American strategies of deploying policing as a tool of governance 
through security have historically shifted from actually enforcing public order via its 
expeditionary forces, to an ethos of technical assistance (policebuilding). The latter then 
  
4 For an extremely useful and comprehensive overview of micro-practices and technologies of colonialism 
– albeit not focused on the historical case of the US - from an anthropological point of view, see the essay 
“The Anthropology of Colonialism” by Peter Pels (Pels 1997). 
5 There is also historical/sociological work on colonial or imperial policing on other settings, although not 
as abundant as in the British case.  One interesting and unusual example is about Papua New Guinea 
during Australian occupation and mandate (Kituai 1998). Another is on colonial policing in the context of 
the Japanese colonial empire (1895-1945) (Chen 1984). For a historical and comparative review of 
imperial policing by several colonial powers cf. (Cole 1999: 88-96).
6 This is all the more surprising given that the U.S. formed, trained,  equipped and at times ran several 
colonial police forces, as shall be seen in greater detail in chapter 3. One early exception to this silence on 
colonial policing can be found in the work of Paul Reinsch – an early proponent and scholar of U.S. 
“colonial administration” at the beginning of the 20th century (Reinsch 2007 [1905]: 409-414) 
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seeks to mobilise local populations so that they  actively participate in the creation of their 
security, albeit under American supervision. However, despite this move towards 
'development' and 'empowerment' of local populations in American policebuilding, it too 
hinges upon a tension between the police as a prime tool of social control, and police 
training and assistance as a productive liberal technology that fosters new subjectivities.
The next section will briefly explore some of the key themes that emerge from this 
interesting literature on British colonial policing, highlighting its revealing insights into 
more contemporary practices of U.S. policebuilding in the wake of interventions.
1.1 Imperial policing, some key themes
Colonial empires exported models of statehood, along with associated models of what 
Saada calls “colonial public order” (Saada 2005: 45-6). Reviewing of the links between 
law and colonialism, legal anthropologist Sally  Merry concisely  lays out precisely how 
colonialism 
(...) was a process in which one society endeavoured to rule and to  transform another. The 
courts and police established by colonial power, arrayed beside the mission, the school, the 
store, and the local government office, enforced compliance to  a new political order and at 
the same time sought  to impose a new culture. (...)  Thus, law, along with other institutions 
of the colonial state, transformed conceptions of time, space, property, work, marriage, and 
the state. The role law played in the colonizing process is an instance of its capacity to 
reshape culture and consciousness. (Merry 1991: 890-1)
As such, colonial or imperial government involves attempts to govern distant indigenous 
populations – both negatively, in the sense of imposing limits on their freedoms, but also in 
the more productive sense of seeking to shape their subjectivities and align their ways of 
life with the wishes of metropolitan governments for a particular version of the “good life”. 
The latter was achieved, inter alia, by deploying such technologies of power as “rule of 
law” programs, criminal justice reforms, and – crucially – imperial policing. Empires thus 
widely  and productively  used policing as a powerful technology of governance, and the 
British Empire was no different. In fact, as Mike Brogden clearly shows, not only were 
colonial police forces used for a variety of important governing functions in the colonies, 
but they also provided something of a testing ground, with important lessons flowing both 
ways (Brogden 1987). Imperial policing was thus an integral part of colonial government 
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panoply  of technologies of rule. Moreover, if Foucault's historical sociologies of state and 
power have taught us anything, it is that government is an inherently problematising 
activity, that is to say, an activity premised in identifying/creating problems, and devising 
expedient solutions to them (Rose and Miller 1992: 181; Dean 1999: 27-8). 
The regimes of knowledge and practices deployed by  imperial police were instrumental to 
both these dimensions. Policing was at once instrumental in imposing a grid of legibility 
over the territory and population of the colonial dominion, in order to devise strategies of 
colonial government, and a versatile tool in addressing colonial problems such as urban 
disorder, social unrest, poverty and vagrancy, economic circulation, etc. In a very 
important sense, then, colonial police played a crucial political role (Cole 1999: 95-96).
Without  a doubt, imperial police forces faced important challenges of legitimacy, 
especially when they clashed with indigenous (older and more socially embedded) systems 
of providing the police function and some form of rule of law. In the multi-vocal situation 
that followed from this clash – what legal theorists refer to as “legal pluralism”7  - older 
systems of justice delivery, conflict resolution and policing (and broad sense) would often 
be ignored, delegitimised and/or marginalised by the occupying power. However, it is also 
possible to see instances where traditional and informal regimes of indigenous security 
governance were co-opted by the colonisers, and/or instances in which there is a process of 
negotiation and accommodation between both regimes of practice (e.g. Benton 2002).
One telling example concerns British imperial control over what is today the border 
  
7 In a recent treatment of legal regimes as forms of “cultural imperialism”, Russell Smandych – drawing 
heavily on the work of legal anthropologist Sally Merry - dedicates a few lines precisely to this idea of 
legal pluralism as central to colonial governmental technologies: “Until the 1990's, the study of law and 
colonialism was intimately tied to the historical and anthropological literature on legal pluralism. (...) 
[S]tudies that fell under the rubric of “classical legal pluralism” were typically concerned with describing 
and explaining how new (usually European) legal systems and laws brought by colonizers were 
superimposed on Indigenous customary laws and pre-existing methods of dispute settlement and social 
control.” (Smandych 2005: 268). Following Merry's framework (Merry 1991), he distinguishes this 
classical notion of “legal pluralism” from the “new legal pluralism” that emerged in the 1990's, and goes 
on to discuss some key issues and trends in the “classical” tradition to demonstrate the centrality of legal 
regimes in colonial government (Smandych 2005: 268-270). It is precisely in this vein that I use the 
concept of legal pluralism here, to introduce the (rule of) law (including criminal law and policing) as a 
governmental technology of security, integral to imperial regimes of power and rule. For an important 
discussion of legal regimes in colonial practice that emphasizes the centrality of legal pluralism, see 
Lauren Benton's monograph Law and colonial cultures (Benton 2002).
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between Afghanistan and Pakistan8. Straddling a geopolitical fault line, this region was 
inhabited by one of the most celebrated, ferociously independent  tribal groups in the world 
– the Pashtuns or Pathans, as they were known to the British. Because of their resistance to 
British imperial rule, the regions that are known today the Northwest Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) were a headache for British 
colonial administrators. In trying to extend, maintain and deepen colonial control over the 
area, British authorities resorted to a mixed model when it  came to security governance. 
On the one hand, they exported and sought to impose British-based law though the use of a 
formal judicial system and a Constabulary police – sometimes with brutal levels of 
surveillance and violence to quell rebellion, especially after the Indian Mutiny. However, 
upon the realisation that  “the enforcement of a judicial system, ill-adapted in its 
requirements to so wild a country” was an extremely  problematic notion (Lord Mayo, 
quoted in Beattie 2002: 96), the British also attempted to penetrate and reform Islamic and/
or tribal legal structures (cf. e.g. Cohn 1996: 57-75). They increasingly did so by co-opting 
many of the mullahs that were local mediators of conflicts and law-givers, or by reshaping 
the social hierarchy  of the Pashtun by  favouring some local chiefs (khans) over others. 
Moreover, the British sought to regulate traditional jirgas, bringing them into line with 
colonial ordinances, thereby entirely  altering the structure of justice and policing in the 
tribal belt (Banerjee 2000: 31-34).
Connected with the last trend, police forces in imperial settings, when facing such lack of 
legitimacy  – ranging from mild resistance to all-out insurgencies – would often resort to 
higher levels of violence and repression. This also reflected in the policing model adopted, 
which usually veered more towards the constabulary, more militarised model (even in 
urban settings). Links with the military forces were also prevalent, as both became partners 
in the pressing tasks of counter-insurgency. As a result, imperial policing almost always 
ended up  suffering from a wrenching tension between the negative and positive elements 
of policing. While the former is essentially concerned with establishing and maintaining 
social control through the deployment of coercive force, as a reserve of violence against 
  
8 The choice of example is far from random. Given the pre-eminence of operations in Afghanistan on 
contemporary U.S. security policy – including one of the largest and most important policebuilding 
programs operated by the U.S. government, as we shall see in chapter 5, there has been renewed interest 
in British experiences in the Afgh.-Pak. border region, often taken by military planners and security 
policy wonks as lessons for contemporary American operations in the area. The literature is expanding 
fast, an illustrative example of this genre is for instance Matthew Williams monograph The British 
colonial experience in Waziristan and its applicability to current operations (Williams 2005)
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those who are not the subjects of development (political or otherwise), the latter's aim is 
shaping the conducts and possible fields of action of colonial subjects. This happens in 
order to improve/develop these colonial subjects, to 'make them' into the kind of citizen 
which is capable of bearing a kind of well-ordered freedom. The fragile balance between 
both, which has been achieved during Western state-building processes that lasted 
hundreds of years under very specific contexts, is perhaps the greatest challenge an 
occupying power must  face when deploying police abroad, or, more to the point, when 
seeking to rebuild, train and mentor local police forces in its image.
Finally, although imperial policing left wide-ranging and long-lasting legacies on the 
colonies, it should also be noted that this was not a one-way process. Indeed, there is a re-
flux of influence, with colonial experiences with policing often informing or even 
decisively  shaping policing rationalities and practices in the imperial centre. Some authors 
suggest that in fact the legacies of colonial policing were crucial in shaping the British 
model of policing which has endured until today (Brogden 1987; Sinclair 2006). If there 
are indeed important parallels between the experience of earlier colonial powers in 
exporting models of security  governance and public order abroad, and the contemporary 
experience of U.S. security  assistance in post-intervention scenarios, then what can this 
historical lesson of re-flux between imperial periphery and metropolis teach us? 
Simply  put, the ways these evolving regimes of policebuilding are deployed abroad have 
tremendous impact in the rationalities and institutions of U.S. policy  at home. As we shall 
see in the following chapters, the evolution of U.S. policebuilding programmes and 
strategies has gradually fed into transformations on the role and self-image of the 
American armed forces, as they adapt to a new security agenda, and new and complex 
roles as technical advisors and nation-builders the world over. This has been particularly 
evident in the wake of American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, as chapter 5 details. 
In other words, if old models of policebuilding based on a constabulary logic are being 
dusted off and implemented, leading to a militarisation of U.S. police reform, the growing 
role of the Pentagon in policebuilding efforts within nation-building missions also signifies 
a growing involvement of the U.S. military instrument with policing and related public 
order tasks. How, then, can we sum up the insights that colonial policing presents for better 
grasping the nature and evolution of American policebuilding regimes?
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First and foremost, one should keep  in mind that the U.S. today, like previous imperial 
powers in their overseas exploits, seeks to export a modality of government. This implies 
exporting as well a mode of security governance, in an effort to structure the field of action 
of distant populations. The establishment of security governance structures – central 
among them the police - is thus a crucial move in opening up  lines of visibility for 
governmental intervention. Concurrently, such security governance schemes seek to foster 
new forms of social action, and new subjectivities within these populations, starting with 
the police officers being trained themselves.
Moreover, efforts to establish or reform security  governance institutions such as the police 
in such transitional countries will inevitable encounter and/or engender forms of resistance. 
Often this resistance will stem out of older forms of security governance already in place. 
While there are many ways of dealing with that challenge, from violent suppression to 
negotiated co-optation, ignorance of these alternative models does not bode well for 
policebuilding efforts. In addition to such resistance, policebuilding efforts will inevitably 
be plagued by tensions between governmental logics: on the one hand, the pedagogical 
matrix of security assistance, seeking to guarantee welfare and foster particular kinds of 
subjects, on the other hand, a disciplinary logic of social control. While the first rationality 
is connected to meliorist discourses of development (and, today, human security), the 
second is usually tied to the deployment of coercive, violent powers – and hence the 
militarisation of both police training and police deployment.
Finally, the present study  suggests would suggest that the best way to understand such 
processes of policebuilding is neither to focus solely on their point of origin in the 
institutional dynamics of Washington D.C., nor exclusively  in exhaustive ethnography of 
the many post-intervention settings in which police reform is implemented. Rather, one 
should pay close attention to the relational, mutually constitutive dynamics between both.
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1.2. Contemporary policebuilding in the context of US intervention9
Why conjure up  debates on empire and imperial technologies of rule to introduce a 
discussion on the (seemingly) prosaic topic of police assistance in U.S. foreign policy? 
Introducing the imperial moniker here actually opens up an interesting line of argument 
about contemporary  rationalities and practices of U.S. international police assistance in the 
wake of interventions, which is the focus of the present project. Specifically, talking about 
liberal imperialism – and the associated technologies of security governance it deployed in 
ruling distant populations – provides a nice introduction to some of the problems I shall 
delve into later on, and allows us to understand some of the deeper tensions inherent in 
U.S. policebuilding efforts today.
Despite the rise and fall of the debates on the putatively  imperial nature of contemporary 
U.S. power that shook IR at the turn of the millennium, two key elements are worth 
retaining for the purposes of the present work. One is that more often than not, proponents 
and critics of the label alike have cast and debated the issue of America's imperial power 
by careful qualifying it as a form of liberal imperialism (Bishai 2004; Boot 2003b; Cooper 
2005; Cox 2001; Ferguson 2004; Purdy 2003; Rieff 2003; Stromseth et  al. 2006: 1-7). 
Even when choosing historical parallels – to either support or attack the idea of U.S 
contemporary  power being imperial in nature or application – the case most often deployed 
is the British Empire. The second is that, for our present purposes, the most productive way 
of understanding this move not in terms of pure ethics (liberal imperialism as an ethically 
  
9 Through the text, I will use intervention as the defining concept for the context in which U.S. security 
sector reform in general, and policebuidling in particular,  takes place. When referring to the same context, 
the extant literature is polyphonic, but most authors seem to prefer the language of “peace operations”, 
“peace support operations”, “peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding”. Other still have defined the 
overarching concept as that of “post-conflict” or “complex emergency” scenarios, using monikers such as 
“stability operations”, or – as in the most recent DOD policy pronouncement on the matter - “"Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations" (US DoD 2005). I find several problems 
with this terminology – for one, peacekeeping and peacebuilding take place in markedly multilateral 
contexts, which has not always been true of U.S.  policebuilding efforts, as we shall see. Historically 
speaking,  I prefer to use the more general term “interventions”,  since speaking of peacebuiling 
retrospectively to analyse imperial intervention in the Caribbean is a stretch, and even to speak of post-
World War II experiments as “stability operations” or “complex emergencies” is to read back and impute 
a discursive regime and associated knowledges, practices and programs to people who never thought of it 
that way. “Intervention” also has the advantage of highlighting the pro-active role played by the U.S., and 
of at least alerting the reader to the conscious, purposeful choice to intervene abroad – sometimes with 
more force,  less legitimacy and less multilateral participation than would otherwise be implied through 
the use of peace-derivate words. Whenever the context warrants it, I endeavour to qualify and indicate 
what kind of “intervention” is being mentioned (it could indeed be in the context of a complex 
emergency, or a peacekeeping mission, such as in Somalia), which highlights precisely the core task of 
this dissertation – tracing the shifts and lines of continuity between the contextual regimes under which 
US policebuilding takes place, and which inform its practices.
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superior option, or a benevolent power as it were), nor also in terms of liberal 
exceptionalism, as per Louis Hartz's famous thesis (Hartz 1955). Without wanting to 
discard the validity  of the liberal exceptionalist argument, one does not have to treat the 
'liberal' in liberal imperialism as an essentially ideological dimension, nor as a uniquely 
American one. On the contrary, one should understand the moniker to mean that 
imperialism – including putative American instantiations thereof – can and often did rely 
on what Foucault calls “the liberal arts of government”, that  is to say, an amalgamation of 
ideas, discourses and practices that seek to rule populations through freedom – governing 
subjects, that is, by mobilising their desires and potential, and aligning them with 
governmental objectives. This has meant the continued relevance of governing these 
subjects through, among others, apparatuses of security, as we shall see in greater detail.
In other words, then, what is interesting about introducing the study of U.S. policebuilding 
through a discussion of liberal imperialism – and imperial policing practices therein – is 
less its imperial nature than its liberal ethos, understood here as an assemblage of political 
rationalities and governing practices. 
It may be indeed that, as Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks intimate, even though there are 
clear parallels between previous imperial ventures and today's liberal internationalism, 
today's putative ‘imperialists are more benevolent – in both motivations and methods – 
than the old colonial administrators of yore, and that they operate in a multilateral 
environment, much more constrained by the precepts of human right and international law 
(2006: 1-8). The purpose of this dissertation, however is neither to demonstrate that current 
regimes of U.S. police assistance and policebuilding abroad are inherently  and 
unmistakably  imperial, nor to produce a moral critique of such practices by contrasting 
them to previous imperial exploits and their levels of violence or adherence to human 
rights. Instead, what the present study attempts is to explore how successive U.S. 
administrations have, over time, understood and deployed policebuilding programs as part 
of an evolving foreign policy, and how such practices - and the conceptual and discourse 
models that underpin them - have changed in order to adapt to shifting security 
environments, and particularly to the now-dominant scenario of post-conflict intervention. 
Moreover, it is my  contention that these regimes of security assistance have been 
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inextricably bound with liberal forms of government, which seek to foster a particular kind 
of liberal subjectivity  abroad through the technical assistance of the local police, a kind of 
pedagogy of liberal security. Paul Wolfowitz, in trying to distance American foreign policy 
from accusations of imperialism, inadvertently made much the same point in a 2004 
interview: 
The premise of your question is that we’re out to run an empire, but  there is no 
American empire (...). We are not trying to control these countries so we can exploit 
their resources. We’re trying to enable these countries to stand on their own feet  and 
our experience says that when they do so, we’re better off. It’s back to the absurdity of 
saying we’re trying to impose our ideas on other people when we want  to help them 
become democracies. (...) But  it’s a funny empire that relies on releasing basic human 
desires to be free and prosperous and live in peace. (Wolfowitz, quoted in Sikorski 
2004, emphasis added)
However, in trying to foster (or, if we are to believe Wolfowitz's formulation, simply 
liberate and/or empower) the self-regulating liberal subject, and the liberal governing 
apparatuses that go with the vision, liberal forms of rule must contend with a wide variety 
of sensibilities. As shall be discussed in detail in chapter two, liberalism has always had to 
contend with the dilemmas of ruling non-liberal subjects, and has therefore historically 
developed specific logics of rule adapted to specific populations. To recover the guiding, 
illustrative example of the previous pages, British liberal imperialism relied as much on 
patrols and penal punishment as it relied on pedagogical schemes to operationalise the 
“will to empower” (cf. Cruikshank 1999) and the “will to improve” (Li 2007) populations 
under colonial rule. In the words, regimes of policebuilding in the wake of intervention 
(colonial or otherwise) have been consistently underpinned by a governing rationality that 
joins – and is torn between - elements of what Foucault  would call pastorate, as well as 
liberal government (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2005: 301-303).
Whereas the international deployment of police forces (or military  forces in a constabulary 
capacity) in order to effect security governance abroad is nothing new in the history of US 
foreign relations, it  has nonetheless taken on added impetus – and added significance – in 
response to the changing security agenda of the post-Cold war world. This agenda has 
brought to the fore a concern with crime and criminality  and the global level, as security 
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threats are increasingly  modulated as transnational criminal flows. One of the results of 
this trend, which I analyse further in chapter two, is a growth of international policing 
activities on a range of issues, and an attending growth in the literatures trying to make 
sense of it.
Within such a context, one particular field of growth has been the deployment of 
international policebuilding in the wake of conflict. This growth has been especially 
apparent in the context  of what policy-makers and scholars alike have come to designate as 
“security sector reform”, often abbreviated to SSR (Ball 2004; Bellamy 2003; Bryden and 
Haenggi 2004; Chanaa 2002; Bryden and Fluri 2003; Rees 2006; Schnabel and Ehrhart 
2005). Indeed, the 1990's have seen a dramatically increase in Western intervention 
(humanitarian or otherwise), mostly taking place in the developing world, and assistance to 
pacify, stabilise and reconstruct post-conflict societies has become a growth-industry, and a 
central theme of contemporary international relations. Having promoted and/or led much 
of the intervening, it  is thus unsurprising that the U.S. has found itself at the forefront of 
international efforts is post-intervention security sector reform. Moreover, since the reform 
and/or (re)building of the police are absolutely  key  to the process of post-conflict security 
governance, it is also not surprising to find the US at  the forefront of international 
policebuilding efforts in the wake of intervention.
Examining these American efforts to achieve security  governance in the wake of 
intervention through the deployment of policebuilding programmes allows us to examine 
an important new field of political activity, and through its analysis to illuminate broader 
issues. At a more general level, what does this practice of international police assistance 
tell us about how successive United States administrations have thought about, and 
practised security?  What can it tell us about security  in the post-Cold war era, how it has 
been thought of and practised? On a more focused note, however, this thesis aims to 
demonstrate how US models, programmes and technologies of international police 
assistance are firmly  grounded on liberal mentalities of government (or liberal 
governmentalities, to borrow a term from Michel Foucault), aiming to govern distant 
populations through security.
The thesis will thus trace a history  of the various models employed by the U.S. 
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Government to deploy such technologies of security  governance abroad, from its early 
colonial experiments in the wake of the Spanish-American war of 1898 to the present day 
occupation of Afghanistan (up to 2008). The purpose is not so much to present a fully 
worked historical account of all instances of U.S intervention in which policebuilding 
technologies were deployed, but rather to establish that at different times the models that 
were used have a family resemblance. As chapter three shows, colonial interventions in 
Cuba, the Philippines or Nicaragua are as similar among themselves as they differ 
markedly from post-World War II policebuilding in West Germany  or Japan. In other 
words, to demonstrate that American policebuilding strategies in the wake of (military) 
intervention are embedded in different regimes of thought and practice of security, and to 
problematise the lines of continuity but also the changes as these regimes evolve into one 
another. It will be shown that while the discursive regimes that underpin and legitimate 
U.S. experiences with the employment of police in post-conflict settings have changed 
dramatically over time, the attending practices show a remarkably similar pattern to that of 
past imperial nations, especially the British, both eventually suffering from the same 
tensions, plagued by the identical problems. 
In general, studies of the historical evolution of U.S. police assistance have been 
predominantly written from a policy point of view, accompanied by little or no theoretical 
reflection. Such studies tend to fall into one of several categories. On the one hand, there 
are descriptive overviews of U.S. police assistance, essentially focused on its underlying 
institutional, legal and budgetary architectures (e.g. Marenin 1998, 2000). On the other 
hand, we have several single-study analyses of a particular police assistance program (Call 
1997), or of a particular national case (Stanley  1999; Wakeman 1992; Wilson 2006). 
Additionally, one can find historical overviews analysing the evolution of a specific policy, 
often looking for lessons learned, or seeking to identify  general, long-standing goals to 
achieve (Bayley 2006; Perito 2004). These are often a blend of rich description and policy-
prescription, and style themselves as focused on the “practical issues of providing police 
assistance abroad” (Berkow 1999). By this, I do not mean that they are unsophisticated, but 
merely that in general they do not genuinely  apply theory to illuminate a policy issue, nor 
use policy-issues or case studies to refine existing theories. Even when they do engage 
with more theoretical issues of democratisation of foreign policy-making (cf. Bayley 
2005), they generally stay within the limits of what Robert Cox has termed “problem-
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solving theory”, rather than engaging in “critical theory” (Cox 1981: 28).
Indeed, if theory is always “for someone and for some purpose” (28), the vast majority of 
existing studies that  examine the practices of American policebuilding seem to be aimed at 
would-be American policy-makers, and for the purpose of improving existing practices and 
rationales for police assistance. Unfortunately, there has been no comparable effort to 
examine in critical fashion the rationalities that underpin U.S. policebuilding programs, or 
to question the nature of the power relations inherent in these same programs. This 
limitation of existing studies of American policebuilding to a form of “problem-solving 
theory” is unfortunate, for a theoretical and critical analysis of the lines of change and 
continuity  in the practices of U.S. policebuilding allows one to highlight many important 
issues. Of particular relevance today is, for instance, the grounds for the seemingly 
insurmountable difficulties faced by U.S. police assistance programs in such places s Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the wake of 9-11. But quite apart from that, let  us look at some of the 
key contributions that  can be gleaned from a theoretically informed study  of US 
policebuilding.
To the study of U.S. foreign policy, such a move is a step towards a better understanding of 
the gradual merging of security  and development as key themes in American foreign 
relations. There is already some research on the gradual securitisation of development, and 
the complex merging of the two perspectives from a more global point of view (Duffield 
2001, 2007), as well as some contributions analysing the impact of this trend on the foreign 
policies of Western liberal states – in particular British foreign policy  towards Africa 
(Abrahamsen 2004, 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2001). However, similar arguments 
are sorely lacking in regards to American post-Cold War national security policy. 
A second contribution, from a theoretical point of view, is to advance a Foucauldian 
contribution to foreign policy  analysis literature. This would advance a new hypothesis for 
understanding the merging of security and development in American foreign policy. This 
working hypothesis is premised on Foucault's notion of the “governmentalisation of the 
state” (Foucault 2005: 109-110; Dean 1999: 102-112). By this, he meant that when 
analysing the relationship between governing and statehood, the analytically important 
move was not to see the state as the key agent of government (what he dismisses as the 
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“etatization of society”), but rather to see the state instead as a field which is traversed by, 
and part of, a broad network of governing practices. As Walters and Haar neatly summarise 
it: 
The governmentalisation of the state implies something different: if the state has a central 
role in our lives, it  is not  to  be explained in  terms of a singular logic, or a will on  the part 
of the state to control society. Rather, an  explanation has to be sought in  the genesis and 
spread of technologies of power in spaces an circumstances that are frequently situated 
beyond the state and which only later become linked to its formal apparatus. The 
governmentalisation of the state is the story of how social practices (...) that  were invented 
under specific, historical circumstances came to provide mechanisms which allowed the 
state to function as a centre of governance. (Walters and Haar 2005: 140).
Thus, the state is but one locus (albeit an important, even focal one) where liberal power 
relations are played out as specific technologies of government. Accordingly, if we can 
observe the extension of similar techniques of government to the foreign policy of a state – 
as with the case of international policebuilding for the U.S., as shall be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, - one can perhaps speak of a governmentalisation of foreign policy. By 
this one should understand a foreign policy which, like domestic liberal government, is a 
“very  specific, albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its 
principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its technical means apparatuses of 
security” (Foucault 1991: 102). Such an analytical model would constitute one more 
contribution to the nascent analysis of international politics as a process dominated by the 
slow but sure expansion of global governmentality (Larner & Walters 2004).
Another contribution this dissertation aims to make is to the study of security governance. 
Firstly, I shall confront more orthodox views of security  governance (understood as the 
governance of security) with novel approaches drawing heavily  on social theory  and 
critical criminology, in order to produce an alternative account of security governance as 
governance through security. As such, this dissertation will show the growing centrality  of 
American programs of security  assistance (especially police assistance) as a key tool of 
(global) liberal regimes of security  governance. Therefore, when considering Foucault's 
words cited above about “apparatuses of security” being the essential technologies 
deployed by  contemporary liberal strategies of government, one can perhaps speak of 
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security governmentality10 to denote the importance of such mechanisms – policebuilding 
especially - in the context of a governmentalised foreign policy. In order to do so, the 
following chapters will attempt to trace lines of continuity  and change in U.S. security 
assistance throughout history, thereby exposing and examining the different logics 
underpinning the changing regimes of security assistance at critical junctures (1800's 
imperialism, pots-2nd World War, Cold War, post-9/11 world).
On a more pragmatic note, policebuilding has been part and parcel of post-intervention 
security assistance efforts by the U.S. – be it  in 1990s Somalia or 2007 Afghanistan, be it 
in the framework of a UN CivPol contingent11 or as security advisers deployed in counter-
insurgency missions. It is thus next to impossible to avoid the question: if this is such an 
important mission, if it is so central to the discourses and practices of global security  in the 
21st century, and if the U.S. has been trying this sort of thing for decades (close to two 
centuries to be more exact), why  isn't it going better? Regardless of the Bush 
administration's positive spin on the nation-building efforts of the U.S., alternatively 
defined as humanitarian intervention, transformational diplomacy, democracy  promotion, 
or security assistance, a perusal of the day's media will reveal a less-than-bright picture. 
Indeed, the world has witnessed looting and lawlessness in much of Baghdad (Andrews 
and Sachs 2003; Branigin and Atkinson 2003), Taliban attacks in Kabul with the 
  
10 Although there is ample work at the intersection of Foucauldian governmentality studies and analyses of 
security issues, as we shall see in chapter two in particular,  the phrase 'security governmentality' has not 
made its presence felt in the literature so far. For exceptions to this (unfortunate) rule,  cf. Tuncay Kardas 
use of security governmentality in his unpublished PhD thesis (Kardas 2005, passim), and Mariana 
Valverde's slightly different usage of 'security/governmentality' as a set of practices obeying a logic 
different from the sovereign/discipline mode of rule (Valverde 2008a: 11-12)
11 CivPol stands for Civilian Police contingent. Such contingents have been deployed in the context of post-
conflict stabilisation missions, or peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, since at least the late 1960's 
(cf. Hansen 2002: 9). They are usually sponsored by the United Nations (in particular under the aegis of 
the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations), but may also be deployed  by other regional security 
organizations such as the OSCE (Hesztera 1998). CivPol contingents are normally composed by police 
officers pooled from the national police forces of various individual states. Since their earliest 
deployments, the nature and role played by CivPol contingents has evolved and become more complex 
(Hansen 2002: 15-32). While initially their role was essentially as monitors and advisors to the host 
nation's local police forces, they have since become heavily involved in delivering police reform. Since 
the 1990's missions in the Balkans and East Timor, CivPol contingents have also been involved in 
actually delivering public security and ensuring a modicum of law and order in countries transitioning 
from conflict, a mission known as 'executive policing' (cf. Dwan 2002). The deployment of such CivPol 
components in the context of post-conflict interventions has spawned a large body of literature since the 
mid-1990's,  reflecting their growing visibility and importance (Azimi 1996; Call and Barnett 1999; 
Gregory 1996; Hartz 1999; Hills 1998; Holm 1999; Perito 2004: 83-112; Smith 2003). American 
contributions to multilateral police assistance through the CivPol framework are managed by the State 
Department (through the Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law, within the larger Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL) and have been steadily growing. For 
overviews of U.S. participation in CivPol, see (Hayden 2001; Perito 2004)
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connivance or at least dejected passivity of the local police (cf. Gall 2004), or ethnic 
tensions still plaguing police work in the Balkans. America’s long experience with 
policebuilding in post-intervention contexts, has provided ample opportunity  for “lessons 
learned”, and has spawned a considerable amount of scholarship and policy-analysis. 
However, despite this and despite the fact that enormous budgets and dedicated institutions 
have been set up  for this purpose in Washington D.C., there are important, structural 
tensions that dog contemporary American efforts of policebuilding & SSR in these post-
conflict scenarios. Attempting to answer why is one of the key drivers of the present study.
2. Theoretical framework and methodology
2.1. Theoretical framework, some considerations
As the previous pages have argued, a major shortcoming of the existing literature on this 
topic is the paucity of theoretical insight when analysing U.S. regimes of security 
assistance in general, and U.S. policebuilding in particular. This dissertation aims to 
contribute to developing such a theoretical analysis, drawing from two main sources. In the 
first instance, I borrow from the scholarly literature in criminology. Indeed, while 
theoretical and historical criminology  have produced numerous and important critiques of 
the practices of security governance by liberal states  (including the U.S.), its insights have 
remained an underused resource for critically  minded IR scholars interested in similar 
issues. Secondly, the work of Michel Foucault and a host  of social theorists working in his 
tradition – what could be broadly construed as governmentality studies - provide further 
inspiration to this project. Let us then briefly consider the nature and advantages of using 
such a theoretical framework for the project at hand, looking at each strand in turn.
To begin with, how useful is it  to draw on of theoretical and historical criminology? 
Criminology as a discipline has developed important, theoretically  sophisticated insights, 
all of which provide linkages to the key theme of this dissertation, namely  the role of the 
police as a liberal technology of government. One major contribution from this quadrant is 
the historical examination of practices of policing, and the evolution of both 'police power', 
and 'the police' as a social institution (Axtmann 1992; Brogden 1987; Dubber 2004; 
Emsley 2003; L'Heuillet 2002; Liang 1992; Newburn 2003; Raeff 1975; Rawlings 2002, 
2003; Robinson and Scaglion 1987; Zedner 2006). The study of this evolution perforce 
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includes its varied processes of internationalisation (cf. e.g. Deflem 2002; 2005a; 2005b; 
Fijnaut 1993; Koenig and Das 2001). Intimately  related to this, is criminology's crucial 
highlighting of the inherently  political nature of policing practices by  foregrounding the 
use of both crime and crime-fighting technologies as instruments of social control, and of 
government, broadly speaking (Cohen 1985; Dunnage 2004; Emsley 2004; Fernandez 
2008; Garland 1996, 2001; Garland and Sparks 2000; Lawrence 2004; Neocleous 2000; 
Newburn and Hayman 2001).  
Similarly, criminological theory has been instrumental to the development and refinement 
of the notion of security governance in recent years (Dupont, Grabosky  and Shearing 2003; 
Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing 2000; Wood and Dupont 2006). Additionally, 
critical criminologists have provided insight  into the complex evolution of policing 
technologies in response to changes in the security field, thereby illuminating important 
aspects of the re-articulation of both statehood and security provision regimes that is taking 
place through re-negotiations of the public/private divide, the domestic/foreign divide, and 
the war/crime divide. Critical criminologists have thus been instrumental in flagging up 
issues which are today at the centre of security studies in IR, such as the privatisation of 
security (Johnston 1992a, 1992b, 2006; Loader 1997, 1999; Shearing and Kempa 2000, 
South 1988; Stenning and Shearing 1979, 1989; Wakefield 2003) and the emergence of 
risk technologies (Hope and Sparks 2000; O'Malley 1992, 1998, 1999, 2008; Stenson and 
Sullivan 2001).
The broad Foucauldian framework employed in this project borrows from the work of 
Michel Foucault and a host of other social scientists who have taken up  his provocative 
legacy and moved it forward into new, productive grounds. In particular, I borrow from 
those authors who have elaborated upon the concept of governmentality over the past two 
decades (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996; Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Dean 1999; 
Gordon 1991; Larner and Walters 2004a, 2004b; Lemke 2001; Rose 1996, 1999; Rose and 
Miller 1992). Foucauldian contributions have greatly enriched several disciplines within 
the social sciences, and IR is no exception. Security  studies in particular has benefited 
greatly from the work of scholars engaged with Foucauldian concepts and insights. This is 
particularly true with relation to what has become known as “critical security studies” or 
CSS for short, where Foucauldian contributions have pushed core debates in fruitful 
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directions (Bigo 2005, 2006; Bigo and Tsoukala 2006; Bonditti 2004; CASE collective 
2006; Dillon 2001, 2004, 2005; Dillon and Reid 2001, 2007; Elbe 2005; Huysmans 2004, 
2006; Leander and van Munster 2007; Lobo-Guerrero 2007; Neal 2006, Salter 2006, 2007; 
see also chapter two for further discussion).  As will be apparent from the opening chapter 
below, critical security  studies is precisely where I locate my work and my research 
interests, and part of my  stated objectives in the present study is to contribute to the 
growing use of Foucauldian perspectives in pushing CSS forward, especially by examining 
liberal technologies of government through apparatuses of security such as the police.
Using such a framework as one of the main theoretical underpinnings of this study is 
particularly useful for a number of reasons. On a ground level, Michel Foucault's work is 
analytically helpful for a fairly straightforward reason: the author himself covered much of 
the same ground, and devoted extensive efforts to studying several of the key themes of 
this thesis. For instance, central to these Foucauldian analyses is the notion than in 
contemporary  societies, since at least the end of the nineteenth century, liberal forms of 
government have relied on security  apparatuses, among them the police (Foucault  2007). 
As such, Foucault convincingly posits a link between the evolution of the modern state, 
liberal rationalities of governing, and the deployment of security apparatuses. In his 
famous “Governmentality” lecture of February 1st 1978, now re-translated and revised, 
Foucault's offers a formulation of this central problematic:
(...) by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by  institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow  the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit very  complex, power that has the population as its target, political 
economy as its major form  of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument.  Second, by “governmentality” I  understand the tendency, the line of 
force, that  for a long time, and throughout  the West, has constantly led towards the pre-
eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so  on – of the type of 
power that  we can call  “government” and which  has led to the development  of a series of 
specific governmental apparatuses (appareils)  on the one hand, [and, on the other]  to the 
development of a series of knowledges (savoirs).  Finally, by “governmentality” I think 
we should understand the process, or rather, the result  of the process by  which the state of 
justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in  the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and was gradually “governmentalized.” (Foucault 2007: 108-9, emphasis added)
Moreover, Foucault incessantly experimented with novel, better ways of analysing power 
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relations and subjectivity in the modern world, thereby developing an extensive toolkit of 
concepts and analytical devices, which offer potentially productive ways of looking at 
social realities – one can think of his notions of governmentality itself (short for 
governmental rationality), biopower, or apparatus (dispositif). Additionally, unlike more 
systemic theorists such as Marx, Weber or even Bourdieu – to name a few – one needn't 
necessarily engage with the entire edifice of his theory  in order to analyse social relations 
through it. Quite the contrary, instead of a “take it all or leave it” attitude, Foucault  himself 
was quite adamant about the nature of his work as a toolkit, from which one could and 
should borrow quite shamelessly, experiment with, discard the less useful analytical 
devices, and push to take the most useful ones into more fertile ground for one's own 
research. In his own words, “I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others 
can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own 
area… (...) I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not readers.” (Foucault 1994 
(1974): 523-4).
Such an approach provides incisive new tools for analysing the issues central to this thesis. 
As shall be highlighted in the following chapters, IR has – generally speaking – paid little 
or no attention to issues of policing in global politics, and the same could largely be said of 
the sub-field of security studies. However, Foucault has extensively treated the subject of 
police as a pivotal technology of power in governing populations (e.g. Foucault 2007: 
407-455). For him, police – understood both as social relation of governance (what today 
we would call policing) and as an institution (what we refer to as the police) - is a 
biopolitical concept, that is to say, a technology of rule focused on governing populations. 
Given that ‘police’ as an innovative technology  of government is inextricably  linked in its 
historical evolution to such cornerstone concerns of international politics as policy-making 
and political economy12, it is ironic that not only  has IR paid little attention to the concept, 
it has so far mildly ignored Foucault’s path breaking work on this subject.
This is indeed unfortunate since both police (the institution) and policing (the social 
  
12  As we shall see in greater detail in chapter two, in its inception police was spelled policey, and before 
becoming institutionalised as ‘the police’ we know today (roughly between 1750-1850) is was in turn 
understood and applied as a set of administrative regulations for the good order of society (policy),  or as a 
basis for ensuring the proper production, circulation and security of both people and goods in the State’s 
territory – the attending notions of a Polizeiwissenschaft (police-science) being inextricably linked to the 
development of modern political economy (cf. Knemeyer 1990, Lidenfeld 1997: 11-45; Raeff 1975; 
Reiner 2007: 345-355).
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function) stand as a key  analytical juncture within technologies of liberal government. As a 
consummate example of a governmental technology of security, policing is riddled with 
significant tensions, which - I will argue throughout this thesis – are central tensions to 
characterise contemporary  American foreign policy. Police as a technology of rule is both 
coercive and productive, aimed as it is at ‘proper’ liberal subjects, but also at liberalism’s 
others (both internal and global). Liberalism’s others thus comprise the populations, groups 
and individuals deemed as the subjects of improvement or development, those in need of 
pastoral care, and those others who stand beyond the pale of liberal government and are as 
such the subject of what has been termed liberal 'despotism' (Valverde 1998). Thus, an 
analysis of police as a political technology of rule highlights the positive aspects of 
government through freedom – through the constitution of free subjects who regulate 
themselves – but also highlights that at the core of liberal government is a kernel of 
sovereign discipline, force, violence and exception (Dean 2002a, 2002b, 2007: 107-203; 
Duffield 2005; Helliwell & Hindess 2002; Hindess 2001; Valverde 1996).
There are other advantages to take a Foucauldian stance in analysing the deployment of 
policing technologies – namely police assistance programs – in American foreign policy, 
besides an emphasis on the ambiguous nature of liberal power once it encounters non-
liberal subjects. In particular, such a Foucauldian stance highlights the inherently political 
nature of the pedagogy of security. That is to say, the historical expansion of liberal 
governmentality  beyond discrete States, or what could simply be termed global 
governmentality  (Larner & Walters 2004) has often been predicated upon two central 
pillars. On the one hand, claims about the superiority  and desirability of (political) 
development along the lines of a liberal telos, while on the other hand this process has 
often taken place through recourse to the rhetoric of technical assistance, as a kind of an a-
political pedagogy of freedom (cf. Prozorov 2004). As the following chapter shall explore, 
this language of technical assistance and the concurrent mobilisation of expert knowledges, 
though purportedly neutral and a-political, it is anything but.
Additionally, the use of the ‘governmentality school’ offers an alternative way of thinking 
ethically about complicated issues of security, opening up thinking space, and doing so 
with an appeal to remain curious and open rather than to pronounce things as good or bad, 
true or false:
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I was telling you earlier about the three elements in my morals. They  are (1) the refusal to 
accept  as self-evident  the things that  are proposed to us; (2) the need to  analyze and to 
know, since we can accomplish nothing without  reflection and understanding—thus, the 
principle of curiosity; and (3) the principle of innovation: to seek out  in our reflection 
those things that  have never been  thought  or imagined. Thus: refusal, curiosity, innovation. 
(Foucault quoted in Bess 1988: 1)
Older generations of scholars have used Foucault – both as a guide and as a straw man – 
essentially  as a proponent of social control theory, preoccupied chiefly  with questions of 
discipline and violence, and thereby  offering a critique of the progressive undertones 
inherited from Enlightenment philosophy (cf. Cohen and Scull 1986; Kelly 1998; 
Habermas 2004: 238-293). By contrast, much of the newest work within the Foucauldian 
frame has focused on varying forms of identity, of subjectivity, and of ethics – in short, a 
Foucault worried not about punishment and the dark side of rationality, but with the 
regimes of formation and maintenance of subjectivity in contemporary societies (e.g. 
Heyes 2007; O'Leary 2006, Strozier 2002). The work undertaken on this thesis follows a 
somewhat different avenue, however, deploying Foucault’s work instead as a toolbox 
particularly suited for looking at the historical sociology of government and state 
formation, and practices of security central to liberal government. The aim is a kind of 
anthropology of security policy, which seeks to describe – through the analysis of 
American policebuilding in the wake of armed intervention - the way U.S. foreign policy 
as a field has oscillated between  different regimes of discourse and practice, understood as 
long chains or networks (dispositifs), obeying to competing logics. Ultimately, this thesis 
tries to understand different regimes of security practice, through an analysis of security 
apparatuses (dispositifs).
Michel Foucault seems to have developed the notion of apparatus in the mid-70s. Although 
he did not devote any major monograph to the subject, references to this analytical concept 
are peppered throughout his lectures and interviews since that date (e.g. Foucault 2007: 
46-49, 59-60, 107; 2001a: 421-422; 2001b: 1059-1062), and the concept  itself has 
generated a certain amount on interest by other scholars within the Foucauldian tradition 
(e.g. Deleuze 1992). At any rate, this Foucauldian concept seems still very useful indeed 
for the purposes of the present dissertation. A dispositif or apparatus differs from previous 
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analytical tools such as episteme “because it encompasses the non-discursive practices as 
well as the discursive” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 121), a feature useful for my project. In 
other words, instead of focusing solely  or even principally  on the politics of knowledge 
inherent in contemporary, liberal security  practice, using Foucault’s notion of dispositif 
allows one to move beyond discursive and linguistic regimes, and draw upon the mutual 
and constant (re)constitution of such discourses and attending practices by  security agents. 
In terms of American policebuilding, the result of this move is to constantly alternate 
between the regimes of knowledge that  make such an activity intelligible as a tool of 
foreign policy (for instance, defining transitional security  vacuums as a problem, or 
identifying ungoverned spaces as dangerous), and the regimes of practice that translate 
governmental police programs into effects on the ground.
Secondly, an apparatus is a “resolutely heterogeneous” ensemble, which may contain a 
number of disparate elements. Foucault exemplifies, saying that an apparatus may contain 
a bewildering array  of “institutions, architectural solutions; regulatory decisions; laws; 
administrative measures; scientific pronouncements; philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions (...). The dispositif itself is the network which one can establish 
connecting these elements.” (Foucault 2001c: 299). 
Third, this analytical construct is not over-determined, that is to say, it may apply  to a 
number of problematics of government, and in so doing it  can highlight  not only lines of 
continuity  and evolution, but also points of rupture or at least tension. Foucault himself 
exemplifies this when he deploys the concept of dispositif or apparatus of security in 
relation to the history of sexuality, as well as to security practices such as town planning 
(Foucault 2007: 12-23). The notion of an apparatus does not presuppose or push a 
particularly neat direction in the relations of the disparate elements – they may  in fact be in 
contradiction as well as in harmony, they may be pulling in different directions, creating 
tensions of government – and this is not a drawback but precisely a productive site for 
one's analysis of government. Finally and fourthly, Foucault postulated that despite this 
relative heterogeneity and indeterminacy, an apparatus emerges as a “formation which, on 
a given historical moment, has had as its central function to respond to an emergency. The 
apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function; (...) it  has a strategic imperative which 
plays the role of something like its matrix.” (Foucault 2001c: 299)
  
39
Obviously, in studying these apparatuses, one cannot focus on all aspects, at all levels, 
especially given the obvious constraints inherent in a doctoral project. The aim of this 
dissertation is therefore to introduce this way of thinking, and concentrate on its points of 
origin. In other words, this dissertation interrogates how policy  is formulated and adapted 
in U.S. government so as to put in place apparatuses of security  that strategically tackle 
government problems. It further questions how the understanding of such problems and 
corresponding governative solutions change over time, leading to evolving regimes of 
practice. Finally, it suggests ways in which current American regimes and apparatuses of 
policebuilding are suffused with the logic of a globalising liberal ethos. However, this 
dissertation will trace the flow of power in this dispositif from the institutional points of 
origin down to the level of the localised micro-practices of security experts, the actual 
techniques used to govern through security at a multiplicity  of sites, and their effects on 
populations at the point of impact, especially in chapters four and five.
2.2. Methodological remarks
Given that my stated goal is to analyse an apparatus of security  within the realm of U.S. 
foreign policy – that is, a heterogeneous ensemble of disparate elements such as 
discourses, regulations, laws, policy programs, institutions and experts – it  seems only 
fitting that  I would opt for methodological pluralism as a starting point. That said, 
however, this project stays firmly anchored on qualitative moorings.
I had initially projected it as an archive-driven effort, focused on the materials produced by 
two key institutions in contemporary  U.S. policebuilding efforts, but  several factors 
conspired against this. The first obstacle was that the subject matter – essentially, police 
aspects of security assistance – is a relatively delicate one, especially when it concerns 
highly  politicised scenarios of ongoing intervention, as in the case of Afghanistan (the case 
I chose to illustrate my points in chapter five). Therefore, access to archival materials 
turned out to be extremely  difficult. Nonetheless, I could make good use of some online 
sources. For the earliest period of U.S. policebuilding analysed in the first half of chapter 
three (roughly 1880-1930), the online version of some of the earliest volumes in the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series, made available by the University of 
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Wisconsin-Madison13 turned out an invaluable resource, including many primary sources 
on the establishment of constabulary forces by  the U.S.. Another online archival source of 
great assistance have been the various State Department collections/materials – ranging 
from historical documents about the creation and evolution of specific offices (through the 
Office of the Historian), to the home pages and fact sheets pertaining to specific programs 
and  bureaux within the Department of State.14
That meant that while I could find useful open-source material online, extensive archival 
research in situ soon stumbled upon governmental and bureaucratic stonewalling. ICITAP, 
a branch of the U.S. Department of Justice I had elected as a key 'institutional node' for my 
research, never got around the long and incomprehensibly difficult process of vetting me 
for access – or so I was periodically told. Moreover, apart from mission statements and 
press releases available online, the State Department's INL (another key institutional node) 
could also not grant me access to their internal documents.
To add to this, the contemporary regime of U.S. policebuilding is in a constant state of 
flux. Between 2006 and 2008, the Bush administration created new institutions, passed 
new legislation, and increased its security assistance budgets massively. Concurrently, 
standard procedures changed, and different police curricula were developed. This constant 
flux, and the quantity and variety of agents and structures involved in the process of 
shaping and delivering U.S. police assistance, made me rethink my methodological 
approach. Specifically, they made me realise that the focus of the project should not so 
much be the detailed working of particular institutions, or the institutional architecture of 
specific policebuilding programs per se, but rather the relationship between them15. 
  
13 The materials form an important part of the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections http://
uwdc.library.wisc.edu/index.shtml ), and they’re fully-searchable and partly downloadable. They can be 
accessed via the website: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/ 
14 The Office the Historian (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ ) is part of the State Department's Bureau of 
Public Affairs. It houses several important online archival resources (including the most recent materials 
of the FRUS series),  and the History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency (http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059.htm# ) which was particularly pertinent to the issues discussed in 
chapter 4.
15 A full methodological discussion of the relational dimensions in Foucault's notion of the apparatus, and 
especially its similarities to other relational, processual approaches to the study of political processes – 
one can think of Elias's figurational sociology, or Bourdieu's field theory – is clearly beyond the scope of 
this introductory chapter, but for a good primer on relational methodology and its potential contributions 
to the study of IR, see Jackson and Nexon (1999)
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In order to achieve this, I thus decided to rely  on Michel Foucault's useful notion of the 
apparatus of power, or dispositif, an analytical construct detailed in the previous section. In 
short, my  focus had to shift to understanding the interplay  of institutions, discourses and 
agents in the apparatus of U.S. police assistance, and to chart the modifications in their 
functioning, as well as answering the questions of what urgent need did the U.S. police 
assistance apparatus respond to at various points in time. Therefore, in order to grasp this 
multivariate nature of sources adequately, my methodology grew to encompass a 
combination of techniques. Thus, while I did conduct archival research online for most of 
the primary sources (especially relating to the historical cases between 1898-1934, and for 
background legislative and budgetary information on more contemporary  programs), I also 
supplemented this with fieldwork – consisting primarily of interviews. I conducted three 
stints of fieldwork: a longer stint in Washington, D.C. during the fall semester of 2006, and 
two shorter trips in the spring of 2007 and 2008 to Afghanistan. In total, I conducted 81 
interviews in a sample that comprised 74 individuals.
The interviews were typically one on one, although in a few occasions (such as at the 
Kabul Police Academy in the spring of 2007) I had the opportunity  to conduct group 
interviews16. Their duration also varied, but on average, each interview lasted from 45 
minutes to an hour. I did not develop a fixed questionnaire, because my emphasis was not 
on generating comparable data on the same topics; the interviews therefore were typically 
semi-structured, with very open-ended questions varying according to the cluster-group of 
subjects (high- or mid-level policy-makers in Washington, private contractors or other 
policy-implementers on the ground in Kabul, police recruits, academics, etc.). My purpose 
was to conduct at least two interviews per cluster and at least two interviews per institution 
or type of expert involved in current U.S. policebuilding programs – an objective was, 
largely, accomplished. However, almost without exception, all interviewees preferred not 
to be quoted, nor recorded directly during the interview. Therefore, in strict accordance to 
  
16 Unlike the remaining interviews, the informants who spoke to me on this occasion are not listed in 
Appendix 1, as I was given access to one of their tactical training sessions, and to them for short 
interviews (5-15 mns. each), on the express condition of total anonymity.  This was reinforced by the 
respondents themselves refusing point blank to provide any personal information whatsoever. However, I 
can add that the group comprised 10 individuals (9 male,  and 1 female), not counting the interpreter 
provided to me, or the European instructors. Their ranks ranged between medium and high (including a 
Col.), but they were all officers. I was also told by the instructors that they mirrored a representative 
cross-section of the ethnic composition of the trainees at the Police Academy, including at least one 
informant of each major ethnic group (Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras) – although I could not verify this 
independently.
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research ethics parameters, I have respected their wishes, and so in the few occasions 
where I refer directly  to an interview as a source for information that cannot be supported 
by literature, I do so by providing a reference number that can be crosschecked with the 
identity  of the informant in a separate list. However, I have refrained as much as possible 
from providing either detailed information about the subjects or quoting them verbatim in 
the text.
3. Chapter outline
The first chapter introduces the changes which have shaped the field of security studies 
and security policy-making since the end of the Cold War. It reviews the extant literature 
and traces how the field of security  studies moved into more critical directions by 
widening its concepts of threat  and of protection, and focusing historically on the regimes 
of security provision, and specially how these have been affected by  globalisation. Some of 
these effects transforming the field of security  are: the erosion of the inside/outside divide 
both in the theory and practice of international relations and security provision in 
particular; the rise of new forms of agency  – including the growing importance of private 
agency in security provision and governance – and the attending theoretical turn to the 
study of security practices as exemplified by  the Paris School of critical security  studies. 
These developments find their corollary in the conceptualisation by Western liberal states, 
the U.S. most prominently, of the global security  field through the lens of criminalisation. 
The chapter then notes that one of the main strategies to tackle this 'new' security field was 
the emergence of security governance as both crucial concept and complex ensemble of 
practices. 
At the theoretical level, the chapter discusses more orthodox contributions to the 
conceptualisation of security  governance (chiefly  the work of Elke Krahmann) as the 
governance of security  networks. The chapter then goes on to discuss as well more critical 
approaches from criminologists who, taking cue from the work of Foucault, conceptualise 
security governance as government through security apparatuses, producing what Shearing 
and Johnston call “nodal security” (Shearing and Johnston 2003).
The second chapter has a twofold task: on the one hand to lay out an account of what is 
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meant, throughout this dissertation, by liberal government, and the important questions this 
form of governance raises; on the other hand, to detail the crucial role of policing in the 
liberal arts of government, including the progressive internationalisation of both. The 
chapter starts by  introducing some of the key themes of Foucault's treatment of liberal 
government, as a distinctly  modern form of rule which evolved from the 16th century 
onwards in Europe. It then focuses on how liberal government, despite its universalist self-
representation as a form of rule premised on equal individuals, in fact depends on 
identifying/creating population categories which are governed through different  logics. The 
following section then proceeds to analyse the two central logics that underlie the liberal 
government of non-liberal subjects: first, pedagogy/development, which seeks to 
(re)produce adequately  responsible, free, self-regulating subjects, and on the other hand 
discipline. From there, the chapter moves to analyse policing as a key juncture between 
these logics, and as a key technology of security  in liberal forms of government, since 
liberal police has, since its inception, retained this Janus-faced character of fostering 
welfare and constraining freedoms. Finally, the chapter ends with an overview of the 
internationalisation of these processes – specifically how, in the realm of US foreign 
policy, these themes play out as both discourses and practices of security assistance and 
police reform.
Part two of the dissertation seeks to illustrate and clarify some of the key theoretical moves 
of chapters one and two through an application on U.S. foreign policy  – more specifically, 
to U.S. efforts in the field of policebuilding, i.e. the establishment and/or reform of police 
forces in post-intervention scenarios. In order to do so, the dissertation presents a historical 
overview of different regimes of U.S. policebuilding over time, seeking to illuminate lines 
of continuity and major shifts as they evolve into one another. Moreover, in chapters four 
and five my analysis will move from the historical and discursive regimes that underpin 
American policebuilding, towards a focus on situated practices. That is to say, I will focus 
on an analysis of how such shifts in the broader regimes that inform American 
policebuilding translate into a multiplicity  of specific knowledges and micro-practices that 
seek to act upon populations and individuals, constituted as targets of liberal governance 
through security.
Chapter three broadly covers three such historical 'regimes' of police assistance: U.S. 
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policebuilding in the context of imperial occupations (1898 – 1934), U.S. policebuilding in 
post-World War II occupied countries (1945-1952); and finally U.S. police assistance 
efforts in the context of the Cold War, where policebuilding (under the heading “foreign 
internal security assistance”) was heavily intertwined with the ideological fight against 
Communism (1950s -1990s). Overall, the chapter seeks to foreground two key  trends: on 
the one hand, although U.S. policebuilding efforts up until the 1990s were always framed 
in a discourse of state-building (that is, assisting foreign nations in improving their 
institutional state capacity in the field of internal security and public order), they shifted 
from more or less temporary efforts of occupation in the wake of armed intervention to 
more structural, long-term commitments translated into long-standing bilateral programs. 
On the other hand, and in tandem with the previous trend, there was a gradual shift from 
delivering assistance through paramilitary  means – typically configured in either executive 
policing by an American constabulary, or police training and supervision of local 
constabulary forces – to civilian programs of technical assistance focused on developing 
local, self-sustaining capabilities. The chapter illustrates these trends by analysing at length 
the birth and evolution of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program, the first civilian institution within the U.S government specifically  dedicated to 
assist police forces abroad.
Chapter four turns to the years Bill Clinton's presidency, and argues that  his Administration 
was crucial in gradually  but steadily adapting the institutional machinery of the U.S. 
government – particularly  the foreign policy and national security  sectors – to the 
momentous structural changes in the post-Cold War security agenda described in chapter 
one. The chapter focuses on three key components of Clinton's legacy in the field of U.S. 
police assistance. In the first place, we shall see how Clinton's policy  team began to 
conceptualise America's national security agenda in terms of “crimefighting” more than 
“warfighting” (Andreas and Price 2003). Secondly, the chapter examines how the Clinton 
administration learned the lessons of the decade's interventionism (Somalia, Haiti, and the 
Balkans) and sought to enhance the policebuilding component of U.S. interventions in the 
wake of complex emergencies. Finally, how he translated the new security  thinking and the 
lessons of intervention into institutional and strategic commitments to further 
internationalising U.S. policing – the retooling of the State Department's Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the issuing of Presidential 
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Directive 71 being the most prominent among a plethora of measures analysed in the 
chapter. The chapter then proceeds to analyse the transition between the Clinton and 
George W. Bush administrations, and what this pivotal moment brought to the landscape of 
U.S. police assistance. This shows that the Bush administration inherited a rich policy and 
institutional portfolio, but deliberately sought to ignore or minimise the Clinton legacy and 
insisted on “rediscovering the wheel”. Moreover, the chapter shows Bush's foreign policy 
increasingly  framing U.S. policebuilding policy in terms of responding to fragile statehood 
and ungoverned spaces in the context of the Global War on Terror. Additionally, it 
highlights how the Bush administration has sought to mobilise expert knowledge claims 
about security governance techniques and their effectiveness, in order to justify 
policebuilding in post-intervention settings.
Chapter five picks up from there, and seeks to illustrate how U.S. policebuilding efforts 
have become inextricably  bound with American armed intervention in, and occupation of, 
both Iraq and Afghanistan. Focusing on Afghanistan in particular, the chapter seeks to 
illustrate the tensions that result from a revival of the constabulary ethic in U.S. 
policebuilding efforts. The result, this chapter argues, is a field of police assistance in 
which well-established civilian programs of technical assistance and capacity-building 
(ICITAP, INL) struggle to accommodate the renewed eagerness of the Pentagon in 
delivering police assistance. The resulting militarisation of U.S. policebuilding – with its 
disciplinary  logic and short-term focus on illiberal subjects and technologies of rule – is 
contrasted with the still ongoing pedagogical/ developmentalist  efforts of civilian agencies. 
The latter are also examined, by foregrounding a set of techniques (co-location, 
professionalisation, screening, mentoring) that seek to work upon and transform the 
subjectivities and practice of Afghani police personnel, thereby deploying a very  effective 
form of liberal government through security.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SHIFTING WOR(L)DS OF SECURITY
1. Rethinking the security field
Recent years have seen ever-increasing debate on the shifting nature of security. 
Approaches within both security studies and policy-making circles which were 
traditionally  focused on securing the survival of the state, and on protecting its borders and 
territorial integrity  in (almost exclusively) military terms, have increasingly come under 
attack since the end of the Cold War. The decline – or at least loss of hegemonic position - 
of this orthodox view, often dubbed “strategic studies” or “national security studies”, has 
been evident and widely  acknowledged in the debates of at least the last decade, leading to 
what Steve Smith has dubbed “the increasing insecurity of security studies” (Smith 2000).
This growing dissatisfaction with traditional approaches to security and the resulting 
changes in the security agenda, however, has not been the sole product of much soul-
searching and greater theoretical innovation in the academic sub-field of security studies 
throughout the 1990’s. As Michael Sheehan puts it, “[i]nternational organizations such as 
the United Nations and NATO now also operate with a definition of security that is 
multisectoral and embraces the broader agenda, and not just the military 
dimension” (Sheehan 2005: 3). The very introduction by the United Nations of the concept 
of “human security” in its 1993 and 1994 UNDP reports shows precisely  this trend 
(UNDP 1993, 1994). Similarly, a review of U.S. national security  policy debates and 
documents will reveal that American security practices themselves have been undergoing 
severe transformations, as is evidenced by the latest National Security Strategy papers 
issued by the US executive (White House 2002, 2006).
One way of scrutinising the shifts of the 80’s and 90’s that brought about this new security 
agenda, both in theoretical and empirical terms, is to identify and survey several strands of 
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literature or “debates” between alternative “schools” of thought. In a sense, however, all 
these debates have circled around the notion of “widening” the security agenda, be it in 
terms of widening what is meant by security, what counts as a threat, or what  institutions 
and agents are implicated in the practice of security.
1.1. Deepening the meaning of security
Despite W. B. Gallie’s early suggestion about the nature of some central concepts in the 
social sciences (Gallie 1956), the realisation that security  is “an essentially  contested 
concept” has taken a few decades to sink in (Buzan 1991: 7)17, so that  only from the late 
1980s onwards did scholars begin to seriously question themselves: “what does security 
mean?” or “whose security are we talking about/ensuring?”. It may well be, as is suggested 
profusely in the literature, that it was the end of the stable certitudes of the Cold War 
period which brought about not only these questions but also answers to them that escaped 
the implicit and taken for granted statist replies (Baldwin 1995; Bilgin 1998: 90; Mutimer 
1997: 187; Masco 1999: 203; Terriff 1999: 3-4). In any case, and despite grudging 
complaints from more orthodox authors, it was this kind of interrogations about the 
changing nature of security  which effectively  brought about a broadening of the security 
agenda by contesting the place of the State as the sole referent of security. The meaning of 
security, it was suggested, was not simply  a function of classical state concerns: primarily 
in terms of “ontological security” – that is, ensuring the continued existence of a state – 
and secondarily  about acquiring and managing the (military) means to achieve this – that 
is, strategic studies.
A reading of security, which takes seriously its inherently  political nature, thus began to 
take shape, and began suggesting that the proper referent of security  should be beyond the 
state (but not necessarily without it). On the one hand, authors affiliated with this broad 
church of critical security studies (CSS) have sought to make individuals the central 
referent of security discourses and practices, in a move that clearly  undermines classical 
understandings of the link between security and sovereignty. On the other hand, more 
attention has also been paid to the closely intertwined questions of identity  and community, 
  
17 Although Arnold Wolfers, as early as 1952, had suggested the 'ambiguous' nature of national security in a 
seminal article (Wolfers 1952). However, Wolfers seemed more concerned with the ambiguity derived 
from the word 'national' than the concept of 'security' itself, questioning the links between national 
security and national interest, and the relevance of both for a clear conduct of American foreign policy.
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a trend that equally  challenges statist assumptions and questions, in particular, narrow 
strategic considerations about material capabilities in security provision by highlighting 
important ideational factors of belonging and behaviour (cf. Krause and Williams 1997: 
47-49). Both of these moves can be described as part of a broader perspective that sees 
security, and the role of the state therein, in the context of historical and reflexive practices 
that are in a state of flux.
1.2. Widening the concept of threat
While some CSS authors were busy widening conceptions of what security meant, and of 
what or who should be secured, a closely  related strand of literature has borne witness to 
those wishing to reconsider and expand what counts as a security  threat, and therefore what 
is within the legitimate purvey of security studies and practices. This other strand of the 
“widening debates” was pioneered by the work of Barry Buzan (Buzan 1983). In People, 
States, and Fear, Buzan voiced an added criticism of the realist orthodoxy in security 
studies, arguing that security  should not solely  be conceived of as “national security”, 
limited to military treatment of offence and defence, but should instead include a broader 
array  of dangers and threats, which should be considered and answered. Buzan then 
proceeded to slot  these into his “five sectors” of security: military, political, economic, 
societal and environmental, an approach which was further developed and refined by the 
contributions of the (then) emergent Copenhagen School, most notably in the influential 
Security: a new framework for analysis (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1997).
This growing awareness of both “new threats” and new referent objects – or at least shifts 
in the way these are conceived of and problematised – mirrors important historical 
changes. Indeed, as the end of the Cold War brought about not only the demise of 
bipolarity  and the end of the arms races, but also the steady decline (both in frequency and 
intensity) of inter-state conflict, a host  of other “security concerns” has come to the fore in 
policy-making circles as well as academic treatments of security. This second “widening” 
move has important implications not only for understanding that socially  constructed 
notions of dangers are subject to conspicuous change over time, but also – and more to the 
point – that current threat  assessments and threat responses are inscribed in particular 
regimes of knowledge and practice. Moreover, this widening move shows that these liberal 
regimes of knowledge and practice, by re-articulating the role of the state in security 
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provision and governance, are currently  also moving away  from the defence of territories 
and boundaries, and towards the management of populations. This gradual move, which is 
taking place under the umbrella of “globalisation” has generated important changes in the 
practices of security and has also re-arranged in significant ways the institutional 
complexes through which security  is provided and managed, as shall be analysed in the 
following section.
1.3. The rise of human security
In tandem with the shifts in security discourse and in security policy  described above, the 
1990's saw the emergence of the concept of 'human security', which would soon become 
highly  influential in policy circles worldwide, and highly debated by academics. From its 
origins in UN circles (UNDP 1994; MacFarlane and Khong 2006), it has expanded in both 
meaning and application, and today has achieved that rare status of being an almost 
commonsensical, organising principle of international relations. To gauge just how far the 
concept has permeated contemporary security policy, and contemporary  political discourse 
around the planet, one has only to look at the profusion of publications that either deal 
specifically with it, or use it implicitly as a key concept. A rather straightforward search for 
“human security” turns up close to a million results in Google, of which over 18.000 are in 
Google Scholar, thus denoting the impact of the concept in academic publications. 
Additionally, human security has been translated into institutional commitments, through 
the creation and maintenance of – amongst others – the Human Security  Network or the 
International Commission on Human Security. Finally, and perhaps most impressively, 
some countries have placed the idea of human security  at the core of their foreign policies 
(cf. e.g. Debiel and Werthes 2006) – Canada, Norway and Japan being the most prominent 
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cases which spring to mind18.
But what does human security mean? Clearly, the concept as it  used today stands at the 
confluence of several trends analysed in the previous sections of this chapter. Primarily, 
human security denotes a shift in focus, away from states as the sole or primary referents 
of security, and towards individuals, communities, and societies instead. Accordingly, it 
has alternatively been described since as “security with a human face” (e.g. Neufeld 2004, 
UNDP 2004), or “people-centred security” (e.g. Makinda 1997, 1998). On the other hand, 
the rise of the human security discourse reflects a growing preoccupation by both academic 
and policy  circles alike with a broader gamut of threats to security, including poverty, 
environmental degradation, forced displacement of populations, disease, etc. This core 
characteristic of human security illustrates not only  the shifts in the social construction of 
threats referred to above, but also the merging of the discourse ( and practice) of security 
with the broad agenda of 'development' – which is why, interestingly, human security  is 
sometimes conceptualised as both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”.19
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is useful to think of the emergence and deployment 
of the human security in terms of biopower, that is to say, to think of human security as a 
biopolitical category (Bell 2005, 2006; Dillon 2004; Duffield 2005, 2006, 2007; Duffield 
and Waddell 2004; Grayson 2008; Larrinaga and Doucet 2007). In this formulation, human 
  
18 Canada's government introduced the 'human security agenda' as the backbone of its foreign police in the 
mid-1990's (cf. McRae and Hubert 2001: 267-274), largely under the direction of Lloyd Axworthy, 
foreign minister from 1996-2000 (cf. Axworthy 1997; Donaghy 2003).  There is by now an immense body 
of literature discussing the relationship between human security and Canadian foreign policy, often from 
a critical perspective (e.g. Owens and Arneil 1999; Bain 1999; Hay 1999; MacLean 2000; Bosold and 
Werthes 2006). In most genealogies of human security, Norway is pointed out as an early partner of 
Canada in adopting a “human security” focus to its foreign policy,  notably through the concerted efforts 
of Lloyd Axworthy and his Norwegian counterpart, Knut Vollebaek. Under the auspices of both, a host of 
countries met in Lysoen, in Norway, to sign the Lysoen Declaration for a Human Security Partnership, 
which would become the basis for the Human Security Network (HSN) (Hataley and Nossal 2004: 8). In 
Japan, the explicit adoption of human security appears to have happened later, roughly after the Asian 
crisis of 1997/98 (Shinoda 2004: 16). Additionally, Japan seems to have emphasized the economic/
developmental side of human security, according to the  Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Japan's 
Official Development Assistance Charter was revised in August 2003 specifies “human security” as one 
of the basic policies on ODA.” (MOFA 2007). For overviews of Japan's foreign policy dealing with 
human security see  (Akiyama 2004; Edstrom 2003; Ho 2008; Soeya 2005).
19 Several authors include both these elements as key the the definition of human security (Annan 2005: 
9-44; Haq, quoted in Gasper 2005: 224, MacFarlane and Khong 2006: passim; Faber 2008:151). Caroline 
Thomas summarizes this neatly when she states that both are “core strands” of human security,  and that 
“on its own,  each aspect represents a necessary but insufficient ingredient for human security” (Thomas 
2007:110, cf.  111-114).  However, Pauline Kerr suggests that either element (freedom from fear, or 
freedom from want) can be treated from a human security point of view, but that freedom from fear is the 
core focus of a narrow human security agenda, while the additional inclusion of freedom from want 
represents a commitment to a “broad school” of human security. (Kerr  2007: 94-95)
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security both codifies and illustrates a relation of governance between an array of 
governmental authorities (states, NGO's, IGO's, etc.) and populations. These populations 
are thus inscribed in networks of power as the subjects of development and security, 
simultaneously. As Duffield puts it, “while development and security have always been 
interconnected, human security  reflects the contemporary reworking of this relationship. In 
particular, it  unites these terms on an international terrain of non-insured groups, 
communities and peoples.” (Duffield 2007a: 114). In other words, the discourse of human 
security reveals a shift in Western liberal governmental rationalities (and, to an extent, 
practices) towards governing populations both through and for security.
As a result, this shift operated through the introduction of human security effectively  de-
couples security  from its traditional regimes of provision, regulated through the notion of 
sovereignty. In other words, the rise of the human security agenda – and the attending 
discourse of the 'responsibility to protect' (cf. inter alia Bellamy 2009) – did much to 
globalise security  provision. In such a framework three important moves take place. In the 
first instance, the erosion of the sovereign divide between inside/outside opens up distant 
populations for security interventions. Secondly, this re-articulation of the state's role in 
security provision to populations beyond its borders is accompanied by a growth of 
transnational networks of security  experts and practitioners, a move best understood by 
focusing on the shifting practices and agency of contemporary security. Finally, these 
processes result in the rise of agenda for security  governance. The following sections will 
thus explore these interrelated themes in greater detail.
2. Globalisation and shifting practices of security
The strands of literature briefly discussed above have effectively moved the field of 
security studies into more fertile ground. However, as Krause and Williams perceptively 
pointed as far back as 1997, 
[a] result  of this disciplinary turmoil is that  reconceptualizing security has often come 
to resemble a grab bag of different issue areas (…). Simply articulating a broad range 
of newly emerging or newly recognized threats to human survival or well-being will 
not in itself move security studies away from its traditional concerns. (Krause and 
Williams 1997: 35)
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Apparently missing was a coherent framework for understanding historical shifts in the 
definition of threats and the provision of security (Mabee 2003), as well as an awareness 
of the changes taking place at the very mundane but absolutely germane level of practices, 
and the associated institutions of social life involved in the field of security. In other 
words, rather than just focusing on concepts and how one should study them, the key  point 
in moving the security studies agenda forward is to focus on the relationship between 
shifting concepts and shifting practices – what Foucault  would call regimes of power/
knowledge (Foucault 1977: 27-8; 1994: 11-15, 83-87). It is important, therefore, to think 
through the impact of globalisation upon the power/knowledge regimes that underpin 
contemporary  security. Indeed, regardless of how one maps the emergent issues and 
debates that have been transforming the face of security  studies as a disciplinary field, the 
defining feature that seems common to all strands of literature is a growing awareness, a 
growing recognition, that what is commonly referred to as “globalisation” has been 
changing the way security  is instantiated (and thought about). Globalisation has steadily 
unhinged security, in word and in deed, from the State - classically understood in Weberian 
terms as holding the monopoly of legitimate violence within its borders, and facing an 
anarchical international scene dominated by inter-state security  dilemma of markedly 
Hobbesian features20. 
As can be gleaned from the brief survey  of the security  literature presented above, there 
are two main ways in which one can perhaps best make sense of this process: (i) by  seeing 
it as the erosion of the inside/outside debate that has been so constitutive of both 
International Relations and Security Studies as disciplines (Walker 1993), and (ii) by 
following Huysmans in his perceptive suggestion that “the widening of the security agenda 
to non-military threats and the growing interest in including non-state referents opened up 
the issue of political agency” (Huysmans 2006b: 5, emphasis added). 
2.1. The erosion of the inside/outside divide
Regarding this apparent  erosion of the classical dichotomy “foreign/domestic” or “internal/
  
20 This streamlined characterisation is a staple in traditional analyses of security – cf.  e.g. Edward 
Kolodziej's formulaic representation of this view (Kolodziej 2005: 53-71). For a neat overview of this 
“orthodox” view of security provision, complete with a critique of its origins in liberal theories of the 
political subject and political agency, cf. (Williams 2007: 19-20)
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international”, it is important to highlight  two crucial points. On the one hand, the 
emergence of “new threats” is paralleled by  the emergence of new forms of agency in 
providing security beyond the state. It is within this context that this project seeks to 
analyse the shifting roles of police institutions, as they increasingly transnationalise and 
globalise their efforts and powers.
On the other hand, the context of a globalised world has brought about the specific linking 
of security  to liberal problematics of governing populations. On this specific point, it is 
perhaps useful to elaborate further. Globalisation has been conceived of in a bewildering 
variety of ways, but for the purposes of this chapter it is especially useful to see it as a 
form of spatio-temporal compression, which in turn has gradually led to a 'closure” of 
social space world-wide21. In other words, processes such as the rise of complex 
interdependence (cf. Keohane & Nye 1977), new regionalism (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 
1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Soderbaum & Shaw 2003; Farrell, Hettne & Langenhove 2005) 
and the growing empowerment of non-state actors have helped bring about a picture of 
world politics as a single, integrated, global social space in need of management – to 
borrow the felicitous expression coined by Manfred Steger, the rise of a “global 
imaginary” (Steger 2008). This global imaginary operates largely  in analogy  with the 
provision of rule of law and welfare for populations at the domestic level, but writ large in 
a networked world of much greater complexity, unevenness and novel actors – themes 
which are prevalent in the now vast literature on global governance (e.g. Hewson & 
Sinclair 1999; Wilkinson & Hughes 2002; Sinclair 2004, Barnett & Duval 2005; Diehl 
2005). Furthermore, this analogy has been complemented, since the early 1990's, by a 
growing body of work on “global civil society” (cf. Keane 2003, esp. 1-39; Kaldor 2003; 
  
21 Robertson defines the process of globalisation precisely in these terms: “Globalization as a concept 
refers both to  the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a 
whole.” (Robertson 1992: 8) He attributes the roots of this conceptualisation to Marshall McLuhan in 
his 1960 book, Explorations in  Communication (Carpenter and McLuhan 1960), where the author had 
spoken of the related idea of the 'global village'. David Harvey is also widely credited with having 
coined the term, speaking alternatively of 'space-time convergence' and 'space-time compression' in his 
seminal The Condition  of Postmodernity (Harvey 1989: 260-323, 350-52). More recently, this 
conceptualisation crops up again in a highly  influential report by the Commission on  Global 
Governance (Haas & Haas 1995: 297-8). For an excellent, in-depth genealogy of the concept, cf. 
Barney Warf's recent  book  on the matter (Warf 2008). Finally, to  see this operationalised in the context 
of shifting understandings of security, see the recent article by  Beeson and Bellamy (2003: 344)
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Baker & Chandler 2006; Germain & Kenny 2006).
These changes have been accompanied by several important shifts in both the 
conceptualisation and practice of security worldwide. Security, in this 'globalised' or 
'transnationalised' sense, is thus seen less and less as the task of dealing through military 
means with international anarchy and its consequences – namely  the classical security 
dilemma – in a Hobbesian way, and more and more as the task of dealing in novel ways 
with a host of increasingly transnational/stateless threats to global populations and their 
well-being. The provision and governance of security, within this framework, has been 
increasingly  conceived of in terms of criminalisation of threats, and along the logic of risk, 
a process which seems to be a 'spill-over' effect from the domestic level to the global of the 
logics which have already gained primacy  (for decades and in some cases for centuries) at 
the internal level of states, at least those of the western liberal matrix. In a topical essay, 
Peter Andreas and Richard Price have posited that within such a context of a growing shift 
in the conceptions and practices of security, most western liberal states are “(…) 
increasingly  defining their security  interests more in terms of crimefighting than in terms 
of warfighting, and more in terms of deterring law evasions than in terms of deterring 
military invasions.” (Andreas and Price 2001: 31)
This trend can be best  be understood as resulting in the increasing extension of “police 
power” – understood not as what police officers do, but rather more broadly as the power 
of states to effect government over the health and wealth of populations (cf. Dubber and 
Valverde 2006). Thus, given the parameters of this emerging paradigm of security, an 
examination of contemporary  practices of security  provision and governance that inform 
U.S. foreign policy is called for, and an analysis of policing rationalities and practices 
therein is absolutely central. However, accounts as those of Andreas and Price (cf. also 
Hippler 2006) focus essentially  on the “spill over” of policing logics and technologies that 
characterises the contemporary practices of the military apparatuses of western states, the 
U.S. most prominently. Conversely, little or no attention is paid to how the police itself are 
being employed in this changing paradigm, a gap that this dissertation aims to fill.
2.2. New forms of agency, new practices
One of the best ways of understanding this change is precisely  to trace the shifts in the 
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nature and uses of policing. While this move has traditionally  been conspicuously absent in 
mainstream IR literature on the subject of security, the efforts of Didier Bigo and the Paris 
school that  sprung around him, or recent work by authors on both sides of the Atlantic, 
show that gradually the discipline is becoming more aware of the potential in reading 
issues of international security through the lens of policing and surveillance– be it about 
border, population and migration controls (Bigo and Guild 2005; Huysmans 1995, 2006; 
Salter 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007), networks of security co-operation (Bigo 1996, 2000a; 
Nadelmann 1993) or policebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006). Indeed, the nature 
and uses of the police as an institution, and the practices of policing undertaken by a 
multiplicity of security agents, have been undergoing significant changes in the direction 
of greater 'globalisation'. In fact, any  survey of contemporary security practices will show 
that the police are no longer strictly  bound by  the classical logic of the “inside/outside” 
dichotomy, and are therefore doing a lot more these days than simply enforcing criminal 
law at the purely domestic level – whether this is really  an emergent reality or simply a 
growing recognition of something as old as the word police itself is something we will 
explore to some depth in chapter two. Grasping this move of internationalisation, 
transnationalisation, or multilateralisation of policing (Aas 2007; Andreas and Nadelmann 
2006; Bowling 2009; Shetptycki 1998) and its implications bring up a number of 
challenges. It also brings us squarely and neatly  to our second issue, that  of agency within 
security practices and attending institutions within a context in which the fields of internal 
and external “become one” (Bigo 2000b) or rather are re-articulated as a “Möbius’ 
ribbon” (Bigo 2001).
Perhaps the most compelling and useful work on the subject has been done within the 
academic framework of what is sometimes referred to as the “Paris school” of critical 
security studies, and especially the work of Didier Bigo. Using a conceptual framework 
heavily informed by  a blend of Bourdieusian and Foucauldian concepts, Bigo investigates 
how, through the crucially important practices of security experts or professionals - what 
he calls “professional managers of unease” (Bigo 2002) – we are gradually  witnessing a 
de-differentiation of the fields of internal and external security, thus re-inscribing security 
practices in a continuum which defies orthodox assumptions about the strict separation 
between military and police functions. His suggestion for a better understanding of these 
changes in the security agenda, what he has recently  termed the “globalisation of 
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(in)security” (Bigo 2006b), is to pay  close attention to workings of myriads of these 
security professionals, as it is they who, by and large, (re-)define the fields of security. The 
networking of security professionals beyond borders, their inter- and intra-institutional 
politics of competition and collaboration, and their innovative deployment of specific 
techniques for understanding and managing security are, for the Paris School, the central 
focus of analysis. Bigo’s framework is compelling because it allows us to understand in a 
sociologically cogent way, both the blurring of the inside/outside divide that has 
characterised the new security agenda and the (crucial) role of police therein.
3. Security governance
The shifts in the security field described in the previous sections would seem to suggest the 
need for novel concepts that better grasp the globalised nature of security, or rather, how 
regimes of security provision and security practices beyond the state have become 
increasingly  important. One of the most interesting concepts to emerge in this context is 
that of ‘security governance’. Security governance is a relatively  new, and also relatively 
underdeveloped, concept in IR, and it seems to reflect the growing dissatisfaction with 
traditional statist frameworks of analysis when it comes to analysing contemporary shifts 
in security practices and institutions.
Generally speaking, security governance is a concept  that has so far been employed by two 
quite distinct  bundles of authors, and has therefore been conceptualised differently by 
them, with differing implications for an analysis of security  practices in the post-Cold War 
world. On the one hand we have those people working within the broadly defined field of 
international relations, most prominently  Elke Krahmann (Krahmann 2001, 2003, 2004, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). On the other hand, we have the work of several authors who 
work in the Foucauldian tradition, such as Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, 
contributions by Mariana Valverde, and the work of Mitchell Dean, all of which 
comfortably  straddle criminology and social theory. These authors propose a framework 
for conceptualising security governance that is informed by much recent governmentality 
scholarship  (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Valverde 2001, 2008b; Valverde and Mopas 
2004). Apart  from the fact that both shift attention away  from the state as the sole or 
central referent (and indeed agent) of security  practices, a move coherent with our early 
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characterisation of the changes taking place in security  studies over the past two decades, 
these bodies of literature do not have much else in common, for which reason they will be 
discussed separately in the following pages.
To foreground the core argument presented in this section, while the first and more 
orthodox approach to security governance focuses on the emergence of new multilateral 
networks for governing emergent security problems (i.e. the governance of security), the 
critical approach conceptualises security as a technology  of governance targeting 
populations, individuals and communities (i.e. governance through security  apparatuses). 
The former takes as its starting point  the dichotomy between government (state-centric and 
“public”) and governance (multi-level and blurring the private/public divide); the latter 
already sees liberal government as an heterogeneous ensemble of agents, technologies and 
strategies of power “beyond the state”, as it were (cf. Rose and Miller 1992).
3.1. Orthodox approaches – the governance of security
For Krahmann, security governance needs to be understood in terms of a movement in the 
provision of security  “from government to governance” (Krahmann 2003: 9-13), in which 
government represents the centralised provision and management of security - understood 
in orthodox terms - by the state, whereas governance
(...) denotes the structures and processes which enable a set  of public and private 
actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and 
implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political 
authority. (2003: 11)
This is apparently a response to the emergence of both new security threats and new 
security actors, which creates a new security  environment, a characterisation that broadly 
resonates with the suggestions of most  of the literature reviewed at the beginning of this 
chapter. This, in turn, has caused an increasing “fragmentation” of the sovereign status quo 
which can be observed along seven distinct dimensions (Krahmann 2005a).22 The result 
has been the rise of new security  governance networks, which are seen seemingly as 
inherently  positive things, as they are more effective in countering transnational threats 
  
22  The seven dimensions are: geography, function, distribution of resources, interests,  norms decision 
making, and policy implementation (ibid.: 12-14, cf. Krahmann 2003: 14-19).
58
(given their own transnational character) and also promote subsidiarity and tailored 
solutions to local political needs – unless, of course, one refers to the “dark networks” that 
develop in the fields “transnational crime, terrorism and the proliferation of small 
arms” (2005a: 14-15). 
While Krahmann must  surely be commended for seeking to introduce the concept of 
security governance into the IR and security  studies literatures23, thus offering a new and 
potentially sophisticated way to deal with recent and important shifts in the nature of 
security, her approach suffers from important drawbacks – apparent at least in terms of its 
ready  usability  in a study such as the present one. A critique of Krahmann’s conception of 
security governance is all the more important, and useful, given how extensively her initial 
work has impacted the ‘security governance’ literature.
Firstly, it rests on a fairly artificial and, this analysis contends, largely needless dichotomy 
between government and governance, almost as if it  portraying “government” in 
unrealistically centralised and statist terms – ignoring important developments on the 
subject in fields such as political science, but especially  sociology – only to set up  the 
appearance of governance as panacea. One would not need to look any  further than to 
Foucault’s conception of government to find a much more sophisticated notion which 
easily does away  with the shaky  dichotomy (cf. chapter two, below). In this view, 
government, or rather governing, is a set of dispositional practices, which seek to 
“structure the possible fields of action of others” (Foucault 2001b: 1058). Governance is 
thus an activity preoccupied with the conduct of conduct, of oneself and others (cf. Dean 
  
23  While Elke Krahmann is certainly the most prolific author writing about security governance within IR,  
and perhaps the one with the biggest impact in setting the conceptual tone, she was not alone in first 
applying it. Rather,  the work of several authors (of which Krahmann is only one) working on security 
governance in Europe – as part of a European funded project that ran from 1998-2001 – must be credited. 
In an early version of a paper delivered in this context, Mark Webber clarifies: “Although for the 
purposes of delivery this paper bears my name it is a collaborative effort, the other authors being Terry 
Terriff, Jolyon Howorth, Stuart Croft and Elke Krahmann. The paper is the product of a project entitled 
‘Security Governance in the New Europe’ funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council 
under the ‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme” (Webber 2003, the paper would appear later under 
collective authorship, cf.  Webber et al. 2004). What is most ironic is that while Webber also pioneered the 
introduction of ‘security governance’  as a heuristic tool, and while his own work has maintained a higher 
degree of critical reflexivity (Webber 2003; Webber 2004) – about the origins of ‘security governance’  in 
the very specific literature on European multilevel governance, or the shortcomings of available 
definitions of security governance – it is hardly given a passing reference by the bulk of the contemporary 
literature deploying the concept of security governance (an excellent exception is Kirchner & Sperling 
2004: 10-11). Rather, most authors in this nascent body of writing explicitly acknowledge Krahmann as 
their conceptual inspiration (e.g. Bryden & Hänggi 2005), and Krahmann herself rarely acknowledges 
this genealogy in print, which is rather unfortunate.
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1999: 10-15). This alternative conception of government thus highlights the relationship 
between security practices, the mobilisation of expert claims and technologies of the self 
that is woefully absent from Krahmann theorisation. 
The central arguments inherent to Foucauldian conceptions of government will be more 
fully  fleshed out  in the next chapter, but for the purposes of this chapter it is worth noticing 
two points. First, not only does this Foucauldian definition straddle both government and 
governance in Krahmann’s definition, effectively  going beyond the state without doing 
away with it24, it also shows how this mode of rule has been developing and expanding 
since at  least the 18th century. Secondly, and – more to the point – draws out  important 
links between shifts in regimes of government rationality  and practice and liberalisation, 
marketisation, and the role of police. The absence of such concerns from Krahmann’s work 
thus make it a much less appealing tool for analysing American policebuilding strategies as 
instances of security governance.
Perhaps one of the most crucial problems with Krahmann's conceptualisation stems from 
its origins in the orthodox conception of security governance in the field of public policy 
analysis, especially pertaining to European governance, in the 1990’s. In other words, 
Krahmann seems to be borrowing heavily from multi-level governance theories, and then 
applying them to security issues. However, such multi-level governance theories 
themselves are not without problems. Paul Stubbs, in a sympathetic critique of such an 
approach, points out for instance that a “shifting configuration of actors, agencies, themes 
and initiatives (...) tests to its limits the Western Eurocentrism of the “normal” multi-level 
governance literature and highlights the need for a much more complex approach to the 
multi-level, multi-actor, multi-sited political, policy and practice arena” (2005: 80). 
Moreover, as Sergei Prozorov succinctly puts it, governmentality authors – chief among 
them Mitchell Dean – have argued persuasively against conflating ‘governance studies’ 
and ‘governmentality studies’, or subsuming the latter as an approach within the former 
(Prozorov 2004: 264). For Dean, governance studies suffer from several drawbacks, chief 
among them their essentially descriptive nature and their lack of reflexivity, which 
  
24 This is particularly apparent in Foucault's discussion of the 'governmentalisation of the state' (Foucault 
2007: 109-110). For a good overview of Foucault's engagement with theories of the state through his 
work on governmentality, cf. (Lemke 2007)
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precludes many of its authors from realising their complicity in evolving discourses about 
the nature, functions and capacity of states to effect government (Dean 2007: 50-51). In 
Prozorov’s apt  summary, such an approach often “uncritically celebrates the innovations in 
liberal governmental technologies rather than disentangle their conditions of 
possibility” (Prozorov 2004: 264). In other words, governance theory often takes several 
key features of liberal forms of governing (decentralisation, networked government, civil 
society, policy regimes, etc.) and treats them as departure points, rather than investigating 
their genealogy, and the relations of power inherent in them.
Additionally, multi-level governance theorists seldom trace policy impacts to the level of 
subjectivity. Krahmann's conceptualisation of security governance, for instance, includes 
functionalist themes about security provision, includes new policy  actors, and seeks to 
move beyond the state in examining global practices of security provision at their origin. 
However, one is left with no idea how to trace the impacts of security governance on the 
populations and individuals who it seeks to govern. To put it simply, where are the subjects 
of security  governance? How can we understand their relationship with the mechanisms 
for provision of security  that Krahmann details? Finally, such a theorisation of “security 
governance” fails to problematise in an adequate way the heavily normative dimension of 
governance: governance can be “good” or “bad”, and often discussions of security 
governance tend to conceptualise it as a move toward some form of “good governance” in 
the security field.25  This is, of course, a valid understanding of security  governance, but 
one that hampers, more than helps, a deeper and more sociological understanding of the 
relationship  between governance and security, and begs the questions: “whose criteria of 
good governance?” and “what about governance which does not meet such criteria but 
nonetheless effects government, and security?”
3.2. A new approach – governance through security
This section moves to examine an alternatively conception of security governance, as 
proposed for instance by Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing in their hugely useful 
  
25  For a related discussion of the differences between analyses of governance and governmentality as 
monikers of governing, and how they differ in sociological and normative dimensions cf.  Rose (1999: 
15-20) and Mitchell Dean (2007: 48-51, 83-4). The latter raises an especially important point regarding 
the implicit normative dimension of governance studies: “There is a deeper question here of whether an 
explanation or description can be entirely divorced from normative values. Indeed, one might ask whether 
the emphasis on governance implies a set of prescriptions in favour of a narrative of the rise of network 
forms of organization and around the decline of state capacities.” (50)
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Governing Security (Johnston and Shearing 2003). For these authors, hailing from the field 
of criminology, security governance comes in as a useful phrase to substitute policing, 
understood in its broadest sense. The arguments introduced in this work by Jonhston & 
Shearing are therefore quite useful for the theoretical framework this thesis seeks to 
develop and apply. That is, first and foremost, because their work re-introduces an explicit 
concern with policing and the police into discussions of security governance, and, in fact, 
make it  a central feature. Given the focus of this dissertation on police as a social 
technology imbued with power, that is a welcome difference from the more abstract multi-
level governance conceptualisation of Krahmann, with its roots in the study of EU policy-
making.
Secondly, Johnston and Shearing conceptualise historical shifts in security  governance and 
their context, including the discursive and practical conditions that structure such shifts (cf. 
Johnston and Shearing 2003: 56-74). That is to say, their conception of security 
governance is much more sensitive to historical context, and resonates with the idea - 
touched upon in the chapters below - that an important dimension of looking at security 
governance, and particularly policebuilding, is to examine the evolution in regimes of 
security provision. This in turn resonates with Foucauldian notions of regimes of discourse 
and practice, and allows for an analysis of subtle shifts in such regimes, a move which will 
be attempted in chapters three and four. As such, Johnston and Shearing's framework 
provides a clear “translation” of some key Foucauldian concepts, and integrates them into 
a very useful model of dimensions of governance to be applied to the study of security 
governance , and policing more specifically.
The sophistication of their understanding of  security governance further shows through 
their conceptualisation of “nodal security” - a idea which has since sparked some 
interesting discussions (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 138-160; Shearing 2005; Shearing 
and Wood 2003; Dupont 2004; Loader and Walker 2007: 131-139). This notion of nodal 
security – which has important roots in, and parallels with, the Foucauldian idea of a 
dispositif of security, adopted in the present study – makes this alternative conception of 
security governance particularly strong and sophisticated in their treatment of the State and 
its relation to government, drawing on Foucauldian themes. Additionally, the parallels 
between nodal security  and the dispositif allow these authors to examine not only policies, 
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programs and discourses at a macro-level, but also to focus their analysis on how specific 
programs and strategies target, and act upon, specific individuals and populations at the 
micro-level (cf. Shearing and Johnston 2003: 117-137). In other words, this sophisticated 
conceptualisation of security governance allows us to examine policing practices in rich 
detail, as a form of targeted governance (Valverde and Mopas 2004) that runs the gamut 
from epistemic regimes of thinking about security, to capillary relations of power through 
policing, in a manner similar to the present study.
Despite having proposed a much more sophisticated and minute understanding of security 
governance than most of what is being produced in IR, and despite having generated an 
growing and fascinating body of literature in criminology  thus far, this more critical 
security governance school is not without blind spots of its own, therefore presenting us 
with room for improvement. For one, their roots in critical criminology have so far meant a 
certain reluctance to engage with the international, transnational, and global dimensions of 
security governance in any sustained way26. Moreover, despite their concept  of nodal 
security explicitly  not awarding conceptual primacy  to any one level/actor/set of practices, 
the authors working in this tradition have de facto ignored the foreign policy  practices of 
states. The theoretical attempt to build upon such concerns about security governance – as 
a nodal modality of liberal rule – and link it to an analysis the foreign policy  of the U.S., 
through an examination of the apparatus of policebuilding deployed in post-intervention 
scenarios, constitutes my own small contribution to this ongoing debate.
To summarise, then, security  governance can have two, closely interrelated, meanings. On 
the one hand, it  can refer to the governance of security – that is, all the agents, institutions, 
processes and networks that are involved in the provision and management of security. 
This conceptualisation draws heavily on (multi-level) governance theories emanating from 
the study of European politics, and as such exhibits a certain disregard for important issues 
such as the relationship between security governance and subjectivity, or the expert 
practices and knowledge claims which are mobilised to modulate an issue as a security 
  
26 But for an important exception, so far without much following, see Wood and Shearing's recent treatment 
of the relationship between human security and nodal forms of governance (Wood and Shearing 2007: 
63-96). Within IR and security studies, there have been sporadic openings to deploying ‘security 
governance’ in this more critical way (Bell 2006; Bubandt 2005; Leander and van Munster 2007; Lippert 
and O’Connor 2003).
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issue, and thus open it up to governmental intervention. On the other hand, one can partake 
in a notion of security governance that focuses on the practice of effecting government 
through security, that is to say, structuring the possible field of actions of others by 
bringing to bear upon their conduct a multiplicity of security technologies and, at  a deeper 
level, by constituting their subjectivities as agent, subjects of objects of security.
Drawing essentially upon the latter, the next chapter examines the theoretical 
underpinnings of security governance in the work of Michel Foucault, thus foregrounding 
the idea of liberal arts of government, their reliance on technologies of security, and the 
role of policing therein. This sets the stage for an examination of policebuilding as a liberal 
technology of rule in the following chapters.
  
64
CHAPTER 2
SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, POLICE
The aim of the previous chapter was to survey the main lines of change in the study and 
practice of security since the end of the Cold War, thereby foregrounding the novel concept 
of security governance as a potentially  useful lens with which to approach the key topic of 
this dissertation – U.S. policebuilding efforts in the wake of intervention abroad. In 
identifying the rising doctrine of 'human security' as a liberal relation of power/technology 
of government, and in offering a critique of the dominant narrative of security governance, 
the previous chapter points to a more productive way of defining and understanding the 
practices of security  governance central to U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, to speak of studying 
U.S. efforts in policebuilding as an assemblage or dispositif, to examine the idea of human 
security as a relation of governance, or to present security governance as a liberal 
technique of governing populations through security mechanisms – all are unmistakable 
intimations of the work of Michel Foucault, and the broader governmentality literature that 
takes his investigations as a point of departure. 
Foucault's work has had a wide impact across the various social sciences, and this is also 
true for IR in general, and security studies in particular. However, as noted by Michael 
Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero in a recent overview of the theme, while invocations of 
Foucault’s work on biopower are not uncommon, “the powerful analytic of security offered 
by the biopolitics of ‘power over life’ is nonetheless also a somewhat neglected analytic 
especially in international relations and security studies.” (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 
265, emphasis added). However, ‘somewhat neglected’ does not mean absent, and the 
impact of this literature on international politics, and (critical) security  studies in particular, 
should not be underestimated. Since the translation of his lectures into English, in 
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particular, there has been a resurgence of interest in Foucault's work27. This resurgence of 
interest and the application of Foucauldian insights and research methodologies to the 
issue of security since the mid- to late-nineties have produced a flurry of innovative and 
sophisticated work on a variety  of topics. These contributions have ranged from the 
development of actuarial understandings and practices of security including insurance and 
risk analysis (Amoore & de Goede 2005; Aradau & van Munster 2007; Bell 2006; de 
Goede 2004; Hutchinson 2004; Lobo-Guerrero 2007; Moore & Valverde 2000; O’Malley 
1992, 1998, 2004), through the securitisation of migrants (Huysmans 2000, 2006), to the 
changing modalities of Western warfare & peacemaking (Debrix 1999a; Dillon 2002, 
2003; Dillon & Reid 2000, 2001, 2007; Reid 2004). They  have deepened our 
understanding of  the privatisation of security (Leander & van Munster 2007), and of 
regimes of population surveillance and control (Salter 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007, 2008), 
not to mention the securitization of piracy (Lobo-Guerrero 2008). Also, there is by now a 
well-established literature which offers more or less comprehensive maps to applying 
Foucauldian insights to security studies (cf. Dillon 2004; Dillon and Neal 2008).
Additionally, authors of the critical persuasion working in development studies have for 
years developed their own critiques of liberal technologies of rule through technical 
assistance, predicated upon improving distant (and not so distant) populations 
(Abrahamsen 2000; Biccum 2005; Cowen & Shenton 1996; Crush 1995; Escobar 1994; 
  
27  Foucault’s work and thought on an astonishing variety of topics had become known, especially in the 
English-speaking world, mainly through his published monographs such as The History of Madness 
(1965, 2006), Discipline and Punish (1977), or The History of Sexuality (3 vols., 1979a, 1986a, 1986b). 
However, one would be hard pressed to find in these monographs any sustained definition of several of 
the key concepts to governmentality studies. Be it governmentality itself,  security as a technology of 
governance, or police, such concepts were tried out and developed through a host of other public 
engagements by Foucault – most notably his many interviews and his famous lectures at the College de 
France, where he held a chair in ‘The history of systems of thought’. While these other statements were 
for a long time available in French – namely through the exhaustive collection Dits et Ecrits,  which 
covered most of what Foucault had written or said between 1954-197 (Foucault 2001), it was only after 
Foucault’s death in 1984 that these other pieces began the process of translation, publication and 
reception in the English-speaking world (with the exception of Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings, 1972–1977 (1980)). One of the earliest such efforts was the translation of his seminal 
lecture on governmentality, which first appeared published in English in the volume entitled The Foucault 
Effect (1991).  In time, a selection of the materials contained in Dits et Ecrits was translated and published 
as a 3-volume series, Essential Works of Foucault (2000-2001). Nevertheless, even these materials 
contained mostly only summaries of his courses, lectures and seminars at the College de France, and it 
was not until 2003 – with the publication in English of Abnormal and Society Must be Defended – that the 
full contents of his lectures became available to the general public,  and began having a real, widespread 
impact in English-speaking academia. Since then, a team of editors and translators (including Michel 
Senellart,  François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, Arnold Davidson and Graham Burchell, all well-known 
scholars of Foucault’s work) has published a new series of lectures, including Hermeneutics of the 
Subject (2005), Psychiatric Power (2008), and Security, Territory,  Population (2007). The last one in 
particular has been absolutely instrumental to the renewed interest in, and impact of, Foucault’s analytics 
of security as a technology of liberal government.
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Ferguson 1994; Li 2007; Ludden 1992; Watts 1993). The very notion of 'development' 
itself, these authors argue, has implicit  in it some of the key tenets of the liberal arts of 
government – the dividing practices between mature subjects o liberal political rule, and 
the subjects of improvement; assistential regimes of power which work by rendering 
hierarchical power relations into technical matters to be supervised by experts – which I 
tackle in the sections below. 
Within this context of critique, of particular interest if the work developed by Mark 
Duffield over the last  decade on the increasing nexus between development and security 
(Duffield 2002, 2007a, 2007b). Drawing explicitly from Foucault and other authors within 
governmentality studies, Duffield has persuasively argued that development is a 
biopolitical category, a relation of liberal government. Moreover, he argues, since the end 
of the Cold War development has been seen and practised by Western states in tandem with 
security policy. As he puts it summarily, “in fostering ‘their’ development, we improve 
‘our’ security” (Duffield 2007b: 225). And, in line with the discussion of the previous 
chapter about the widening of the security  agenda, the rise of human security  focusing 
liberal security  agendas on 'population', and the rise of regimes of security  governance 
beyond the state, Duffield elaborates: “Since the risks to human security are largely 
associated with underdevelopment, broadening the scope of security to include the 
protection and betterment of the world’s poor and marginalised peoples establishes its 
complementarity with development” (Duffield 2007a: 3). He goes on to offer an overview 
of the discursive and programmatic mechanisms at play in this merging of security and 
development, noting their continuity  with liberal imperialist schemes, their inherent 
racism, and the way fragile states are discursively opened up for liberal interventionism, all 
the while focusing the ensuing development schemes in terms of local ownership – a 
hallmark of advanced liberal government.
Interestingly  enough, neither the authors within the first cluster of research on the 
biopolitics of security, nor critical development scholars, including Duffield himself, have 
paid much attention to the issue of policing. This neglect of policing as an absolutely 
crucial liberal technology of security  governance extends not only to the increasingly 
internationalised/transnationalised deployment of policing beyond the state, but also – and 
perhaps more surprisingly – to American programs of policebuilding, which stand 
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precisely at the confluence of regimes of technical assistance so typical of development 
schemes, and the logics of biopolitical security as described by Foucault. It is precisely 
from this theoretical background that this dissertation emerges, seeking to make a modest 
contribution to both these clusters of research. 
However, in order to better understand this alternative framework for thinking about 
security governance – and consequently  about policebuilding – in post-Cold War US 
foreign policy, it becomes necessary to delve a little deeper into the concept of liberal 
government. Throughout the previous chapters, the words government, governance and 
governmentality  have often made their presence felt, especially in conjunction with the 
adjective 'liberal'. Indeed, liberal governmentality has been identified since the outset as a 
structuring concept in seeking to better understand U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, this 
study is specifically focused on police assistance and reform being used as a technology of 
government by the U.S. when it intervenes abroad, especially in countries emerging from 
conflict. Therefore, an analysis of what exactly is meant by 'police', and precisely  how it 
relates to liberal government becomes a crucial step before moving our attention to the 
empirical analysis of U.S. policebuilding regimes evolving over time.
The first part  of the chapter, then, analyses the birth and development of what Michel 
Foucault called “the arts of government” (Foucault 2007: 127, 132; Ivision 1997: 24-52), 
in particular the emergence of distinctly liberal forms of governing societies which 
accompanied the formation of the modern state in Europe from the 17th century  onward – 
what Foucault and others in his wake have termed (liberal) governmentality. This section 
further identifies police as a key  technological assemblage in the modern arts of 
government, and sheds some light  into the evolution of the concept  in relation to governing 
populations through apparatuses of security. A second section examines how liberal 
governmentality  relies on a set of dividing practices which identify/constitute specific 
populations, to be governed by differentiated processes, obeying to different logics. 
Departing from these differentiated categories of subjects, the third section of this chapter 
discusses the existence of a developmentalist ethos in liberal governmentality, whereby 
those individuals and populations identified as not yet ready for liberal autonomy, but who 
demonstrate potential for it, bring about the rise a pedagogical approach to governing, 
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complete with assistential regimes. Alternatively, liberalism holds in reserve more negative 
forms of power aimed to contain and or eliminate those subjects beyond the pale of both 
self-rule and pedagogical improvement. This section will argue that it is against this very 
background – evident from colonial modes of governing subject populations, to 
contemporary  practices of foreign aid through technical assistance – that one must 
understand the changing regimes of U.S. policebuilding in the wake of intervention. The 
remainder of the section, then, examines how such liberal understanding of populations, 
and attending practices of rule aimed at forging the kinds of liberal subjects capable of 
bearing a well-ordered freedom, became internationalised. As such, it foregrounds the 
difficult tensions between forms pastoral power and the pedagogy of security which 
pervade American policebuilding efforts.
1. Thinking about liberal governmentality
1.1. The arts of government
Before delving any  closer on the meanings and uses of ‘governmentality’, it may be 
obvious but useful to start by  stating that governmentality shorthand coined by  Foucault 
for referring to governmental rationality - is concerned with the operations of government. 
This much is clear by  a simple glance at both words, but what exactly  is mean by 
‘government’ within this theoretical context? What is it about Foucault’s writings on 
‘government’ – or, more accurately, ‘the art of government’ – that gives it its 
distinctiveness, and allows us to speak of governmentality?
Government, or the arts thereof, is a specific political rationality, the origins of which 
Foucault situates in the late 16th century as a heterogeneous body of literature in political 
philosophy in reaction to Machiavelli’s seminal work, The Prince (Foucault 2007: 87-114) 
This is important because, as will be shown, government as an idea begins as a critique of 
sovereign power, or rather, of the narrowness and circularity  of the conceptions of rule and 
power which some authors perceived (right or wrongly) in Machiavelli’s book. 
Machiavelli is preoccupied with giving advice to princes on the exercise of sovereign 
power, a deductive exercise of authority (the power to “make live and let die” (Foucault 
2003: 241)), so that rulers can maintain control of their principality. This control, this 
relationship  between the prince/sovereign and his territory, is seen as external and therefore 
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fragile, and the exercise of power will accordingly  centre on identifying enemies (external 
and internal) who would break this princely  hold on his domain, and devising strategies for 
manipulating the relations of force in order to foil such attempts and allow the Prince to 
maintain his principality. In other words, both power and government are narrowly 
conceived as a raison d’état that  is self-referential or circular, as well as negative or purely 
extractive.
In opposition to such conceptions (real or imagined, as Foucault underlines), a tentative 
body of literature begins to emerge in 16th century  Europe that conceives of government 
more broadly, and is no longer exclusively  preoccupied with advising a prince/sovereign 
on how to maintain a hold on his territorial domains. In fact, as shall be discussed below, 
the momentous but gradual changes from a medieval, feudal society of estates to 
something else (Pasquino 1991: 111), to forms of centralised authority  within modern 
states, and the attending discoveries of the mechanisms of 'population' and of the 
'economy' marks a shift in how government is understood and enacted. This shift in 
governance from territory to population as the ultimate referent of rule cannot be 
underestimated, and Foucault is emphatic on the centrality  of population for modern forms 
of rule:
‘. . . population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In 
contrast  to sovereignty, government  has as its purpose not the act of government  itself, 
but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its 
wealth, longevity, health, and so on; and the means the government  uses to attain these 
ends are themselves all, in some sense, immanent to the population; it  is the 
population itself on which government  will act  either directly, through large-scale 
campaigns, or indirectly, through techniques that  will make possible, without  the full 
awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of 
population into certain regions or activities, and so on.’(Foucault, quoted in Legg 
2005: 137)
Guillaume de la Perrière’s definition of government as “the right  disposition of things, 
arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (quoted in Foucault 2007: 96) exemplifies 
precisely such a way  of looking at  the productive and constitutive aspects of power, 
conceived as a social relation rather than a quantifiable good that can be held and 
accumulated. This is what Foucault means when he characterises the art of government as 
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“the conduct of conduct” or as “aiming to structure the possible field of action of 
others” (Foucault 2000b: 341). Government understood this way  is different from 
commonsensical usage of the word, usually seen as emanating from a small, bureaucratic, 
decisionary State. Government in the sense meant  by Foucault - and in this dissertation - is 
a much more encompassing and complex activity, one that does not “refer only  to political 
structures or the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct 
of individuals or of groups might be directed (…)” (Foucault 2000b: 341) . Government, 
therefore, is an activity  that operates at a multiplicity of sites: there can be government of 
the self, and there are myriad instances of governing families, sexualities, factories, 
schools, transnational policy areas, etc. (Allen 1991; Dean 1992, 2007; Nadesan 2008; 
Peter and Rose 1990; Rose 2000; Stenson 2005; Walters 1994, 2000).
It is important to retain this conceptualisation of government as an ensemble of productive 
and structuring techniques of rule over a population, because – for the purposes of the 
present dissertation – it  means that one can extend this notion to policy  of all sorts, both 
domestic and foreign. Therefore, to look at (American) foreign policy as governmental 
activity is to foreground its preoccupation with structuring the possible fields of action of 
distant populations, and to do so through productive techniques that aim to foster particular 
arrangements of power and particular subjectivities.
Government is thus a practice that presupposes two key features. Firstly, it  is a rational, 
intentional, calculating activity. An economic understanding of governing brings with it a 
preoccupation with the sustainability of certain logics of government. Therefore, a 
government starts to be directed not at singular individuals in particular instances, but at a 
social body, the mechanisms of which are to be discovered and improved. In this sense, 
government becomes a problematising activity, and governmental tasks and programmes 
become increasingly articulated around problem-posing and problem-solving (Rose and 
Miller 1992). Foucault’s discussion of the birth of the prison, the factory, and schools are 
certainly couched in this logic (Foucault 1977). To use Rose and Miller’s seminal 
formulation - in one of the earliest pieces in the burgeoning governmentality  literature 
explicitly trying to set out a Foucauldian framework for an analytics of government 
“beyond the State” - such an calculating, economic analytics of government can be 
exemplified by looking at how it crystallises into “political rationalities”, their translation 
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into “programmes of government”, and, finally, their instantiation as “technologies or 
techniques of government” (Rose and Miller 1992: 178-184). The first would allow an 
exploration of the rise and transformation of discursive fields that articulate, constrain and 
enable the possibilities of social reality  and of power relations within it. The second would 
permit a much more focused analysis of how broad ideas (freedom, rights, economy, civil 
society, power, wealth) become articulated and crystallise into very specific (and 
heterogeneous) programmatic schemata. 
Government is therefore an inherently  calculating activity, which makes itself intelligible 
through means of problematising – government as a sort of strategy  of power (cf. Foucault 
2000b: 346-348). But the second characteristic of governing which I wish to highlight here 
is its technical nature. In fact, government engenders, and is dependent upon, a series of 
technical, expert knowledges for translating its will to improve into actual programs and 
technologies of social and political intervention. Rendering governmental problems and 
governmental practices technical achieves several things. First and foremost, “rendering 
technical confirms expertise and [thus] constitutes the boundaries between those who are 
positioned as trustees, with the capacity to diagnose the deficiencies in other, and those 
who are subject to expert direction” (Li 2007: 7). This plays into, and legitimates, the 
dividing practices inherent to liberalism & attending hierarchical/supervisory practices that 
will be discussed at some length below. Secondly, rendering governmental issues as 
technical matters achieves a certain de-politicisation of them. Liberal logics of rule achieve 
this by casting such matters as non-political, and/or designing technical assistance 
programs as “a deliberate measure to contain a challenge to the status quo”(7-8). Studying 
such expert knowledge practices in deploying government thus becomes crucial in 
critiquing liberal forms of government, by foregrounding their inherently political nature in 
establishing very structured relationships of power and hierarchy, and often containing 
illiberal elements of coercion and authoritarianism.28
  
28  To anticipate one of the arguments I wish to advance in chapter five, in relation to the liberal ethos of 
governance inherent in U.S. policebuilding programs, one needs only to think of current American police 
assistance efforts in Afghanistan to realise the validity of the points raised above. Rendering such police 
assistance as a technical issue is aimed precisely at producing the effects diagnosed by Tania Li: one the 
one hand, constituting a hierarchical power relationship between those who possess the right kind of 
training and expertise (American mentors), and those who lack the specific knowledges and habits and 
therefore need mentoring and supervision (Afghans). On the other hand, this move of presenting U.S. 
policebuilding as a neutral form of technical aid is designed to contain challenges to the status quo.
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Thirdly, liberal government is an activity which both presupposes and utilises the freedom 
of the governed, and seeks to structure that freedom so as to align it  with the ends of 
government itself (cf. Rose 1999: 15-97). Governmentality therefore also allows one to see 
processes of world-ordering and world-governing not only – or even primarily - as a 
coercive activity of imposition and intervention, but also as a more subtle, and often 
immensely  more effective, process of mobilising the desires and strategies of subjects 
toward “definite but shifting goals”, to use Mitchell Dean’s apt phrasing (Dean 1999: 209). 
As we shall see further on, the case study of U.S. policebuilding in Afghanistan in chapter 
five foregrounds exactly this logic. American police assistance, understood as security 
governance, seeks to align the desires and needs of Afghans for security (however defined) 
with the very specific means and ends of American liberal government.
In this sense, the deployment of discourses (and technologies) of ‘freedom” and ‘security’ 
are not merely  ruses, under which guise the supposed “real processes” of (neo-)liberal 
power and rule operate (as one often reads in more materialist accounts of world order, be 
they  realist or Marxist). In a very real sense, ‘freedom’ and ‘security’ play a key 
governmental role in constituting the thoughts and actions of those who govern (by 
framing governmental problems and proposed solutions in specific ways), but also those 
who are governed (who mobilise their desires for, and manage themselves towards, such 
objectives). In other words, it is not that the language of freedom masks the operations of 
power – the language of freedom is power operating (cf. passim Rose 1999, Cruikshank 
1999), or, as Foucault would phrase it, liberty must  be understood as both “ideology  and 
technique of government” (Foucault 2007: 51, 71) In light of this, it important to 
operationalise government in its intersection with freedom, and nowhere is this more 
evident than in the governmental rationality  commonly known as liberalism. Therefore, 
below we discuss briefly the connections between liberalism and governing, and how that 
relationship birthed the very peculiar idea of ‘police’.
2. Welfare, security, population – thinking about the police
When one hears the word ‘police’, it usually conjures up a relatively  straightforward image 
of uniformed individuals whose main task is to fight crime and uphold the law of the land. 
From the traffic cop to the detective, by way  of the bobby on his/her neighbourhood beat, 
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speak of the police to most people, and they almost inevitably  associate the term with 
officered individuals working within the criminal justice system of modern states. But 
clearly, the way  in which the governmentality  studies literature deploys and investigates 
the concept of police allows for a much broader understanding of policing as a liberal 
relation of power, and as a modality of rule.
It is not merely an etymological coincidence that the words politics, polity, policy  and 
police all resemble one another. But, looking at  the ensemble, and pressed to find the odd 
man out, one would almost certainly  single out ‘police’. This happens, however, only 
because the word police have suffered in the course of the last two hundred years or so, a 
drastic evolution in meaning and application. When using the word today, one almost 
certainly refers to an institutionalised body of officers, sometimes in uniform, whose task it 
is to prevent and solve crime (as well as ‘keep the peace’) within the territorial jurisdiction 
of a modern state29. However, this now dominant usage obscures important tensions 
between police and its cognates: politics, in the sense of government; polity, as in a 
political community  and its social arrangements; and policy, as a set of governmental 
prescriptions designed to administer and regulate community life. In its earliest sense, 
police was, simply put, a synonym for the well-ordered community - and, as time went on, 
it came progressively to mean the set  of practices aiming to achieve precisely this 
(Knemeyer 1980: 172-173). Soon, however, the word came to assume a central tension that 
– contemporary conceptual and practical restrictions nonetheless – has characterised the 
theory  and practice of policing to this day: the tension, that is, between the more 
commonly accepted, more restricted and more ‘negative’ meaning of police (police = 
safety, as in the prevention of crime), and the more interesting, broader and more 
‘positive’ sense (police = welfare or happiness of the citizenry) (Knemeyer 1980: 
185-191).
This section aims, precisely, to explore the tensions inherent in this triangle of government 
– police – security, and to show how, when properly  understood and excavated, it 
illuminates important aspects of contemporary social life and political practice, aspects 
  
29  Pasquale Pasquino’s important study of the origins of ‘police’ discusses, more briefly and concisely than 
the bewilderingly detailed article by Knemeyer (1980),  the origins of this rather restricted and ‘negative’ 
sense of police (Pasquino 1991: 109)
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which also become salient when analysing, further ahead in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the 
international uses to which police has been put in U.S. foreign and security  policy 
programs.
The origins of police as we understand it  today, both etymologically  and historically, lay  in 
the momentous but slow changes taking place at  the end of the Middle Ages in Europe, 
whereby traditional social hierarchies based on orders, each customarily  subjected to a 
panoply  of secular and religious overlapping fields of authority, begin to crumble (cf. 
Rawlings 2002: 8-30, 2003: 41-43). As myriads of instantiations of localised custom began 
to gradually  give way  to centralised, secular authorities, and as orders/estates began to 
mutate into something like a social body or a civil society, and individuals and populations 
become the central subjects of governmental activity, a number of fields of regulation 
opened up for these new authorities, thus giving birth to the police (Rawlings 2002: 31-60, 
2003: 41-61). New categories of people (the urban poor, indigents, wanderers, criminals, 
professional craftsmen, the mentally  insane, salaried labourers) came under the gaze of the 
nascent modern state and its officials – or perhaps more accurately, are created by this 
gaze. Pasquino talks about the beginnings of police thus:
I would say that  police regulations regulate, or try  to regulate, or purport  to regulate, is 
everything which in  the life of this society of three orders goes unregulated, everything 
which can be said, in ‘the waning of the Middle Ages’, to lack order or form. This is what 
the science of police is about: a great effort  of formation  of the social body, or more 
precisely  an undertaking whose principal result  will be something which we today call 
society or the social body, and which  the eighteenth  century called “the good order of the 
population (Pasquino 1991:111)
Such a description of the roots of ‘police’ presents us with three important points. Firstly, 
the startling inclusiveness of the concept, dealing with “things” - something which we find 
ridiculous today, and give little thought to, precisely because they  have been so deeply 
institutionalised and ingrained in their constitution as sites of government. The sheer 
amount of things such a notion of police covers is bewildering to our contemporary eyes – 
from populations (‘the police of servants, domestics and nurses’; ‘the police of Jews’; ‘the 
police of the poor’), through economic activities (commerce, trades, weights and 
measures), to places (marketplaces, forests) and “things” (the police of foodstuffs, or the 
police of garbage) (cf. Pasquino 1991: 110, Knemeyer 1980: 177, 184). Secondly, it signals 
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an overarching concern with the establishment and maintenance of order, and, hence, 
police demonstrates its usefulness for understanding the activity  of governing as an 
ordering activity, aiming to produce what has been variously  called “good order” (Luedtke 
and Reinke 1996), “public order” (Argenson, quoted in Foucault 2007: 324), or the 
maintenance of a “well-regulated society” (Novak 1989, 1996: 9). 
For the specific purposes of this dissertation, police begins to show its usefulness as an 
analytical tool by allowing us to understand American foreign relations as governmental 
practices which are essentially  world-ordering practices: one need only think about the 
myriad tasks assumed by American state officials and a plethora of civil society actors 
when engaged in recent efforts in ‘nation-building’ in Iraq or Afghanistan.
If these are the traits that characterise the application of police as a technology of 
government, what are the overarching ends of government which are sought which such an 
effort? 
The towering concern most easily identifiable is of course with something like a state of 
well ordered prosperity  – its attachment to political economy and the aggrandisement of 
the wealth of the state on the one hand, and the need to secure the health and happiness of 
its population, on the other (cf. Foucault  2007: 322-328). Writing in 1808, police theorist 
Guenther Heinrich von Berg writes up  a definition of police which shows precisely this 
totalising spirit which sought to embrace under the heading of police the administration of 
(potentially) each and every single aspect of social and political life:
Policey is like a well-intentioned genius who carefully  levels the way for those committed 
to his care; cleans the air that they breathe; secures the villages and holdings in which they 
dwell, and the streets along which they walk; protects the fields that  they cultivate, secures 
their homes against fire and flood, and they themselves against illness, poverty, ignorance, 
superstition and immorality; who, even if he cannot  prevent  all accidents, seeks however 
to diminish and ease their consequences, and offers refuge in time of need to every pauper, 
casualty or person in  need. Its watchful eye is ubiquitous; its helping hand is ever-ready, 
and we are invisibly surrounded by its unceasing care. (von Berg 1808, quoted in Tribe 
1984: 274)
With such a grand objective in sight, early police (from the 16th through the early 19th 
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centuries) was closely linked to the doctrines of reason of state and cameralism30, as all 
authors working on the genealogy of police stress (Dean 1999, Knemeyer 1980, Tribe 
1984). The apex of this logic of police was the creation in early modern Germany of a very 
specific police science (Polizeiwissenschaft), as a system of specific knowledges of 
government, and its political correlate, the ‘police state’.
In this sense, the work of police - understood as all those tasks that needed regulating for 
the establishment or maintenance of good order in a community – may seem fairly linked 
to sovereign and disciplinary practices, and thus somewhat strange to liberal logics of self-
rule. The work of James C. Scott in particular shows that this early-modern obsession with 
absolute knowledge of everything within a State, even if it bore the best intentions, ended 
up being highly counterproductive (Scott 1998). Both its attachment to a single, political-
economic, focus on revenue and population control, and its normalisation mania produced 
many a disaster. This notion of police as a more or less totalising technology  for the proper 
administration of society seems to assume a kind of natural transparency and malleability 
of the objects of government. Increasingly, however, European states acting through police 
under this assumption increasingly realise two key  problems in this. First, there is a 
growing realisation that the objects of government – populations, individuals, roads, 
forests – are both more opaque to the governmental gaze and its forms of knowledge, and 
less malleable than projected, engendering a host of practices of resistance and producing 
unforeseen results.
Second, the definitional indeterminacy of police – as a technology of rule under which 
potentially every single aspect  could fall – would come to produce a sense of its limits, and 
the high costs of its maintenance. It is precisely this realisation of the limits of 
  
30  Cameralism can be defined as “a theory of governmental expediency, primarily with reference to 
revenues,  later covering much wider areas” (Small 1923: 158), including security. As a doctrine of 
government relied on two key, interlinked notions of Oeconomie and Polizei, or (political) economy – 
worried about the proper circulation of goods and people,  and the State’s intervening role in the 
production and accumulation of wealth – and police, or the ensemble of administrative measures a State 
could apply to the promotion of ‘good order’. Cameralism as a science of administration of government, 
having gained notoriety especially in 18th century Germany, became an institutionalised discipline at 
university, with several chairs in ‘Cameralism’ and ‘Police science’ being established. Ultimately, this 
more or less unified theory of government would give rise to the separate disciplines of the social 
sciences we have come to know as public administration/public policy, political science, (political) 
economy, and to an extent criminology, as a series of expert knowledges instrumental to government (cf. 
Small 1923). Albion Small’s studies of cameralism remain to this day extremely thought-provoking 
(Small 1909; 1923). Keith Tribe’s article on “Cameralism and the science of government” is an obligatory 
reference (Tribe 1984). Foucault discusses precisely the relationship between cameralism, government 
and police(-science) in Security, Territory, Population at various points (Foucault 2007: 25-26, 68-70).
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governmental forms of knowledge, and governmental intervention, that  brought about the 
rise of liberal ideas about governing and the limited role of the State therein. As Tribe 
summarises, “[w]hereas Polizei encountered its limit in the apparent  inexhaustibility  of the 
objects that could be regulated, the new liberalism encountered its limit in the perpetual 
invasion of that which it had expelled, the State” (Tribe 1984: 284).
But, as Valverde stresses, this is not where the story of policing – understood broadly in its 
productive sense – ends (Valverde 2003: 235-37). One gets the feeling from most of the 
literature that  the steady decline of ‘reason of state’ and ‘police state’ as synonyms for too 
much government, and the consequent rise of liberal logics of rule, are made to coincide 
with the beginning of the institutionalisation of the police as we understand it today, and 
the decline of earlier notions of police, seen as too encompassing or totalising. Moreover, 
there is a tendency to believe that this “New Police” was now more concerned with the 
negative tasks of ensuring security through the application of the law and the ethos of 
crime-fighting (cf. Emsley 2003; Taylor: 1997). This is, however, not the case, for the 
liberal understanding of security had never been simply negative but, as Tom Osborne puts 
it, inherently productive and constitutive of liberal subjectivities within populations:
The concern with  technologies of security – as opposed to  centering upon discipline or the 
sovereignty of a territory  – is a distinctive feature of liberal political rationalities. The focus of 
liberal security  is not the territory or the body, but  the ‘ensemble of a population’; and the 
function of such mechanisms of security will be to assure the integrity  of ‘natural phenomena, 
economic processes of population’ while affirming the vulnerability of such natural processes 
and the need for a well-modulated intervention in relation to them. (Osborne 1996: 101-102)
Police (and, more broadly, the associated notions of the welfare of the population – salus 
populi31  – and of its security) in the power regimes that have taken shape since the 
nineteenth century, has evolved so as to respond to reconceptualisations of the tasks of 
government. As such police evolved in response to the discovery of “new” problematics 
requiring governing, and to the invention of new forms of government. In this sense, police 
as a technology of rule concerned with the exercise of power over individuals and 
population as a whole - in order to achieve the security  and welfare of each and all (omnes 
et singulatim, in Foucault’s famous phrase (Foucault 1979)) - has been relocated within 
  
31 For a discussion of the centrality of the notion of salus populi to the theory and practice of police power, 
especially in America, see the genealogies of police power by Markus Dirk Dubber (Dubber 2005: 112-113) 
and William J. Nowak (1996: passim)
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novel forms of (liberal) governmentality. In fact, as Mitchell Dean convincingly argues, 
one should not overplay the distinction between policing and liberal modalities of rule. 
Liberal forms of rule do not displace or do away  with the earlier notion of police, but 
rather propose a new format of policing, and “[t]his new form is a no less comprehensive 
police than the old one” but rather it deploys “techniques and agencies located within civil 
society rather than merely  issuing regulations, and thus must rely  on knowledge of 
economic, social and other processes outside the formal sphere of the state” (Dean 2007: 
113).
For instance, police as it  was understood and deployed in nineteenth century America – as 
localist, common-law based practice – has suffered enormous transformation through 
centralisation, constitutionalisation and increasing institutionalisation, thereby loosing 
some of fields of application and some of its mechanisms of implementation (Novak 
1996). However, new forms of policing have emerged, tied with the transformation of 
liberal to advanced liberal rationalities of government. Mariana Valverde, for instance, has 
shown how intricate this process of change is because of its simultaneous novelty (for 
instance, the increased use of actuarial technologies based on risk and probability, and on 
demand-side economics, such as ‘targeted’ policing) and striking patterns of continuity 
(Valverde: 2004, Valverde & Mopas: 2004).
3. Making People Up
As we have seen in the sections above, one of the key features of modern, liberal forms of 
government is their focus on population. This ‘discovery’ of population32  as the key 
referent of the arts of government is what allows us to speak of the biopolitical nature of 
modern liberalism, i.e. as a rationality  of government which takes the life of the population 
as its key concern (cf. Foucault 2008; Nadesan 2008: 8-9, 20-23, 93-94). Nevertheless, the 
fact that liberalism – as both a theory of politics and a governmental practice – is usually 
based on universalist  claims about the nature of individuals, and their ultimate desire for 
freedom, should not blind us to the most  subtle ways in which liberalism deals with a 
plurality  of subjects. In other words, at the core of liberalism is a conception, if one can use 
  
32  In his key lectures gathered in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault explicitly says: “Population is 
undoubtedly an idea and a reality that is absolutely modern in relation to the functioning of political 
power,  but also in relation to knowledge and political theory, prior to the eighteenth century.” (Foucault 
2007: 25)
79
the expression, of the ideal-type of liberal subject: the responsible, self-helping individual 
who acts upon himself (classical liberal theorists would regularly evoke the theme of self-
control over the passions (cf. Holmes 1997)) and is thus capable of bearing a kind of well-
regulated freedom, and indeed contributing to it. However, ‘really  existing liberalism’ has 
always had to contend with the fact that such a subject is more an end-goal than a starting 
point, and therefore liberal regimes of government have always to deal with non-liberal 
subjects. 
This is what  Barry  Hindess has suggestively named the liberal “government of 
unfreedom” (Hindess 2001).  How, then, has liberal thought dealt with such subjects? The 
following section suggests that a key move has been to categorise individuals on a scale, 
essentially  isolating and delimiting various subjectivities, which open up  individuals and 
populations to governmental action of various types, obeying to specific logics according 
to each category. Following work by  several authors working in the Foucauldian tradition 
(Cruikshank 1999; Dean 2007; Hindess 2001; Valverde 1996), I want to flesh out these 
categories, suggest  how liberal mentalities and technologies of rule have been applied to 
each of them, and isolate their underlying logics. Further, I want to suggest that on the one 
hand, these categorisations have been globalised since at least the days of liberal 
imperialism; and, on the other hand, that police is a technology of governance particularly 
suited for dealing with them, since it stands at a confluence of pedagogy, welfare, and 
coercion – which may well be the reason why police power has remained such a fluid, and 
such a core constitutive technology of modern rule, as indicated in the previous section.
3.1. Liberalism and its Others
As briefly delineated in the previous sections, then, evolving liberal forms of government 
are predicated upon governing through the freedom of the governed. As such, liberal 
theory  and liberal political practice have always worried about what kinds of interventions 
and technologies are needed to foster such a mature liberal subjectivity that  the governed 
become capable of performing their freedom adequately, acting upon themselves. Part  of 
becoming mature liberal subjects – or responsible, participating citizens – is therefore a 
kind of moral education that teaches the control of impulses and passions, and the self-
regulation of behaviour to conform to liberal modes of knowing and living the political (cf. 
Dean 1994; Glover 2005; Kumar 1989; Rose 1990; Seth 2007). Liberal subjects must be 
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inculcated the habits necessary to empower themselves, improve and regulate themselves, 
perform their freedom adequately  (cf. Cruikshank 1993, 1994, 1999). As pointed out by a 
variety of authors working in or about the liberal political tradition, such subjects do not 
appear ready-made (Valverde 1996: 359-361), but necessitate instead a more or long period 
of education and trusteeship, until eventually they  reach their full capacity for 
(self)government.
This theme of the need for a specific liberal pedagogy is present at both the domestic and 
international levels. Domestically – quite literally  – even the earliest  liberal theory, and 
certainly liberal politicians too, have always posited that  certain categories of people - 
children up to a certain age, women, indigents, migrants, etc. – are not (fully) capable (yet) 
of governing themselves. Internationally, the same logic applies, and has its clearest 
antecedents in the colonial practices of liberal states during the 19th and early 20th centuries 
(cf. Duffield 2007b: 228-231; Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005). As Mariana Valverde – among 
others – points out, it is precisely this logic of division underpinned by a liberal 
pedagogical stance which allows John Stuart Mill, champion of individual rights, isonomy 
and the empowerment of (Western) women to say: “those who are still in a state to require 
being taken care of by others, must be protected against their actions as against external 
injury. (…) Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, 
provided the end be their improvement” (Mill 1859, quoted in Valverde 1996: 360, cf. 
Sullivan 1983). This notion of the need for a form of ethical despotism in the colonies was 
by no means unique to Mill, rather being vocally proposed by  other well-known liberal 
authors such as Tocqueville (cf. Tocqueville and Pitts 2003, Boyd 2001) and Lord 
Macaulay (Mehta 1999: 15-16). That liberalism has thus to govern different  populations – 
or populations made intelligible precisely  because of their difference – presupposes that 
not all of them will be judged to have mature enough subjectivities to be amenable to, and 
partake in, liberal (self-)government. Liberalism, therefore, has always had at its core a 
judgement to make about its potential subjects, resulting in differentiated population, each 
judged to have specific characteristics and require particular forms of government. 
This set of dividing practices operating at the heart of liberalism (both classical and 
advanced or contemporary) was apparent in liberal imperialism – returning us to the 
history of British imperial logics of rule over distant population with which the 
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introductory chapter opens – and it results in a certain form of paternalism, a hierarchy in 
relations of power. Previous scholarship, when looking at  this apparent paradox at the core 
of liberalism, has spoken of despotism, recovering precisely what was a preferred language 
of classical British liberals when engaging with imperial/colonial subjects (patent in the 
quotation by Mill presented above).33 
Mitchell Dean, when considering the issue, suggests we should conceptualise liberalism’s 
dividing practices along a scale or matrix, which pigeonholes subjects into more or less 
fluid categories, or groups, according to their maturity and autonomy in relation to 
government (Dean 2007: 118-122). In the first group  are those subjects who have attained 
liberal status, demonstrating both their autonomy and their ability  to act upon themselves 
in self-regulation. In the second group  are those who need some form of assistance or 
supervision (Dean speaks of the subjects of welfare) in order to provide them with the 
incentives (not  always positive) and skills to improve themselves (cf. Cruickshank 1999). 
In the third group – and perhaps the more relevant one for the purposes of my argument 
about American policebuilding regimes as a form of development through security  – are 
the individuals and groups that, albeit potentially  capable of performing the liberal ideal of 
a well-regulated freedom, nonetheless lack the tools and skills to do so, and therefore need 
external improvement/development – let us call them precisely the subjects of 
development.
Finally, Dean mentions the two categories of subject more problematic for liberal 
government, given the kind of intervention required. The first are those subjects who are 
not yet/no longer capable of autonomy, and as such are by  necessity under the care/
authority of others – in a relationship of hierarchy  that bears striking resemblance to what 
Foucault has called pastoral forms of government. In a particularly  relevant discussion of 
  
33  While the realisation that such dividing practices lay at the core of liberal government,  and while 
conscious that their inherent hierarchical notion and their sense of conditioned freedom opens them up for 
productive critique, different authors – even those working under the general heading of governmentality 
studies – have developed different categorisations and labels. As already mentioned, in conceptualising 
the supervisory relationship established between such differently constituted subjects, Mariana Valverde 
uses the Millian notion of ‘despotism’ (Valverde 1996: 360-364). Barry Hindess, in turn,  prefers to speak 
of the ‘liberal government of unfreedom’, while Tani Li veers towards the idea of trusteeship (2007: 
4-10). Mitchell Dean has written of it as authoritarian liberalism (2002a, 2002b), and both he and a host 
of others have moved the debate about it towards the work of Carl Schmitt and notions of exception 
(Dean 2007: 158-195). Even regarding the categories of subjects there is a polyphony of terms of art: 
Mark Duffield has moved from a conceptualisation of ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’ at the borderlands of 
liberal modernity (2005), to a frame of analysis that relies on the notions of ‘insured and non-insured 
life’, as well as ‘surplus life’ (2007: 1-31). 
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the pastoral nature of particular policebuilding techniques employed by the EU, Michael 
Merlingen summarises the nature of pastoral power thus:
At the core of the pastorate is a paternalistic order of difference. Its figures are, 
metaphorically speaking, the shepherd, a distinct and superior kind of being, and the 
flock to be cultivated and protected. The members of the flock are imagined to lack 
the habit  of or aptitude for making responsible choices. Hence, they are in need of 
constant  surveillance and hierarchically administered benevolence. The effect, albeit 
not necessarily the intention of the political pastorship, is to constitute subjects as 
inferior and dependent things (...) (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite2006: 30)
The authors then go on to describe how contemporary  police reform efforts within the 
framework of post-conflict peacebuilding are “underpinned by a rationality that joins, 
albeit uneasily, elements of both the pastorate and liberalism”, a process which works 
under the powerful liberal assumption that a more or less prolonged “period of pastoral 
discipline and administration is needed to inculcate habits of responsible choice into 
natives and install institutional capacities for liberal peace in violently  divided 
societies” (31). Noting that such a pastoral logic results in severe restrictions in  the 
freedom of subjects in exchange for the eventual improvement, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite presciently note the stark implications of this logic of rule for policebuilding, 
given that “the free persons posited by peacebuilding are always already situated in 
subject-moulding networks of power/knowledge” (31). 
Today, similar logics can be seen at work in regimes of development, foreign aid programs, 
and various instances of technical assistance. Local agency, having been identified as a 
legitimate and even urgent site of improvement or development, is nonetheless 
subalternised (Li 2007: 14-17, Prozorov 2004: 70-115, 254-262, 283-298). This 
inescapable tension between freedom and tutelage at the heart of liberal programs of 
policebuilding is the context that informs much of the analysis in the following chapters.
Finally, there is a group of subjects – or perhaps better said, given their characterisation 
and the governmental technologies deployed to deal with them – objects of government 
which are deemed as ‘beyond the pale’ of freedom. That is to say, they are perceived as 
wholly incapable – or, significantly – unwilling to perform freedom. Dean quotes, tellingly, 
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U.S. Secretary  of State Condoleeza Rice, who identifies these subjects as existing on the 
“wrong side of the freedom divide’. It is for these subjects that liberalism holds in reserve 
technologies of authoritarianism, surveillance, discipline and – ultimately – death. 34
These liberal logics of government through security – and specifically  through evolving 
regimes of conceptualising and deploying police – have thus far been analysed in more or 
less abstract terms, referring essentially to issues of governance within relatively bounded 
territories. However, and as already  suggested, the constant  expansion of liberalism as a 
rationality of governing throughout time, and its diffusion through international society, 
allows us to speak of global (liberal) governmentality. From the paragraphs sketched 
above, outlining some of the key characteristics of liberal modalities of rule over 
differently constituted populations, one can extrapolate important aspects to the study  of 
(American) policebuilding programs as tools of a developmental foreign policy, the core 
concern of this project. 
4. Globalising logics
4.1. Globalising crime, criminalising the global
When examining the transformations which the security field – as both a field of practices 
and a discursive field – have undergone since the end of the Cold War, one cannot but help 
to notice the increasing dominance of narratives about the dangers posed by international/
transnational crime. In other words, a veritable cottage industry  of scholarly and policy 
literature has emerged since the 1990's which forcefully  foregrounds globalised crime – 
often referred to as transnational organised crime - as a dominant threat (e.g. Edwards & 
Gill 2002, 2006).
Mainstream scholarly  narratives on this topic tend to focus on the existence of such crime, 
and the threats it poses to the security of Western liberal states (e.g. Berdal and Serrano 
2002; Allum and Seibert 2003; Farer 1999; Beare 2003; Raine & Cilluffo 1994, Shelley 
  
34  Giorgio Agamben,  referring to these logics, would say that they represent a form of bare life,  at the camp 
(Agamben 1998). His empirically unconvincing analysis notwhitstanding, scholars working in the 
Foucauldian tradition have seized upon the issue,  and have provided cogent critiques of these modalities 
of government in such sites as Guantanamo (Neal 2006)
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1995)35. These accounts point out that transnational crime has increased. Moreover, 
transnational crime has become adept at spawning bridges between criminal activities - for 
instance focusing on the terrorism-organised crime nexus (Makarenko 2004; Thachuk 
2001). These authors also warn that this crime-continuum (including transnational terrorist 
activities) represents one of the most  egregious and urgent security threats facing Western 
liberal states, and that this requires these states, and particularly  the U.S., to actively pursue 
a policy of “international crime control” (Finckenauer 2000; Williams 2006). However, as 
Andreas and Nadelmann shrewdly observe, “the globalisation of crime control (...) cannot 
be explained entirely or even primarily in terms of the functional need to respond to the 
globalisation of crime.” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 224). Instead, their analysis 
foregrounds the practices of security agents – especially  those in the employ of states – as 
key to what they term the “criminalisation” of international society, that is, the process by 
which “certain transnational activities came to be prohibited and targeted by  international 
crime control efforts in the first place.” (17). The authors further argue that the three main 
dimensions of this move, those that account for most of the globalisation of policing 
technologies as tools of state power and foreign policy,  are (i) the rise of global 
prohibition regimes, (ii) the intensification of trans-border institutional co-operation 
between States, a trend initiated by Western European countries almost a century ago, and 
(iii) the policies espoused by successive US administrations, which have caused it  to 
“emerge as a hegemonic policing power and leading global crusader against transnational 
crime”. (223).
An important added dimensions of such policies is the practices of security  experts (who 
Didier Bigo drolly  names “professional managers of unease”, Bigo 2002) as they compete 
by offering advice, echoing themes of domestic criminal policy  so familiar to Western 
citizens, to policy-makers that they should be “though on crime, tough on the causes of 
crime”. That is to say, Western states should pursue strategies to interdict criminal flows, 
but they should also identify the origins of such criminal flows and seek to address that. 
More often than not, recent analyses have framed the issue in terms of lack of governance, 
and have thus modulated the lack of governance (both at domestic level and at the 
international level) as a security issue (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 198; Giraldo and 
  
35  While I am focused here on literature that narrates such threats from transnational organised crime in 
relation to Western states’ security agenda, I do not mean to imply this concern with transnational 
organised crime has not become a key concern of states elsewhere (cf. e.g. Emmers 2003)
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Trikunas 2007: 355). In other words, in the same way that states have learned to govern 
through crime domestically, their task is now to expand parallel regimes globally (Aas 
2007; Findlay  2008; Inda 2006: 125-174; Lea 2002; Simon 2007; Walters and Haar 2005: 
99-101).
The insight that the criminalisation of certain forms of behaviour is a particularly expedient 
and especially effective form of governing individuals and populations is nothing new in 
the social sciences. Thus emerges the theme of security governance as leitmotif of 
contemporary discourses and practices of Western liberal states, the US most notably.
4.2. Globalising police? Early dimensions
If one way to approach the globalisation of these logics of liberal government is to look at 
the modulation of 'global crime' as an emerging security  field, one other route is to look at 
the globalisation of policing. As discussed above, the police power, and manifestations 
thereof, developed in an intrastate context, or rather, developed as part of the long, 
complex processes of state formation that  took place in post-medieval Western Europe. But 
since almost its early days in the 16th and 17th centuries, notions and practices of police 
have become increasingly  globalised. First as wave upon wave of Western imperialism 
exported the police power and police institutions, as part and parcel of the elements of 
“state export” (Badie 2000) that were so central to colonial experiments. But there were 
other, overlapping processes at work that contributed to the globalisation of the modern, 
liberal and largely Western police. The history of police co-operation, for instance, is long 
and rich, and is especially notorious around the turn of the 19th century when Western 
governments were reacting to what was seen as a vast and dangerous international 
anarchist movement. This section seeks to enumerate and describe some of the major 
historical dimensions of what we have previously called the globalisation of policing.
4.2.1. Foucault on inter-national aspects of “police” in Europe
In some of his 1978 lectures at the College de France36, Michel Foucault became one of the 
first contemporary authors to explore the links between the emerging technology  of 
government called 'police' and the inter-national politics of Western Europe in the 
  
36 These were the March 29th lecture (Foucault 2007: 311-332) and the April 5th lecture (Foucault 2007: 
333-362).
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Unfortunately, Foucault never fully  developed his 
thoughts on the international dimensions of 'police' beyond a few pages of lecture material, 
but he raises nonetheless important issues which resonate with the concerns of this chapter, 
and this dissertation more broadly. Foucault's work, albeit often comparativist in nature, 
never truly focused on international relations to any depth, but his 1978 lectures brought 
him to that unfamiliar field through a circuitous route. In analysing the rise of Raison 
d'Etat in European political imaginary, Foucault delves at  some length into how Raison 
d'Etat influenced not only relations of force within states, but also between them. 
It is in this context of changing dynamics of force between emerging European great 
powers, the establishment of what he terms the “diplomatic-military system”, and the 
nascent idea of a European balance of power, that Foucault  locates the international 
dimension of police. He entitled this brief excursus “the triple relationship  between the 
system of European balance and police” (Foucault 2007: x). The first  dimension is 
morphological: “(...) the problem of European equilibrium has as its main objective the 
maintenance of a balance despite the growth of the state (...), the problem of the police is 
how to ensure the maximum growth of the state's forces while maintaining good internal 
order” (314). Foucault calls the second relation between police and European balance of 
power a relation of conditioning, and elaborates: 
One can only  effectively maintain the balance and equilibrium in Europe insofar as each 
state has a good police that  allows it to develop its own forces.  There will be imbalances 
if the development between each  police is not  relatively parallel.  Each state must  have a 
good police so  as to prevent  the relation of forces being turned to its disadvantage.  One 
quickly arrives at  the, in  a way, paradoxical and opposite consequence, which consists in 
saying:  In the end, there will be imbalance if within the European equilibrium there is a 
state, not  my state, with bad police.  Consequently one must see to it  that there is good 
police, even in  other states.  European equilibrium begins to function as a sort  of inter-
state police or as right.  European equilibrium gives the set of states the right  to  see to it 
that there is good police in each state. (314-15)
Finally, Foucault suggests, there is an 'instrumental' relationship, since both the science 
and practice of early  modern police and the balance of power relied on detailed, actionable 
knowledge of each state's growth and capabilities, and therefore both relied on (indeed 
were instrumental to the development of) statistics. 
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What is the importance of these early insights in which Foucault tantalisingly  thinks 
through the internationalisation of police as a technology of government? First and 
foremost, it  establishes a very  early link between the objectives and techniques of foreign 
policy of modern states and the deployment of police (although, in this instance, merely  as 
a conceptual instrument for statesmen to make sense of the European balance of power, 
and not the deployment of actual police forces abroad). Second, it establishes that the 
police of other states is a legitimate object concern for a state's foreign policy, lest it breed 
“imbalance” or disorder in the society  of states – a theme which would eventually develop 
into a much more mature discourse of technical security assistance to states with weak 
internal security  apparatuses, as shall be examined in greater detail in the following 
chapters. And thirdly, it denotes that the exercise of “good police” is predicated upon, and 
dependent on, a series of technical knowledges (such as statistics), which are themselves a 
constitutive technology of rule.
4.2.2. “International social defence” - origins of international police co-operation
In addition to the conceptual importance of police for the foreign policy of major European 
states in search of balance of power, one other way in which police becomes part and 
parcel of the external relations of states is through cross-border police relations, what is 
usually  known as international police co-operation. There is now a large body of literature 
dealing with the origins and development of Western – essentially European, with the late 
and timid arrival of the U.S. - police co-operation (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 59-96; 
Deflem 2000, 2002, 2005; DiPaola 2007; Fijnaut 1993; Gerspacher 2008; Jensen 2001, 
2004; Liang 2002: 83-181)37. As one prolific author put it, the origins of the current 
regimes of international police co-operation lay in these “various efforts, especially on the 
European continent, to control the international spread of people and organizations that 
were held to be opponents of established political systems, such as socialists, democrats, 
liberals, and anarchists.” (Deflem 2005b: 275). Moreover, in the materials relative to the 
international conferences organised by Western European states to deal inter-
governmentally with anarchism (Rome in 1898, St. Petersburg in 1904), as well as “white 
slavery” (London in 1899, Frankfurt in 1902, Paris in 1902, 1904, and 1910), there seems 
  
37 It is intriguing to note that almost all of the extant literature on the birth and development of of 
international police co-operation – a well-documented, socially and politically relevant phenomenon 
since at least the last decade of the 19th century – has been produced in the last decade, roughly speaking.
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to percolate a sense of the transnational character of these problems, which are represented 
as “having no nationality”, and affecting an equally  non-national citizenry (Deflem 2005b: 
277-283, Liang 2002: 155-168).
This development is significant for the arguments of this thesis in at least  three ways. First, 
it neatly illustrates, and contributes to a better historical understanding of, the complex 
process of de-differentiation of the internal and external security fields of Western liberal 
states which Bigo alludes to, and which forms part of the theoretical background against 
which this dissertation emerges. In other words, these historical developments in 
international police co-operation help shed further light on the renegotiation of the inside/
outside divide through the emergence of specific knowledges and practices of security 
emanating from liberal forms of government. Moreover, the examination of this 
phenomenon reveals the intrinsically political nature of international policing activities, 
thus directly challenging the notion of a divide between political policing, usually 
portrayed as nefarious and/or anomalous, as opposed to 'good' criminal policing usually 
seen as a technical, neutral element. What actually seems to emerge is a sense that 
governments engage in the (evidently politicised) criminalisation of issues and in so doing 
eventually achieve legitimation for (politically) acting upon them. To put it  succinctly, and 
in terms congenial to the line of analysis espoused in this project, liberal states govern 
through security, which means modulating governmental problems in terms of security 
governance. Finally, it foregrounds the notion, advanced by the practitioners of the time 
themselves, of this international policing co-operation being directed at a social body, by 
talking in terms of “international social defence”38.
  
38 The Rome conference (24th November - 21st December 1989) was actually entitled “Conference 
internationale de Rome pour la defense sociale contre les anarchistes” [Rome international conference for 
social defense against anarchists] (Deflem 2005b: 275; Jensen 1981: 342). Interesting also, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, is the inevitable production of specific knowledges which went along with this 
particular instance of liberal governmental action: on the one hand, the conference's first order of business 
was to arrive at an agreed upon definition of anarchism (framing the issue, and enabling action),  which 
resulted in the clarification of an anarchist act as “having as its aim the destruction through violent means 
of all social organization” (Jensen 1981: 327).  This development dovetails neatly with Nikolas Rose's 
idea that around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, liberal governmental gaze and action began to 
focus on 'the social body', which leads him to speak of the 'invention of the social' as a key to 
undestanding modern forms of liberal government (Rose 1999: 112-133). On the other hand,  one of the 
main measures adopted by the conference – and indeed one of the only almost universally enforced by 
participant countries – was the adoption of the portrait parle, a system of individual identification and 
classification of anarchists and other criminals based on what today would be called biometric data (at the 
time, measurements of the facial and corporal characteristics of individuals),  based on the system 
invented by the French Alphonse Bertillon – commonly known as bertillonage.  (Jensen 1981: 332-334, 
but also Cole 2002: 32-59, Kaluzsynski 2001: 123-138 discusses at length the use of bertillonage as a 
technique of government).
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4.3. The globalisation of policing in U.S. foreign policy – between pastorate and pedagogy
It is now time to focus our attention on the United States of America, and the long 
historical relation between that state and several strands in the processes of globalising 
policing. The previous sections have thus far surveyed several historical trends which 
suggest that from its origins as a key  instrument of governing populations within emerging 
states in Europe, police has become slowly  but steadily intertwined with the foreign 
relations agendas of states. It is no coincidence, nor should it  strike us as a surprise, that in 
several of the dimensions analysed above, the U.S. government gained a prominent – 
indeed central – role, even if it  was often a “latecomer”. From exporting police models to 
its overseas dependencies, through leading global prohibition regimes, to its crucial role in 
the formation of Interpol – not to mention introducing the idea of 'international police 
power' to the world – the US has been at the forefront of modern states in using the police 
as a governmental technology outside its borders. Moreover, it has for a long time 
developed a repertoire of governmental modalities and governmental techniques associated 
with its externalisation of policing. These have, over time, congealed in more or less stable 
“regimes”: the one structured around the exercise of police over a population of subjects 
deemed too immature for self-government and in need of some form of pastoral care (but 
holding in reserve a series of more authoritarian mechanisms to survey and punish 
offenders beyond the pale); the other structured around assistential, technical regimes of 
development through the police (policebuilding), in order to effect social and political 
change through the inculcation of liberal habits in indigenous police institutions.
Neither exists in the absence of, or in direct contradiction to, the other. As the next few 
chapters shall seek to demonstrate, the rationalities of government and the attending 
practices of security which underpin American policebuilding oscillate between the two, in 
a relationship that can only be described as uneasy but productive tension. In the pages that 
follow, I shall seek to illustrate how such changes have taken place, and how the 
application of a Foucauldian lens to the practice of American policebuilding can illuminate 
important aspects of U.S. foreign policy, conceived as the attempt to expand and apply 
liberal governmentality over distant populations through apparatuses of security.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM CONSTABULARY TO CONSULTANT– 
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICEBUILDING REGIMES, 1880S-1980S
It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or 
entertains any projects as regards the other nations (…) save such 
as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the 
neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. (…) If a 
nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency 
and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and 
pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United 
States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a 
general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, 
as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized 
nation, and (…) may force the United States, however reluctantly, 
in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise 
of an international police power. (…)While they thus obey the 
primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they 
will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We 
would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it 
became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at 
home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or 
had invited foreign aggression (…). 
(Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address to the 
Senate and House of Representatives, Dec 6th 1904)
‘Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to 
extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively 
work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, 
and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of 
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September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, 
can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong 
states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and 
murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make 
weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders.’ 
(The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America 2002)
1. A new security frontier?39 Early U.S. policebuilding abroad
The previous chapters have alluded to the growing trend in U.S. security discourse and 
practice to substantially reconceptualise threats to international security as a matter of 
transnational criminal activities, a trend which demands in response more and better 
security governance mechanisms. Within that framework, the internationalisation of 
policing emanating from Western liberal states - as a governmental technology aimed at 
promoting liberal spaces of well-ordered prosperity – was foregrounded. In the case of the 
United States in particular, the recent record is bewildering. 
For instance, the FBI has a large number of Legal Attaché Officers (Legat's) stationed 
overseas, with an international presence “(...) in more than 70 key cities worldwide, 
providing coverage for more than 200 countries, territories, and islands.” (FBI  n/d, 
Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 132-34; Theoharis 1999: 165-66, 218-19)40. And since 
1994, when the first International Civilian Police mission was launched in Haiti, “(...) more 
than 7,000 experienced U.S. law enforcement officers and experts have participated in 
CIVPOL missions”, and over 1600 are currently  deployed worldwide (INL 2007). Clearly 
then, the complex process of globalisation mentioned previously is also having a major 
impact in  reconfiguring the way the U.S. deploy their police forces beyond their borders. 
  
39 The idea of American activities in police assistance and administration of justice programs representing a 
“new frontier” for policy-makers in the post-Cold War world was first proposed by Martin Andersen in a 
prescient 1993 article for the SAIS Review (Andersen 1993)
40 Additionally, at the municipal level one can observe similar trends. The New York Police Department, 
following the 9/11 attacks, has launched an ambitious International Liaison Program, and now has 
officers stationed as far afield as Madrid, Tel-Aviv, Singapore, or Amman (Nussbaum 2007, Pincus 2008)
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One can thus speak of the globalisation of American policing.41
This chapter builds on those themes, but instead of the more general points about the 
“criminalisation” of international security  in US foreign policy discourse, and the attendant 
internationalisation of policing mechanisms, it charts instead the rise of international police 
assistance as a key tool in US foreign policy. 
Police assistance has become a significant element of U.S. foreign and security  policy. 
David Bayley  concisely illuminates just how significant an issue international police 
assistance is today when he notes that “American efforts to assist police forces abroad are 
substantial, costing about $635 million per year in 2004, touching three-fourths of the 
world’s countries, and directly  involving several thousand police officers and other justice 
officials.”(Bayley 2006: 48). It is worth pointing out that the estimated budget advanced by 
Bailey was already  problematic in 2004, probably erring by default rather than excess, as it 
does not count covert forms of assistance. The numbers since then, particularly through 
police assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, have risen substantially, and interviews 
conducted with Department of State officials in late 2006 suggest that my own estimate of 
between $1-2 billion is closer to the mark42. Also, numbers of individuals involved in 
delivering police training and assistance abroad are contentious, particularly since there are 
no reliable figures on how many private contractors are currently operating in such 
programs – neither the Department of State nor the private sector have publicly released a 
reliable aggregate figure so far43. 
As has been emphasised in the previous pages, the internationalisation of policing is a 
complex process that has a wide range of manifestations. These include the expansion of 
  
41 The extant literature has been nothing if not prolific in devising terms for this, often encompassing 
disparate trends. One of the earliest works available spoke of the “internationalization of U.S. criminal 
law enforcement” (Nadelmann 1993), and one of the latest monographs to be published on the subject 
speaks of “crafting transnational policing” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007).  As shall be seen below, 
deployment of police forces or police power beyond a state's borders can take on a variety of formats, 
often with very different premises, objectives and results. In order to avoid confusion, therefore, I will use 
globalization of policing to refer to the ensemble of these trends, and specific headings (‘transnational 
crime control’ or ‘policebuilding’, for instance) when referring to any one of them in particular.
42  DC14, personal communication with the author, Washington, D.C., 6th December 2006; DC13, personal 
communication with the author, Washington, D.C.,  15th December 2006; DC29, personal communication 
with the author, Washington, D.C., 19th December 2006 (cf. Supplementary Sheet)
43  DC1, personal communication with the author, Washington, D.C., 2nd November 2006; DC5, personal 
communication with the author, Washington, D.C., 10th November 2006 (cf. Supplementary Sheet)
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institutional co-operation between police forces (Bigo 1996; Deflem 2000), the creation 
and deepening of international policing bodies (Deflem 2002), and the (by and large) 
unilateral expansion of policing jurisdictions by the U.S. (Nadelmann 1993, Andreas and 
Nadelmann 2006). Additionally, such a process of internationalisation is also manifest in 
the increased use of  civilian police (CivPol) contingents in peacekeeping operations (cf. 
Azimi 1996; Call and Barnett 1999; Hayden 2001), the use of “executive policing” in the 
latter context (Dwan 2002), and the growing operationalisation – at  a more abstract level – 
of an international police power (Dubber and Valverde 2006). However, what is meant in 
this chapter, and indeed throughout this dissertation, by U.S. international police assistance 
is a set of bilateral instruments (treaties, programmes, institutions) which aim to (re)build 
and/or reform internal security  institutions in ‘transitional countries’ (Lindholt et al 2003; 
Pino and Wiatrowski 2006; Wulf 2004), with a particular emphasis on those states 
emerging from conflict (Call 1997, 2002, 2007; Mani 1999; Neild 2001). 
This is a form of foreign aid which has become central to contemporary U.S. foreign 
policy practice, and which is enmeshed in a set of other related, bilateral programs – the 
training of foreign armed forces, the promotion of the rule of law abroad, the reform of 
foreign criminal justice systems, to name but a few. However, unlike global prohibition 
regimes such as the “war on drugs”44, it has a much more productive ethos (in the 
Foucauldian sense) – the ultimate goals are not primarily to interdict and punish certain 
forms of unlawful or criminal behaviour (although disciplinary, sometimes illiberal, 
practices certainly find their place in such assistance programs, as shall be seen), but to 
shape social institutions which are brought to bear on the conduct of individuals, 
socialising them in a particular way of relating to policing, and the rule of law more 
generally  – a crucial aspect in the promotion of liberal forms of governing to which we 
shall return at the end of the chapter45.
2. Early efforts (1898-1945)
As the opening quotations to this chapter demonstrate, the idea of American security  and 
  
44  On global prohibition regimes, cf. Ethan Nadelmann’s original article (Nadelmann 1990)
45  While there has been some recent, pathbreaking work on similar processes of socializing agents in 
international society, through the deployment security practices and inclusion in institutions of liberal 
security (cf. Gheciu 2005a, 2005b on NATO’s role), police assistance has received little or no attention in 
this analytical context.
94
vital interests being affected by  forms of international disorder and lawlessness emanating 
from neighbouring, underdeveloped states is not new. Concurrently, the solution found by 
the U.S. in the form of interventions to redress the rule of law in such places– state-
building avant la lettre, as it were – is also not entirely  new, and dates back at least  to the 
mid-1800’s, when America embarked on a host of interventions in the Caribbean and the 
Pacific. 
Although the (in)famous Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine reproduced above 
was at the time explicitly directed only to the nations of the Western hemisphere, it 
nonetheless remains a strongly influential precedent to more contemporary understandings 
– and practices – of U.S. interventionism (Holmes 2006; Mitchener and Weidenmier 2005; 
Ricard 2006). The themes that underpin the Corollary, and in turn laid the intellectual 
foundation for American interventions, range from the disavowal of American imperial 
design to a strongly  liberal view of a desirable international order as mirroring a state of 
domestic well-ordered, responsible freedom and prosperity. Particularly evident is the 
notion of the civilised nations (and, by logical extension, of which counted as uncivilised 
or barbaric ones), which leads to identifying the breakdown of social and political order in 
other states as an object of security concerns and ultimately security governance by the 
U.S. (cf. Holmes 2006: 63-86; Ninkovich 1986). Theodore Roosevelt – himself a former 
chief of police in New York – thus evinces an extraordinary degree of overlap with 
contemporary  U.S. discourses on international order and international security, particularly 
within the Bush administration . Almost a hundred years separate both statements, and yet 
the most remarkable thing is the underlying similarities in the concerns displayed and the 
solutions proposed46.
2.1. Caribbean blues
From 1898 to the mid-1930’s, just  before World War II, the bulk of US assistance to 
internal security forces was centred on the circum-Caribbean region, occurring in the 
context of US imperial expansion in the late 19th century, as the presence and influence of 
the rival Spanish Empire receded (Beede 1994). Under the general premises of the 
  
46 In fact, there is a direct and strong connection between both administrations, in that neo-conservatives in 
the Bush administration often and explicitly recognise their admiration for, and desire to emulate, the 
(foreign) policies of Theodore Roosevelt (cf. Halper and Clarke 2005: 35; Kristol 2004: 34; Kristol and 
Kagan 2004: 73-74). For an excellent discussion of the Rooseveltian theme of “national greatness”, and its 
impact on neo-conservatism, cf (Williams 2005: 318-320, fn. 23)
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Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and a policy of 'preventive intervention', 
“American armed forces intervened to restore order where local armies failed.” (Pérez Jr. 
1982: 168). It was in this context that the US intervened militarily in Cuba four times (in 
1898-1902, 1906-09, 1917, and 1921), in Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic 
(1916-1922), and in Nicaragua (1912-1933). Panama  was in fact a country  largely created 
on account of a 1902 US intervention47. The US also intervened militarily in Mexico's 
revolution (1914-1917) and for several brief times in Honduras48, but these interventions 
never developed into protracted occupations. To this list one should add American 
interventions in the Pacific archipelagos (Hawai’i, Samoa), of which the Philippine War 
(1989-1902) and its complex aftermath (1903-1934) was the most significant case.49
In many of these cases, and especially in those scenarios where initial military intervention 
by developed into a more or less protracted occupation, the U.S. had to tackle social unrest 
in these countries – be it in the form of political protests against the U.S. support 
government, full-blown insurgencies, or banditry in the countryside – and so created and 
trained several paramilitary  police forces, or constabularies. Generally speaking, the 
military – and particularly the U.S. Marine Corps – were the primary tool both of the 
intervention proper, and the stabilisation phase that followed (to use contemporary 
parlance), during which police reform or policebuilding efforts took place (Blake 1938; 
Ellsworthy 1974). 
  
47 After this intervention, which shielded the nascent republic from Colombian retaliation, U.S. Marine 
presence continued almost unabated 1903-1914 (cf. e.g. LaFeber 1990: 21-45; Major 2004: 9-190).
48 The US intervened during the Honduran revolution in 1903, in support of military operations in Nicaragua 
in 1907, in the context of the Honduran civil war in 1911, to protect economic interests in 1912, and in 
support of Honduran elections in 1919, and again in 1924-5. (Haggerty and Millet 1995)
49  For a full, annotated list of US armed intervention worldwide (1798-2001) cf.  Richard Grimmet’s report 
for the Congressional Research Service (Grimmet 2002)
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Fig. 1 – Caption reads: “The Filipino Americanised – constabulary soldiers, Manila, Philippine Islands” 
© 1907, H.C. White Co. Source: Digital collection, US National Archives, Washington D.C.
Police assistance, in these instances, was still bilateral in nature, but  differed markedly in 
both objectives and methods from what has become, especially  since the end of the Cold 
War, the standard of US policebuilding efforts. In terms of the methods, patterns differed 
greatly from case to case, from actual military  government of a country, to government by 
proxy, to several forms of limited or shared sovereignty (cf. Healy 1988; Munro 1934, 
1964, 1974; Musicant 1995, 1998). The actual “how-to” of police assistance delivery  on 
the ground varied, with cases as different as Haiti, where the U.S. created a gendarmerie 
force officered by Marines, and later “Haitianised” it (FRUS 1931: 403-4; Rausch 
1994:198-200); and Panama, where the U.S. convinced the local government that a 
standing Army would be a danger to the stability of the country and to the Canal 
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operations, and thus replaced the disbanded armed forces with a newly created National 
Police, which for over 40 years would be the only security  force in the country. However, 
one can summarily  characterise police assistance in the period as a mixture between (i) 
training and capacity building of indigenous forces, and (ii) the actual exercise by the 
occupying forces of policing functions with executive authority (what would later become 
known, in UN mission parlance, as “executive policing”, cf. Dwan 2003) – often for a 
prolonged period of time. 
The first two occurrences of U.S. police assistance abroad in this early period were the 
occupation of Cuba (1898/9) and of the Philippines archipelago (1899), both taken over 
from Spain in the wake of the Spanish-American War of 1898. They are also extremely 
significant, in that they  providing testing grounds for early U.S. strategies of 
policebuilding, the lessons of which were then applied in subsequent scenarios. 
In Cuba, after gaining possession of the island, the U.S. faced a scenario of devastation 
following the Cuban War of Independence (1895-8), with the rural economy laying in 
waste and a surge of banditry affecting the countryside, especially the Oriente province, a 
state of affairs that was soon to spread to the entire island (Perez 1986). With such a 
situation of general lawlessness, economic crisis, the formal disbandment of the Cuban 
Army – which meant lower changes for the reintegration of former combatants in civilian 
life, and a rise in banditry – the U.S. swiftly proceeded to establish a constabulary force, 
under the directives of Brigadier General Leonard Wood (cf. Hitchman 1994: 599-603). 
This initial force, modelled on the Spanish Guardia Civil and the Mexican Guardia Rural, 
was highly decentralised, fairly informal, and started off sharing its police and peace-
keeping duties with a variety of other police forces, including Cuban municipal police 
forces. Under the supervision of General Wood, who in the meantime had become Cuba's 
military governor, and a U.S. cavalry officer (Captain Herbert  Slocum), this makeshift 
constabulary would eventually turn into an official body, the Cuban Rural Guard (Millet 
1972: 191-196). 
The Guardia, as a typical constabulary force, straddled both police and military  functions. 
It was modelled largely on U.S. cavalry forces, informally trained and supervised by 
American officers, and even possessed artillery units. Nevertheless, it was charged 
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essentially  with maintaining social order in the Cuban countryside, and combating banditry 
on the island. As the name indicates, the Guardia was always inextricably  linked with the 
power of local landowners and rural 'big men', thus enforcing a conservative, and often 
racially-tainted, social order50.
This template was by no means unique to the Cuban case. In the Philippines, where the 
U.S. intervened in 1898 and stayed on until, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps similarly 
established a constabulary force, the Philippine Constabulary 51. The Constabulary had been 
created in July 1901, under the leadership  of Cavalry Captain Henry Allen, and by early 
1902 it already numbered 2000 men (Linn 1999: 19). Already in July  1902, the U.S. 
military government promulgated General Order 152, stating that the Philippines were 
officially  in a state of peace, and thus formally abolishing the military government, thereby 
transferring responsibility  for public security, law and order to a cadre of American civil 
administrators and to the Philippine Constabulary (26). There are indications that the 
Constabulary was hard at work in this task, with records showing that in 1901 alone, the 
force had captured over 3000 “bandits” (Keenan 2001: 304-305). By late 1902, the 
numbers of active duty  personnel within the force had gone up to 6000 men, garrisoned at 
over 200 posts throughout the islands. The Constabulary formally endured until the end of 
World War II, by which time it was formally assimilated into the Philippine Army (305).
While it existed, the force served several important purposes. According to historians 
Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, 
The Constabulary had the power to regulate the use of firearms, take the lead in health 
emergencies (typically cholera epidemics), and expand the telegraph  and postal systems 
throughout the archipelago. Regarded as “peace officers”, constabulary units were also 
charged to  prevent  and suppress brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies and 
breaches of the peace. The constabulary supervised municipal police forces to improve 
  
50 Harold Sims, in a short overview of the history of the Guardia Rural, confirms this point when he states: 
“The guardia Rural, for the most part, was dispersed throughout the countryside at the insistence of local 
landowners, who often provided land, supplies, telephone services, and whatever else was needed to 
maintain outposts. By 1905, just 28 of 288 such posts were state-owned. The Guardia was clearly linked 
to prominent rural sectors, and its recruitment system reflected that fact. Nonwhites were excluded from 
the officer corps; members had to pay for their own uniforms, and letters of recommendation from 
landowners were required for entry.” (Sims 1994: 215-216)
51 The Constabulary was established to replace the Guardia Civil, the similar institution which had operated 
under Spanish colonial supervision,  and was seen by American occupiers as venal and 
“irredeemable” (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 122)
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professionalism and thwart  politicization by elected local officials. (Abinales and Amoroso 
2005: 122)
The pattern of recruitment and training was similar to what had already  happened in Cuba. 
White American officers serving their commissions with the Army would fill the officer 
ranks (known as constables), the bulk of the force was composed of young male Filipinos 
between 18-25 years of age. Interestingly, one of the selection criteria was that they be 
bilingual in English and Spanish, the two administrative languages of the country - one 
assumes, on top  of their native language(s) (Keenan 2001: 305). As with Cuban policy, and 
with most subsequent cases, a policy of progressive indigenisation of the forces was 
sought. On this note, and while there is a dearth of archival or even secondary sources in 
what concerns their training routines, one can nonetheless infer from documental evidence 
(cf. Fig. 1, above) that American assistential efforts sought to “Americanise” the 
constabulary soldiers under its command (through the language requirements, their daily 
interaction with American commanding officers, their immersion in American 
administrative and legal structures, as well as their symbolic allegiance to the American 
flag). The two are by no means contradictory – while U.S. officials sought to gradually 
bring in natives into the officer corps (allowing for American experienced officers to move 
on), their integration was precisely premised on how well they performed by  American 
standards of professionalism and loyalty.
Not only was the template for establishing and deploying such a constabulary  force similar, 
in actual fact there was purposeful circulation of knowledge, techniques and personnel 
between Cuba and the Philippines. This is especially true of military officers moving from 
one commission to the next. For instance, General Leonard Wood, who had been military 
governor of Cuba 1899-1902, left that post to serve in various commanding and 
gubernatorial position in the Philippines (cf. Hitchman 2001: 599-603)52. His case was by 
no means unique. This trend, and the relative similarity  of the Cuban and Philippine cases 
(in that they were both former colonies of the Spanish empire, under the same nominal 
  
52 James Hitchman's portrayal of his military and political career in the colonial context offers an interesting 
note, in that it both details his efforts to establish civilian structures of government, and invest in the 
education and 'empowerment' of Filipinos in running their own destinies, but at the same time was a 
vehement critic of any suggestion that Filipinos (as late as 1916) were ready for self-government 
(Hitchman 1994: 602). This was by no means a paradoxical or uncommon attitude at the time, and 
resonates powerfully with some of the themes discussed in chapter two about the structures of deferral 
and trusteeship inherent in liberal schemes of development.
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legal and administrative tradition, and were under military occupation by the U.S.), 
ensured that  similar patterns of police assistance ensued. However, while in Cuba the 
Guardia Rural was essentially occupied with (re)establishing social control and fighting 
widespread banditry, in the Philippine archipelago the Constabulary  had to deal with fierce 
and organised resistance guerrillas. This added an important layer of militarisation to the 
nature and deployment of the Philippine Constabulary, who repeatedly  saw action and was 
employed for counter-insurgency purposes53.
The patterns of police assistance demonstrated in the Cuban and Philippine case were to be 
repeated with varying degrees of success. In Haiti, the U.S. established the Garde d'Haiti 
(later renamed Gendarmerie d'Haiti) (Beede 1994: 198-200; Bickel 2001; FRUS 1916: 
334-336; Renda 2001). Across the border, in the Dominican Republic, a force under the 
name of Guardia Nacional Dominicana was set up (FRUS 1913: 193-264, Peguero 2004: 
33-41; Roorda 1998: 18-22). In Nicaragua, the local version of a constabulary, the Guardia 
Nacional, played a similarly crucial role (FRUS 1923: 605-616, 1925: 618-646; 1927: 
285-478; Joes 2004: 134-6; Nalty 1968).
In short, the essentially military context of such interventions in the circum-Caribbean 
brought to the fore the establishment of “intermediary forces”, often referred to as 
gendarmeries or constabularies. In essence, these “intermediary forces” – as their name 
indicates – straddled the divide between internal and international security, between crime 
and warfare, between police and the military. They were of a paramilitary nature, meaning 
that while their organisational structure, equipment, and basic training are essentially 
military in nature, they  are – strictly speaking – not part of a country’s armed forces, and 
their primary mission is the maintenance of law and order internally. As Lutterbeck 
observes, gendarmeries were created to “(…) maintain law and order in the interior, chiefly 
in rural areas and along major thoroughfares(…)” and as such, historically speaking, “(…) 
gendarmeries were essentially instruments of the central powers in extending and 
consolidating their rule over the national territory, in particular the often ‘unruly’ 
countryside.” (Lutterbeck 2004: 47). Additionally, these forces have always had 
transnational and inter-national application, both in warfare proper, and in the following 
  
53 James Beede details that “The Philippine Constabulary helped suppress small units still fighting after the 
formal end of the Philippine War in 1902, control restive groups, such as the Muslims of the southern 
Philippines, and combat banditry” (Beede 1994: 121).
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phase of “winning the peace”. It is in this latter context that  they are most relevant to this 
study, as they highlight the application of a concept of policing which is markedly different 
from today’s, and in which gendarmeries were most preoccupied in fostering order in a 
given community  than in creating and maintaining a professionalized institution charged 
with criminal law enforcement, as discussed previously in chapter two. 
As for the objectives of such interventions and attending practices of police assistance, 
those most often adduced by scholars are twofold. On the one hand, the reason most often 
mentioned is the securing of U.S. economic interests in the region – a thesis most 
comprehensively illustrated by the work of Martha Huggins (Huggins 1998)54. Another 
reason adduced by  scholars is the coeval fear of a European colonial asserting a sphere of 
influence in the circum-Caribbean region and denying the influence of other Great Powers 
in the area (especially the then much feared German encroachment, Langley 2002: 13-15). 
The validity of these arguments notwithstanding, one should not fail to mention an 
overarching objective, or set of objectives, namely liberal reform premised on racial and 
cultural stereotypes of 'backward peoples'. However the mode in which this was achieved 
was not, by any means, democratic, nor did it seek to establish democratic, liberal 
institutions of government, at least not in the short-run. The policy  followed was thus one 
of self-regarded 'benevolent tyranny' bent on promoting (a particular type of) law and 
order, first and foremost, which – it was assumed – would establish the bases for stable 
government in such countries, giving them the opportunity, in the long run, to progress 
towards a social, political and economic model which emulated that of the United States 
(cf. Berger 1993). 
The Cuban case once again provides an illuminating example. Describing the political 
rationalities at work, Jennifer Bailey recounts the colonial improvement schemes: 
The military government  of Cuba undertook the reform of various institutions. As 
administered by Gen. Leonard Wood, it  attempted to build a stable, independent 
republic by renovating the educational and legal systems, improving the public works 
infrastructure, and training the Cubans in  self-government. In pursuing this course, the 
  
54 This should not be taken to mean that all explanations which emphasise this motive are necessarily about 
financial or monetary gain. Marha Huggins' work makes a compelling (but ultimately all too narrow) case 
for seeing American policing interventions at the time as attempts to enforce a particular set of labour 
relations (Huggins 1998).
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administrations of McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt  steered between evacuation and 
annexation (...) The majority in both countries, however supported the U.S. policy of 
remaining in Cuba for a few years to establish  durable government that would render 
future intervention unnecessary. (Bailey 1994: 137)55
Such a paternalistic policy, irrespective of its reformist and meliorist credentials, was 
bound to backfire, and indeed it is now widely  recognised – as a 'lesson learned' in the 
literature on police assistance, but also on more general historiographic accounts – that the 
establishment of constabulary units by the US in the circum-Caribbean region at the time 
led not to creating the bases of modernisation, but rather equipped local elites with the 
necessary tools for dictatorial, repressive government over their populations.
2.2. World War II police assistance & reform
In post-war Germany, the Allied forces faced a predictable breakdown in public order 
following the defeat of the Nazi regime. One of the first tasks of the Allied military 
government that ensued was to restore public order and reorganise the internal security 
forces in an extremely complex scenario, since a large number of police had been killed 
when drafted into the war effort, and many more were tainted by association with the worst 
excesses of Hitler’s regime. Paramilitary units with police functions which had abounded 
during the Nazi regime (most notably the infamous SS and SA) had to be disbanded (cf. 
Browder 2008; Dobbins 1999: 4, 9-12, Fairchild 1991). In other words, the internal 
security forces of post-war Germany were in shambles, and in order to tackle the violence 
and insecurity of citizens’ everyday life and combat more serious crime in the wake of 
Germany’s military  defeat (especially sabotage and banditry  from remnants of Nazi units 
roaming the country), the US turned to the constabulary solution once more – an idea 
which is reported to have originated in the War Department. In a historical review of the 
use of constabulary forces by the US, Tammy Schultz notes that: 
General George C. Marshall echoed this suggestion in a report  recommending U.S. 
Army officers lead local personnel in  Germany, Japan, and Korea. When General 
Marshall asked General Dwight D. Eisenhower to comment  on the plan, General 
Eisenhower modified the proposal for Germany by suggesting that  the constabularies 
  
55 Notice the remarkable similarity in discourse – in both the merging of security and development themes, 
but also in the politics of deferral and trusteeship mentioned in chapter two – between the political 
discussion about the occupation of Cuba (1898-1902) and the contemporary American presence in Iraq 
(2002-present).
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be staffed by all U.S. military personnel, with no  German personnel. (Schultz 2005: 
17-18, quoting Snyder 1947)
As a result, in November 1945, the European Theatre Command issued order to turn a 
mixture of in-theatre military units into a paramilitary  force, the US Constabulary, which 
also came to be known among their military counterparts by the colourful name of “C-
Circle-Cowboys”, and established US constabulary school at Sonthofen, Bavaria. The 
recruitment, equipping and training of these forces, under Major General Ernest Harmon, 
lasted roughly from November 1945 until July 1946, by which time the US Constabulary, 
composed of approximately 38.000 soldiers, formally assumed its security  duties (Brouse 
2006: 38-39). Simultaneously, as the US constabulary performed a variety of primary 
“public order” tasks (in particular disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of 
combatants, or DDR) and secured Germany’s borders, the actual training of local police 
forces began to take place under the Public Safety Branch of the US occupation forces. By 
October 1945, 22.000 German policemen had been trained and equipped with light 
weapons, and by mid-1947 General Lucius Clay  declared the German police to be “fully 
competent” (U.S. Dept. Army 2003). 
However, one should take this official and rather streamlined version of events as it 
appears in some military  histories with a pinch of salt, as U.S. police assistance efforts 
continued well into the 1950’s, and in a relatively  discontinuous way. Moreover, the 
manner, duration, and curricula of police training varied according to the geographic area 
of occupation, and it reflected the national traditions of each of the occupying powers 
(Fairchild 1989: 456). 
While the American, British, and French occupiers alike agreed on the paramount 
importance of ‘democratising, demilitarising and decentralising’ West Germany’s police, 
they  went about doing that in fairly different ways. As a result, only the French model was 
palatable to the Germans in the long term (Fairchild 1989: 457), while the British model 
was gradually adapted and changed in a series of negotiated tensions with the local context 
(Mueller and Kröger 1960). The American model was the “most radical of all”, involving 
“communalization of all police forces in towns over 5,000 in population, break-up of the 
police schools in which recruits were trained for police work at the same time that they 
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served as riot and emergency  forces, and total civilianization of police 
operations.” (Fairchild 1989: 456). In short, the US was using policebuilding as a (foreign) 
policy tool, in order to achieve radical reconfiguration of the social and political structures 
of post-war Germany, so as to achieve two key objectives. On the one hand, the U.S. 
sought to create a democratic police force in support of a democratic Germany; while on 
the other hand it sought to maintain German police under the control of local, competing 
authorities in such a way  that avoided any future possibility  of a central police force ever 
again being co-opted into the war effort (Fairchild 1989: 456). In time, the post-occupation 
German state would gradually  adapt  this American legacy, ending up with a mixed system, 
somewhere between its traditional continental model of police (pre Nazi period), and the 
more de-centralised model imposed by  American policy-makers in the immediate post-war 
period.56
In Japan, police assistance in the post-war period followed a very different model, with 
reform of indigenous institutions achieved almost entirely through the Japanese politico-
legal system (cf. Nakahara 1955). In fact, the Japanese police was, under MacArthur’s 
General Order Number One, exempt from surrender and disarmament (Chwialkowski 
1998: 722). Although the process of police reform was initiated and supervised by  Gen. 
MacArthur’s staff, no actual constabulary unit was formed or deployed in the Pacific 
Theatre by the Allies or the U.S on its own, as had been the case in Germany. One author 
offers an explanation of why  this may have been so: “The decision to engage in an indirect 
Occupation meant that the police were indispensable to the Americans, and ensured that 
the institution would not be radically  altered until other reforms had been successfully 
pushed through.” (Aldous 1997: 43)
But it is interesting  to note that the US insisted on greatly  increased numbers of police 
officers in post-war Japan, and also encouraged and supervised the creation of the National 
Police Reserve (NPR), a constabulary type force which, although always referred to as a 
  
56 This should not surprise us. Indeed, it points to an important feature in any governmentality analysis of 
liberal interventions: they have to suffer a process of “translation” so as to adapt to the specificities of 
local conditions. Indeed, if the hallmark of liberal government,  as we have seen in chapter two, is the 
subtle mobilisation of the desires and expectations of the government, so as to align them with the 
programmatic objectives of government, then policies have to adapt to those same desires and 
expectations. Moreover, governmental interventions – although suffused by asymmetric power relations – 
nonetheless frequently engender resistance.
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police force, de facto constituted an embryonic armed forces (Wildes 1953: 656)57. The US 
Marines, which were deployed in-country some 2-3 months in advance of actual Allied 
military government, co-operated with existing police, who billeted them. Given the highly 
militarised nature of the Japanese Rural Police units, they liaised easily with Marines, but 
there was no actual deployment of an American constabulary. Instead, as early as February 
1946, General MacArthur set in motion the process of police reform when
he requested the services of former New York  City Police Commissioner Lewis J. 
Valentine. The Valentine Commission, together with a second body headed by 
Michigan State Police Commissioner Oscar J. Olander, planned the entire program of 
police reform. The Valentine group  studied municipal police systems, while the 
Olander group prepared recommendations for reorganization of the rural police. 
(Braibanti 1949: 19)
The overhaul of the Japanese police structures was profound, and not only  in terms of 
force structure, or regulatory framework. Indeed, even more so than in Germany, the US 
occupation effectively  oversaw and implemented a change in policing paradigm: from an 
imperial police state which drew heavily on the Polizeiwissenschaft of pre-Weimar 
Germany and Napoleonic France (cf. Aldous 1997: 21-28; Jansen 2002: 400-402; Sims 
1998; Tipton 1990: 45), to a democratic police force at the service of the public according 
to the model then in vigour in the U.S.. Lewis Valentine, himself a former police officer, 
made his intentions plain from the outset: ‘Stating that  it was his intent to “see the 
Japanese police force patterned on that of New York City”, Valentine insisted that the 
Japanese police officer think of himself not as an object of control, but as a “real friend of 
the people”’ (Chwialkowski 1998: 724). The police were no longer to have jurisdiction on 
matters of public sanitation, fires, health and safety, labour organisations, and a myriad 
other issues reminiscent of 16th, 17th and 18th century Continental police traditions. Neither 
were they  to be seen as an arm of the state apparatus potentially  in charge of productively 
organising and administering all aspects of life (economic, social, political, and even 
intimate) and welfare in a system of well-ordered prosperity. Rather, they were simply an 
institution charged with the relatively negative and reactive role of ensuring public safety 
and fighting crime, in the service of their respective communities.
  
57  In 1954, the NPR became the Japan Self-Defence Forces.
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Interestingly, and tellingly, the model proposed by Olander and Valentine, and 
implemented under the supervision of MacArthur – even though it was realised in such a 
unique manner - followed one central tenet in common with the reform of post-war 
German police, and that was decentralisation. This was not simply  a case of pure 
translating the American experience with a highly decentralised police organisation58 into 
the Japanese context. Rather, the US clearly  wanted to make sure that  in this particular 
instance of nation-building (as was the case in Germany and Japan), the central state 
apparatus would be weak, at any rate in terms of having power over the institutions dealing 
with internal security. In a clear parallel with the German post-conflict  scenario, “[a]ll 
towns and villages with a population of over 5,000 inhabitants were required to raise and 
maintain their own police”, which caused “the creation of over 1,600 police units, each 
operating as a separate force, with more than 1,400 supervising small towns and 
villages.” (Chwialkowski 1998: 724).
2.3. The gradual retreat from a constabulary strategy
Although the constabulary strategies deployed by  the US, as we have seen, varied greatly 
according to the region, country and time, one can detect a number of common traits in the 
first 50 years of US international police assistance. Derek Lutterbeck has astutely  observed 
that developments in security since the end of the Cold War and the attending shifts in 
security practices by Western liberal states, as analysed in chapter one above, have led to a 
blurring or de-differentiation of internal and international security fields and, as such, have 
once again brought  to attention the crucial role of “intermediary” or constabulary forces 
(Lutterbeck 2004, 2005). During the period analysed in this section, post-conflict policing 
duties were accordingly performed by paramilitary forces, with actual training of local 
police forces generally not perceived as a priority. When they did take place, such efforts 
were usually ad hoc and short-term, and they were entrusted to, and performed by, private 
individuals (such as retired police chiefs, or military  offices) under some sort of contract 
  
58  The US still possesses, to this day, no national police force. Police forces are essentially municipal in 
nature, and the overall picture is that of a bewildering patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions. With close 
to 18.000 independent police agencies in 2004 (USDOJ – BJS 2007), the picture by David Bayley sounds 
accurate enough: “The United States has no general principles for organizing [police] coverage. Almost 
any government can create police, unconstrained by considerations of geographical scale,  overlapping 
jurisdiction,  optimum size, or efficiency. (…) [T]here is a hodgepodge of autonomous forces created by 
various levels of government according to parochial considerations. American police coverage is made of 
patches on patches rather than tailored to fit.” (Bayley 1979: 124).  For an excellent historical study on the 
municipal nature of police power in the US, and the changes brought about by the creation of federal 
police institutions, see (Novak 1996).
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with the Departments of War or, more usually, the Department of State. 
The German and Japanese experiences with post-conflict  police assistance in the wake of 
major warfare and subsequent occupation hold some important insights, historically 
speaking, about US policebuilding strategies, both in terms of continuities and important 
ruptures. While still largely  based on the use of constabulary force with executive authority 
to achieve public order prior to developing and training local police forces, and while still 
remarkably  shaped by the demands of policebuilding in the wake of intervention and/or 
violent conflict, often in regions where the occupying forces enjoy little legitimacy with 
the populace, these experiences nonetheless sowed the seeds of change in terms of US 
approaches to policebuilding. 
The first step was a gradual recognition, still below the level of actual articulation but quite 
visible when pouring over the difficulties faced by  each successive US intervention, that 
there was no actual framework – legal, institutional, budgetary  – to deal with 
policebuilding proper. As a result, one can see that  the experiments with police assistance 
in both Germany and Japan, unlike most earlier attempts, actually emphasised and 
followed through on the development of local police capability. Secondly, they started a 
preoccupation with the reform of the wider structures (legal, political, institutional, and 
social) in which police-(re)building must perforce occur. And finally, and perhaps more 
importantly, these variegated experiences at the end of the Second World War began 
highlighting the connection between state-building (especially re-making internal 
structures of security governance in a way conducive to particular forms of modern liberal 
government) and democracy promotion (as evinced in discourses of democratising the 
police and democratising through the police) as intertwined overall strategies within which 
US police assistance would take place. In short, the lessons drawn from police assistance 
until the Cold War, as discussed in the next section, opened the way for the creation of 
more specific, durable institutions and policies of international police assistance. This also 
reflects a slow, gradual change in paradigm from wanting to establish a rough semblance 
of order in post-conflict scenarios, to the linking of policebuilding with democratisation, 
the overarching concern of US foreign policy since at least the 1990’s.
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3. “Foreign internal security assistance” - The Cold War years
Regarding American deployment of police assistance abroad, the Cold War years, from the 
mid-1950s to the creation of the International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program 
(ICITAP) in 1986, were a remarkable period in at least two ways. The first, as shall be 
analysed further below, is the degree to which institutional and intellectual developments 
in the field at this time came to shape in significant ways the evolution of US police 
assistance, allowing the overall paradigm of police assistance to transition gradually from 
earlier ad hoc interventions deploying constabulary forces to maintain public order in post-
intervention scenarios, to a much more constant, sustained and articulated policy  of 
support, training and equipping foreign police forces, in order to develop local capabilities 
and (to a degree) local ownership of the process. Similarly, it was a period that highlights 
the transition from an essentially militarised form of police assistance taking place in a 
vague institutional haze, and almost without means of regulation or effective legislative 
oversight, to a policy environment characterised by  multiple competing agencies seeking 
to achieve the status of lead nation or focal point, a growing primacy of civilian agencies 
and concepts (at least until 2005), and heavy regulatory framework – paradoxically, as a 
result of so many ideologically tainted abuses of human rights in Latin America during this 
period. Moving from the structural to the programmatic level, the operational concept at 
this time was that of “foreign internal security  assistance”, that is, assistance to the internal 
security forces (police, gendarmeries, paramilitary groups) of foreign countries in the 
context of anti-Communism and counter-insurgency. The key player throughout this period 
was the Office of Public Safety.
3.1. Policebuilding as anti-communism – The Office of Public Safety (1962-1974)
The bases for the establishment of the Office of Public Safety were created under the 
Eisenhower administration in 1957, and the effort saw a substantial follow-through during 
the Kennedy years. A previous study, commissioned in 1954 by the National Security 
Council, had focused on strengthening “(…) the internal security forces of friendly foreign 
countries" and on developing a coordinated effort to deliver police assistance abroad as a 
"first line of defense" against  “subversion” (LeFever 1973, quoted in McClintock 2002). A 
spate of “Public Safety Programs” ensued, from as early as 1955 (in Indonesia) 
(McClintock 2002), and although prolific evidence has since then come to light that  proves 
beyond doubt the extensive infiltration and instrumentalisation of such Public Safety 
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Programs by  the CIA, the majority of experts on the ground were civilians with a law-
enforcement background. The result was the creation of an Overseas Internal Security 
Program, and later on – in 1962 - the Office of Public Safety itself59. Officially under the 
aegis of the International Co-operation Administration (AID’s predecessor) and then the 
USAID, the Office was in fact closely linked to the CIA (cf. Lobe 1983). In fact, its 
director from 1962-1973, Byron Eagle, was widely rumoured to be a “Company man” 
himself (McClintock 2002). 
Police training in these instances was seen essentially as a means of fostering a sort of 
“early warning” system that would allow the US to anticipate social upheaval, “subversive 
activities” and Communist infiltration (Rosenau 2003; Jones et  al 2006: 10-11). Training 
thus clearly  emphasised the police function as an arm of state power (a police force), rather 
than a service for the citizenry (a police service). Most treatments of these policies have 
focused this aspect, highlighting the negative, repressive, and violent nature of US police 
assistance during this period. Martha Huggins, for example, explores in detail the origins 
of OPS, and particularly the effects in Latin America, where she highlights the centrality of 
disciplining labour relations, and squashing any political dissent (Huggins 1998). While 
this denunciation is highly important, especially in that it sheds light into former human 
rights abuses, and potentially triggers a “lessons learned” mentality regarding “foreign 
internal security  assistance” in US foreign policy with important repercussions today  (cf. 
Jones et al. 2006),  it nonetheless presents only a partial view of things.
The work of Robert Holden offers a richer and more interesting view as he speaks of two 
main motives for US involvement in Central America during the Cold War years in 
productive terms, what he dubs the twin objectives of “modernisation” and 
“security” (Holden 1999). In fact, separating the two is not as interesting as seeing their 
  
59  The National Security Council memoranda which led to the eventual establishment of the OPS under the 
Kennedy Administration can all be found online. With suggestive and transparent titles such as “Training 
for Friendly Police and Armed Forces in Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Subversion, Riot Control and 
Related Matters” (NSAM 114) or  the laconic “Police Assistance” (NSAM 177), they are an invaluable 
instrument to understand the changing rationalities of police assistance in Washington at the time. The 
latter document, NSAM 177 of 7th Aug. 1962, was crucial for the creation of the OPS, and also its 
location within AID. Stating that “The US should give considerable greater emphasis to police assistance 
programs in appropriate less developed countries (…)”,  it charged the Administrator of AID “(…) in his 
capacity as coordinator of US aid programs, with responsibility for coordination and vigorous leadership 
of all police assistance programs; that he establish an interagency policy group, to be chaired by his 
designee, to assist him in this responsibility.” (NSC 1962). The memoranda can be found online in the 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum collection: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical
+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/NSAMs.htm 
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interrelationship  and the tension between them, and to bring out the fact  that, as this 
dissertation has been highlighting since the beginning, the US often attempted to 
modernise through security, and secure through modernisation. However, Holden makes a 
powerful case, and allows us to highlight two important aspects of US police assistance 
during the Cold War years. On the one hand, it is important to note how, in assisting the 
internal security forces of host countries in Central and South America, the US was not 
only providing resources that ultimately allowed local elites to stay in government through 
non-democratic means and brutally suppress any dissent or opposition, but also – and more 
crucially – the US was again using police assistance as a prime tool of its foreign policy. 
Thus, under an essentially  technical rubric – development aid to governments in its sphere 
of influence – the US managed, if not to promote a particular (liberal) logic of governance, 
at least to impede a competing (illiberal) rationality of government to take hold. Once 
again, development aid tools and national security objectives were inextricably linked. On 
the other hand, as noted also by Holden, regardless of the atrocities to which it 
unfortunately  led, this policy of building up police forces in Third World countries in effect 
amounted to a long exercise in state-building, by boosting the state’s capacity in terms of 
surveillance and the monopoly over the means of coercion. Another author, specifically 
making the bridge between this reasoning and the centrality of modernisation theory within 
the context of Kennedy’s foreign policy, concurs:
Foreign internal security assistance, as a component of counterinsurgency, reflected tenets 
of modernisation theory. Central to that  theory was a belief in the importance of 
strengthening institutions of the state. As articulated by administration strategists, the role 
of police and paramilitary forces was to expand the presence of the state, and to shield 
fragile institutions from communist  subversion during the difficult transition to modernity. 
(Rosenau 2003: 66)
The impact of the OPS should not be underestimated. In little more than a decade (and less 
than two even if we consider the earliest “public safety programs” under Eisenhower), it 
trained and/or equipped over half a million personnel in more than 41 countries (McHugh 
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1994)60, where it also significantly boosted institutional capabilities (albeit in a lopsided 
manner that over-privileged the host countries’ security  institutions)61. Furthermore, the 
OPS represents a line of continuity between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy 
administrations, without major differences except  in “packaging” (Rosenau 2003, passim). 
More importantly, its workings also crystallise the emerging doctrine of US police 
assistance as it operated throughout the Cold war years, and allow us to have a glimpse of 
the lines of change and continuity in this policy. 
Four issues stand out in this respect. First, one must highlight the importance of police 
assistance instruments in contexts where military training and assistance - or indeed full-
fledged military deployment - would be unacceptable. This led to a regime of practices that 
gradually came to emphasise the “local ownership” of security  tasks, and the need to 
develop local institutions and skills to cope with security  demands (cf. Rosenau 2003: 72), 
a trait significantly different from earlier experiences in the circum-Caribbean region, and 
somewhat more mature and constant than during WWII.
Secondly, the interpenetration of programs and agencies involved in bilateral police 
assistance, ranging from U.S. military advisors (albeit in ever-decreasing roles as far as 
actual police training was concerned), to the Department of State through USAID, to the 
CIA and the Drug Enforcement Association. This inevitably created a sort  of institutional 
fog, filled with tensions (not least between civilian and paramilitary  agencies), a feature of 
U.S. police assistance that has remained to this day. This dispersion of authority and 
objectives in terms of agencies involved is mirrored in the variety  of instruments used to 
deliver police training. These included exchange programs, with foreign counterparts 
typically coming to the U.S. for relatively short periods of intensive training at American 
institutions, the use of contractors to deliver in-country  assistance and training, to the 
  
60  Different authors present conflicting numbers. While the chapter generally follows the numbers resented 
by Heather McHugh in an official report by the Congressional Research Office (McHugh 1994), at least 
two other prominent authors – Charles Call (Call 1998: 317) and Martha K. Huggins (Huggins 1998: 111) 
– indicate a much higher figure,  citing sources to support their view that the OPS trained over a million 
police personnel during it’s brief tenure.  Whatever the case, both figures would support this section’s 
general argument about that the impact and influence of the OPS on subsequent US experiences with 
police assistance should not be underestimated, the paucity of literature dealing with it notwithstanding. 
61  This stance is clearly linked to the perspective of Samuel Huntington, who not only recognised the trend 
in his Political Order in Changing Societies (Huntington 1968), but spoke approvingly of it. Echoing the 
general ethos patent in American security assistance circles at the time, Huntington suggested that a 
country’s security forces are often the best equipped to lead a nation through the stages of development 
while simultaneously keeping potential social unrest resulting from rapid modernisation under control.
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creation of purpose-built training institutions, such as the original International Police 
Academy which today has several successors (Huggins 1998: 108-115, Marenin 1998). 
Thirdly, it is important to note the emphasis placed, at the level of the overall intellectual 
trends informing U.S. police assistance abroad, on internal security  institutions – in 
particular the police – as visible markers of state power, and as “barometers” of a state’s 
ability  to perform. This bears witness to the gradual linking of security assistance (and 
therefore the overall objectives of the U.S. national security) with modernisation theory, 
and a drive to develop Third World countries. This marks an important step in articulating 
the ideas of “security assistance as development” (so prevalent today) and “development 
assistance as obtaining security”, particularly the intellectual strand that affirms the link 
more and better governance institutions (including security governance) and the U.S.’s 
ability  to diminish or at least manage security threats of a non-military nature. Finally, on a 
very practical level, it  is important to note here the beginnings of the association between 
U.S. police assistance abroad and a counter-narcotics strategy, a move which would have 
enormous impact for the future (cf. Neild 2005; Kuzmarov 2003).62
Despite the centrality of Office of Public Security in reorganising and giving shape to 
American international police assistance efforts, nothing could mask its instrumental role 
in supporting – sometimes directly  participating in - repressive regimes and repressive 
practices abroad, which included kidnappings, torture, assassination and other grave 
human rights abuses63. Criticism of the OPS and U.S. security aid more generally  became 
strident and extensive, especially  in a time of widespread protest  against the Vietnam War 
and the rise of domestic social activism, and it reached the highest levels of government. 
Under pressure from Senators James William Fullbright  (who had started criticising the 
methods the OPS employed or promoted in Latin America as far back as 1966) and James 
Abourezk (Huggins 1998: 113-115; Nadelmann 1993: 116), a worried Congress took firm 
action, and the Office was finally dissolved in 1974, under a legal provision in the Foreign 
Assistance Act called Section 660. This section, entitled “Prohibiting Police Training”, 
clearly stated that
  
62  The OPS started counter-narcotics work in Iran and it included “specialized narcotics training” into the 
curricula at the International Police Academy (Lafever, quoted in McHugh 1994: 12)
63 For the most comprehensive, and most current, overview of the OPS’s repressive acts, which nonetheless 
links it convincingly with the modernisation ideas behind American foreign policy cf. (Kuzmarov 2009)
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On and after July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to carry out this Act, and 
none of the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to provide training or 
advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement 
forces for any foreign government  or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance 
on behalf of any foreign government  within  the United States or abroad. (Foreign 
Assistance Act 1961/2002: 358-359)
3.2. An exceptional decade (1975-1985)
However, despite the stringent prohibitions imposed by  Congress between 1974 and 1975, 
largely to curb or avoid altogether the excesses associated with the Office of Public Safety, 
international police assistance continued to be a key instrument of U.S. foreign policy. 
Despite the tone of finality  in Section 660, and while the institutional focal point that had 
been the OPS was irretrievably gone – and rightly so, given its track record in human 
rights abuses – the various components of police assistance were again dispersed 
(Nadelmann 1993: 118-120). Through a number of exemptions, particulars programs and 
institutions have been excepted from the ban, and allowed to pursue foreign aid policies in 
the area of police assistance and reform, a fact that is candidly  acknowledged in both the 
academic literature and its policy counter-parts. As one scholar succinctly puts it,
The general prohibition of aid for police has, nevertheless, not  hindered the evolution 
of a gamut  of programs through what  can be described as a “policy of exemptions” to 
Section 660. Rather than preventing police assistance as originally intended, the 
section's statutory authority has been hollowed out  by a series of exemptions that have 
created multiple channels of funding for diverse programs through multiple agencies. 
(Neild 2005: 66)
Even when institutions were closed down – such as the pioneering International Police 
Academy – that represented only  a temporary lull.64 And USAID, despite being mired in 
legal restrictions, was still conducting assistance under the heading of anti-narcotics, right 
  
64  In 1995, the Clinton Administration, as part of its strategy to combat transnational crime and strengthen 
foreign criminal justice systems, paved the way for the opening of a series of International Law 
Enforcement Academies (ILEA’s) to serve as regional focal points for delivering some police assistance, 
particularly in terms of renewing and modernizing curricula, and imparting organizational and 
management skills to foreign police personnel. Direct heirs of USAID’s international Police Academy, 
there are currently five ILEA’s (Budapest,  Bangkok, Gaborone, San Salvador and Roswell New Mexico), 
which handle a large amount of US bilateral police assistance outside post-conflict intervention scenarios. 
For further information on ILEAs, see the DoS’s website on the subject, available online at: http://
www.state.gov/p/inl/ilea/ 
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through the 1980’s and 1990’s (McHugh 1994: 12-16).
However, such efforts were disjointed. In the words of one policy analyst, this 
multiplication of sites and programs has created “patches of agency  turf and competition 
for programs and funds”, in such as way as to make it “impossible to have a national police 
assistance program or to develop policy guidelines and coordinated programs within the 
parameters of current law and funding” (Neild 2005: 66). As an analyst for the 
Congressional Research Service candidly echoes in a 1994 report for Congress, “[t]he US 
government lacks a clear and consistent policy  on the role of US assistance to police forces 
in the new and emerging democracies” and went on to notice how “[it] lacks clearly 
defined program objectives; lacks a focal point for coordination and decision-making; and 
lacks a means for determining whether individual programs and activities support US 
policy or contribute to overall  US interests.” (McHugh 1994: 5, emphasis in the original) 
The OPS, for all its immense faults, had provided a focal point for articulating (albeit with 
tensions and difficulties as mentioned before) US policy on bilateral police assistance, but 
after 1974, no such institutional focal point existed, leading to further disarticulation 
between the agencies still involved in some type of police assistance. Ad hoc interventions 
became common, as indeed they had been until the aftermath of WWII.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of this process is the fact that, starting in 1983, the 
Reagan administration had obtained from congress the first of a series of “waivers”65 from 
section 660, in order to implement – again through the Agency for International 
development - a series of “administration of justice” programs in Latin America (Call 
1998: 318-320).  These exemptions, and the resulting “administration of justice” programs, 
confirm the insight that the Cold War years in general, and the decade between 1974 (the 
abolition of the OPS) and 1986 in particular, were an exceptional and transitional period. 
In terms of deploying police assistance abroad, one can perhaps speak of a gradual but 
very thorough hollowing out of the legal restrictions on police assistance. In fact, for the 
meagre eight lines of Section 660 quoted above which clearly  prohibited all police 
assistance of any kind abroad (Sub-section (a)), there are three sub-sections, seven clauses, 
  
65  While the literature often mentions such exemptions from section 660 as “waivers”, this is perhaps not a 
correct terminology. In this chapter either the legal term is used under scare quotes, or else referred to as 
exemptions and exceptions more generally. I thank Nina Serafino, of the Congressional Research Service, 
for pointing this out to me and guiding me through the intricacies of the legal apparatus surrounding Sec. 
660.
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and a whopping 53 lines of legal code that detail all manner of exceptions and exemptions 
to the rule. This is of course not mentioning a raft of other legal provisions in the Foreign 
Assistance Act which specifically  permit and regulate other police assistance activities. In 
fact, this hollowing out – which corresponds roughly to the gradual dénouement which 
preceded the end of the Cold War – makes one wonder, as some analysts do, whether one 
should even keep Section 660 at all within the newly amended Foreign Assistance Act66.
Inevitably, the Cold War logic of containing the spread of global communism pervaded the 
Reagan administration's attitudes towards police assistance, and towards the restrictions 
that Congress had imposed on it. In fact, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Elliot Abrams testified before Congress in 1984 that the “flat ban on aid to police 
forces [was] counterproductive” and that it “really would be awfully helpful if we could do 
that” once more (Abrams, quoted in Cottam and Marenin 1989: 589)67. Thus, while 
Reagan's administration sought to clearly  distance itself in the public’s eye from the human 
rights abuses perpetrated under the guise of police assistance at the time of the OPS, it 
nonetheless pressed hard to retain some capability to train and assist security  forces 
abroad. 
This was a notoriously  strong policy drive when it came to Latin America, and such a 
move must be understood within the context of the 'second Cold War', Reagan's 'Evil 
Empire' speech and the consequent hardening of American policies68. Following the 
recommendations of a 1984 report by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America (chaired by none other than Henry Kissinger) with regards to resuming police 
assistance, the Reagan administration actively sought to change “the law while 
  
66  DC16, personal communication with the author, Washington D.C., 11th December 2006; and DC2, 
personal communication with the author, Washington D.C., 7th November 2006.
67 It is interesting to notice here the early involvement of Elliot Abrams in lobbying Congress for lifting the 
prohibition on American police assistance, given his well known ties to the neo-conservative movement, 
and his controversial tenure in the Bush Administration (Dobbs 2003).
68 One can also make some sense of this through Jeanne Kirkpatrick's work. In her controversial but 
immensely influential article “Dictatorships and double standards” (Kirkpatrick 1979), she argued that 
American policies,  especially in Latin America should heed the distinction between totalitarian left-wing 
regimes of the Soviet style, and right-wing authoritarian regimes. In her view, while the former would 
never liberalise,  the latter could (and were also useful allies in fighting the spread of communism). In this 
light, police assistance to right-wing dictatorships in Latin America had a double-advantage: it would 
support stable and friendly authoritarian regimes in the region, helping them stop communist infiltration 
and it might in the long term produce a modicum of liberalisation, or at least relaxation of police 
authoritarianism. 
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systematically  skirting the edges of the Congressional prohibition on police assistance. It 
also used two other means and justifications – the international war on drugs and the 
suppression of terrorism – to supply aid to police forces in Central America” (Cottam and 
Marenin 1989: 590)
It is in this context of flux and exceptionality that the next institutional pivot – and the 
longest standing authority - for U.S. international police assistance would come into 
existence, as we shall see next.
4. Building law enforcement institutions worldwide since 1986 – enter the ICITAP
4.1. The ICITAP in its own words
The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was 
created in early  1986 by  the Reagan Administration, for a very particular purpose – in 
order to manage the latest of a series of “administration of justice programs”, in El 
Salvador (Call 1997: 320). The US Congress, in response to negotiations with the State 
Department about how best to circumvent the restrictions of section 660 and thus ensure 
the prosecution of crimes against American victims in El Salvador, expanded the criteria 
for exemption in terms of “administration of justice”. The legislation which contains this 
crucial – if, at the time, fairly ad hoc – element in the history of US police assistance is 
known as Section 534, and clearly states that ‘[t]he President may furnish assistance under 
this chapter to countries and organisations, including national and regional institutions, in 
order to strengthen the administration of justice in countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean’. It was this legislation that was used as the basis for establishing the ICITAP 
within the Department of Justice – although the agency was created to administer 
programs designed and funded by the State Department and the US Agency  for 
International Development (Call 1997: 320, Perito 2002: 19). Although initially only 
mandated to develop the investigative capabilities of local forces, Charles Call argues that 
by 1987 ‘(…) Congress had become sufficiently  comfortable with ICITAP to expand 
section 534(b) (3) to two other critical areas: police management generally and police 
academy curriculum development’ (Call 1997: 320). Legal authorisation of more and more 
areas ensued as section 660 became gradually  hollowed out, so that in the 1990’s the 
ICITAP was already fully authorised to 
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reconstitute civilian police authority  and capability in the post-conflict  restoration of host 
nation infrastructure for the purposes of sup-porting a nation emerging from instability, 
and the provision of professional public safety training, to  include training in 
internationally recognised standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and 
the promotion of civilian police roles that support  democracy. (Foreign Assistance Act 
1961/2002)
On the one hand, this it highlights how remarkable it is that such a small agency, 
established for such a particularistic mission, and within such a complex institutional and 
legislative set of arrangements, would become, in less than a decade, the ‘most significant 
bilateral police aid program in the world’ (Call 1997: 316). On the other hand, it serves to 
remind us that, although the ICITAP remains to this day “the only [US] government 
institution created specifically to provide foreign assistance directly  to the police” abroad, 
“[i]n terms of government organisation, ICITAP is an anomaly” (Bayley 2006: 39).
Regarding the first insight, if the period immediately  following 1986 corresponds to 
ICITAP’s institutional infancy, then the 1990’s – and especially the Clinton years – 
correspond to a period of dramatic expansion for ICITAP, both geographically and 
functionally. Geographically because the ICITAP soon began to extend its administration 
of justice activities, and its training activities as well, from its birthplace in Central 
America and the Caribbean to the rest of Latin America. Although a 1993 government 
report commissioned by Congress noted somewhat disparagingly that Latin American 
programs still made up the bulk of ICITAP assistance efforts (GAO 1993), and that the 
Program had not acted in a swift manner in recognising the opportunities presented for 
police assistance in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet collapse, a 
cursory review of ICITAP programs since then (cf. Table 1, below) shows a different 
picture. In fact, less than a decade later, Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Central 
Asian republics constitute– depending on which data one relies on69  – either the most 
important target of ICITAP programs on police assistance, or the second most important, 
closely behind Latin America. 
  
69 The data in Table 1 reflects the information publicly available from ICITAP’s homepage (ICITAP 2007a,  
2007b, 2007c, 2007d).  However,  for Latin America, conflicting data exists, as the Washington-based 
Centre for International Policy fact sheet on ICITAP (CIP 2007) lists at least 10 active programs in that 
region – this data is indicated in parenthesis. 
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Functionally, what started out as an interdepartmental office dealing with “administration 
of justice” programs aimed at  improving prosecutorial standards in Central America has 
since “(…) expanded to encompass two principle [sic] types of assistance projects: (1) the 
development of police forces in the context of international peacekeeping operations, and 
(2) the enhancement of capabilities of existing police forces in emerging 
democracies.” (ICITAP 2007a). The ICITAP now provides, alongside training in 
improving the standards of criminal justice and prosecution in host countries, training in a 
host of other skills – from technical assistance (forensics, for instance) to curricular and 
institutional development skills such as “(…) recruitment and selection process, budgeting, 
policy development, supervision, and management.” (ICITAP 2007b)70.
Latin 
America
Africa Central & 
Eastern 
Europe
Central Asia Asia-Pacific
Current 
programs
4 (10) 3 7 8 2
Upcoming 
programs
- 4 2 2 -
Total 4 (10) 7 9 10 2
  (Table 1 – ICITAP programs worldwide 2002-2007, by region71)
In short, then, if during the mid-1980’s the ICITAP was struggling to find its place within a 
complex U.S. governmental machinery  in charge of foreign police assistance, and it sought 
to carve a space for itself within a tangled and tight legislative space under the watch of the 
U.S. Congress, in less than two decades the Program was already able to comfortably re-
brand itself as a key  player in American foreign policy  programs (cf. Neild 2005: 83).  In 
  
70  In its 2007 brochure, ICITAP described their approach to policebuilding as “a holistic approach toward 
training by providing general and specialized policing courses to senior and supervisory officials,  rank-and-
file personnel and support staff. ICITAP also supports the development of police academies as well as the 
knowledge and skills of academy instructors so they can in turn provide basic- and enhanced-skills 
instruction to recruits and new or refresher training to other members of their organization (...).  ICITAP’s 
comprehensive training methodology is geared toward helping the host country’s law enforcement 
organisation institutionalize academy-taught precepts such as community-based policing into their daily 
operations.” (ICITAP 2007b)
71 The regional divisions within ICITAP have changed to reflect its adaptations to the existing programs, and 
the program’s strengths. As of late 2008, the ICITAP major regional divisions were “Africa and Latin 
America”, “Asia-Pacific”, “Europe/Eurasia” (which focuses almost exclusively in the former Soviet-bloc 
countries), and finally a small division dealing solely with Iraq and Afghanistan. DC31, personal 
communication with the author, via telephone, 13th November 2008 (cf. Supplementary Sheet).
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fact, as its own brochure acknowledges, ICITAP became adept at making the most of the 
Clinton administration’s strategy of linking democracy-promotion and the control of 
transnational criminal flows to the national security of the US:
ICITAP recognises that two of the U.S. Government’s major international priorities are to 
promote democracy and control transnational crime. Law enforcement as part  of the 
criminal justice system has a major role in both areas. In order to thrive, an emerging 
democratic government  must  create an effective democratic police agency that  can protect 
life, property, and human rights and enforce the rule of law. Protecting life and property 
involves controlling transnational crime, which  requires strengthening foreign police 
agencies’ ability to effectively detect, investigate, and forward for prosecution those 
persons involved in transnational crime. Effective foreign police services serve both their 
domestic law enforcement  needs and become an effective partner with U.S. law 
enforcement. (ICITAP 2007c)
As a result of this, ICITAP became gradually  more and more focused on bilateral programs 
aimed at reforming the police system of nations transitioning to democracy, and gradually 
less focused on implementing large programs of policebuilding in countries emerging from 
conflict such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In its website and information fact-sheets, ICITAP 
still formally maintains a commitment to all three major types of police assistance missions 
(emerging democracy and developing countries, post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacekeeping missions, and nations of the frontlines of the War on Terrorism). However, 
an analysis of programs currently running shows a much greater concern with programs 
occurring within the first category (ICITAP 2007d).
This may not be a decision of ICITAP’s own doing, however. It is much more accurate to 
describe this lack of ICITAP participation in the major American policebuilding efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of organisational or bureaucratic competition, a competition 
which the ICITAP has been consistently  losing on. For instance in Iraq, ICITAP presence 
has been minimal, and then only as a subordinate of the State Department’s INL bureau 
initial efforts (DC29, personal communication with the author, 19th December 2006). In 
any case, the ICITAP’s program was soon eclipsed by the Pentagon’s efforts in 
reconstituting the Iraqi police, as detailed by Anthony Cordesman (Cordesman 2005: 82). 
In Afghanistan, the situation is even starker, with the ICITAP virtually kept out of the loop 
in terms of policy  planning and implementation. In response to a recent U.S. government 
report evaluating the progress of the policebuilding in Afghanistan, ICITAP’s deputy 
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director Robert Carr Trevillian complained that while in his view the program is “uniquely 
qualified to develop, implement and manage such a large scale program effort”, decisions 
by other agencies on the ground have effectively ignored this capability:
ICITAP currently has almost no role in on-going program efforts to assist the Afghan police 
forces. While the report notes that ICITAP developed curricula for the Afghanistan mission,  it 
does not speak to this matter,  and it does not clearly articulate the role the Department and 
ICITAP should play in future program efforts. We continue to be dedicated to interagency 
cooperation and the ultimate success of the USG’s mission in Afghanistan, but are concerned 
that our expertise is not being utilized - much to the detriment of the USG’s efforts.  (Trevillian, 
quoted in GAO 2005)
The following and final section will try and make sense of these developments, examining 
ICITAP’s evolving role within the contemporary regime of policebuilding in terms of its 
major contribution, but also its drawbacks - which ultimately led the program to lose the 
pre-eminent position as the lead agency in America police assistance programs in post-
conflict settings.
4.2. Promise and problems with the ICITAP
The greatest contribution of the ICITAP for the evolving American regimes of 
policebuilding was that it served, for a while, as an important focal point through which to 
channel U.S. bilateral assistance to foreign police forces. In the 1990s, it  did so in a fairly 
programmatic and relatively sustained way. It  also shifted the balance in U.S. 
policebuilding efforts in two major ways. On the one hand, in terms of the rationalities 
informing police assistance, it  changed the grounds from anti-communist counter-
insurgency to an explicit preoccupation with the rule of law and the promotion of 
democracy. On the other hand, in terms of the regimes of practice associated with the 
delivery of U.S. police assistance on the ground, it crystallised the demilitarisation of such 
missions, turning policebuilding into an increasingly civilian activity and privileging 
“institutional development over short-term training” (Call 1998: 362). As such, ICITAP’s 
activities reveal an important contribution in terms of seeing and enacting policebuilding 
as a form of technical assistance, premised upon a pedagogy of security that effectively 
merges America’s preoccupation with security  governance, foreign assistance, and 
democracy promotions.
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Despite optimistic assessments, however, one should not overemphasise the role of 
ICITAP. Indeed, much of what was being diagnosed retrospectively  by USAID analyst 
Heather McHugh in 1994 would still hold today. In other words, safe for the implication of 
American policebuilding in gross human rights violations, U.S. police assistance programs 
under ICITAP are still plagued by  issues of poor coordination (both between the U.S. and 
host countries, the U.S. and other donors, and between American agencies), and “the 
tendency for program slippage from the original objective(s) to other activities” (McHugh 
1994: 1).
Regarding the latter issue of program slippage, McHugh details the consistent trend in 
American policebuilding to slip “from law enforcement activities to security activities” 
more broadly  (3-4). In terms of coordination issues, she points out that the “lack of a clear 
policy on the role of US assistance to police forces for the past two decades [1974-1994]” 
has meant that “each program is managed individually”. She concludes by stating 
dejectedly that “while the need for coordination of police training activities is obvious, few 
(if any) suggestions for how to coordinate police training activities emerged from a review 
of the literature” (McHugh 1994: 3)
In organisational terms, it does not help  that although the ICITAP is located within the 
Department of Justice, its funding comes mostly from USAID, and its supervision on 
specific cases emanates essentially from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the Department of State. As David Bayley puts it, “(…) [t]he 
sole organisation in the US government whose statutory purpose is assisting police abroad 
operates through bureaucratic slight-of-hand rather than by coherent authorisation and 
consistent Congressional oversight” (Bayley  2006: 39, quoting Perito). This complex 
network – which had tremendous impact on both supervision and finance issues – has 
resulted in policy-making processes that were at times not very  clear, and has also resulted 
in either failures of coordination or debilitating tensions between the Departments of 
Justice and State (GAO 1999: 4-5).  As far back as 1998, the Government Accountability 
Office was already reporting “some disagreement had developed between Justice and State 
concerning State's role in directing ICITAP's police training program. In particular, Justice 
wanted a larger role in developing law enforcement policy and program priorities” (4). 
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This was premised in the realisation that the ICITAP was becoming a de facto sub-
contractor, working to merely implement programs under the supervision of the INL (cf. 
Fair and Chalk 2006: 109). 
Adding to this are chronic shortcomings in terms of staffing: the ICITAP has only a very 
small number of full-time personnel72, it draws mostly from federal law enforcement 
agencies (especially the FBI) on short-term contracts or “loans” (Call 1998: 360-361). As a 
result the program outsources – without all the adequate means of oversight and regulation 
– a fair amount of its work. Moreover, it can be said with fairness that  in the main, 
ICITAP’s staff is composed of a mixture of experienced career technocrats and retired 
federal law enforcement officials, both of which are very attuned – perhaps overly  so – to 
the interests, needs and trends of Washington politics. What it patently lacks is a large 
cadre of people with extensive experience of the areas in which ICITAP intervenes, and 
who understand the social, cultural, and linguistic intricacies of their host country73 – a 
problem which has, in general terms, plagued US international police assistance efforts 
since the beginning.
Finally, these internal problems with personnel and budget were compounded by charges 
of widespread irregularities and malfeasance within the program, including staff at the 
most senior level. These problems were exposed by  a whistle-blower, which in turn led to 
a minor scandal and a prolonged inspection in the late 1990s by  the Justice Inspector 
General, which severely tainted the image of ICITAP in Washington circles (DC21, 
personal communication with the author, 14th December 2006; Dettmer 2000; GAO 1999: 
4; Grassley  2000). All of these factors combined have led to a degree of sluggishness in 
ICITAP’s performance regarding police training activities.
The creation and maintenance of ICITAP, and the expansion of its mission – 
geographically as well as functionally – marks a high point in the transformation of 
  
72 ICITAP documents speak of “approximately 40 federal employees” working at headquarters in 
Washington D.C. in 2008. When speaking of its field operations, currently active in 16 countries, the 
document is less clear – it speaks of “19 federal managers”, and states that its largest field office 
(excluding Iraq) is staffed by 39 personnel. However, the document does not provide exact numbers for 
federal employees and contractors, either per office, or overall, stating only that “hundreds of contractual 
advisors, instructors and support personnel serve ICITAP's programs worldwide” (DoJ 2009: 1-2)
73  Interview with former ICITAP police assistance expert (DC21, personal communication with the author 
Washington DC, December 14th 2006).
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international police assistance from an essentially military framework to a civilian one, 
concerned with issues such as human rights, oversight and accountability, and in general 
following some basic tenets of modernisation theory mentioned above in relation to 
previous regimes. As such, while ICITAP indeed illustrates some degree of rupture 
between American regimes of policebuilding, especially given the degree to which they 
increasingly  emphasise a civilian ethos of technical assistance, it is nonetheless another 
step in the enmeshing of security and development - a strong line of continuity in 
American police assistance.
  
124
CHAPTER 4
MODULATING DOMAINS OF INSECURITY74 – 
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICEBUILDING REGIMES FROM CLINTON TO BUSH
1. The Clinton legacy
Bill Clinton’s administration (1993-2001) is often characterised, in terms of its foreign 
policy, as almost exclusively focused on the pursuit of prosperity and the promotion of 
global regimes of trade and economic integration, with the late addition of a flimsy 
'Clinton Doctrine' on democratic enlargement and humanitarian intervention, often decried 
as inconsistent and/or dangerous for U.S. national interests (Rieff 1999). As a consequence, 
Clinton and his administration have been chastised from conservative and neo-
conservative quarters alike for a 'soft' position on security issues (cf. e.g. Gertz 1999, 2000; 
Kagan 2000; Muravchik 1996: 139-170; Zakheim 1993) a position that has become almost 
commonsensical since the September 11th attacks (cf. Lowry 2004, Patterson 2004). While 
it is true that Clinton oversaw a downsizing of the US military  in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, this should not be taken prima facie as a sign of a weak or disgruntled security policy. 
Rather, it is this chapter’s contention that Clinton and his administration oversaw a pivotal 
moment of re-articulation of the US government security agenda, whereby not only 
security policy became much more preoccupied with transnational criminal issues as new 
security threats, but also laid the groundwork for linking this trend with democracy-
promotion strategies and the issue of state-failure/state-building. On both counts, then, the 
Clinton administration decisively  structured the security agenda within which international 
police assistance would happen: on the one hand it bolstered mechanisms for international 
co-operation in fighting instances of transnational organised crime, while on the other hand 
it sought to create sustainable institutions and policies for strengthening/reforming criminal 
justice and rule of law instruments in countries emerging from complex emergencies. 
  
74 I borrow the idea of modulating domains of insecurity from Jef Huysman’s recent monograph The politics 
of insecurity (2006: esp. 3-10)
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In this sense, then, Bill Clinton and his cabinet oversaw a gradual transition between 
regimes of security assistance. Picking up from previous experience in deploying police 
forces abroad for effecting security governance in post-intervention settings – as detailed in 
the last chapter, – Clinton’s foreign policy team sought to adapt such experiences to the 
security architecture of the post-Cold War world. On the one hand, Clinton’s agenda for an 
“international crime control” strategy  affirmed the importance of deploying U.S. police 
transnationally, and integrating the Department of State and the Department of Justice into 
the national security  strategy of the country. On the other hand, even as Clinton sought to 
create an institutional framework for dealing with international crime through increased 
and improved security governance, the dismal experiences of the U.S. in post-intervention 
security sector reform in the early- to mid-nineties pushed his administration to rethink 
American policebuilding. The resulting legislation (Presidential Decision Directive 71) 
sought to set the tone for future policebuilding strategies as multilateral enterprises within 
a UN framework, aimed at improving local capabilities and ownership  in the wake of 
violent conflict.
The first section of this chapter traces the policy processes through which the Clinton 
administration gradually  but inexorably shifted the American security agenda in the post-
Cold War world to an understanding which emphasised criminal transnational threats to the 
U.S.’s national interests, an innovation in comparison with the previous (Reagan and Bush 
Sr.) administrations. Following that, the second section analyses the innovations introduced 
by the Clinton administration regarding the internationalisation of U.S. law enforcement, 
both at  the legislative and institutional levels. After looking at how U.S. policebuilding 
strategies became progressively  more intertwined with humanitarian interventions and 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions during the 1990’s (especially  Somalia), the chapter 
then moves on to map the lines of continuity  and rupture between the Clinton and George 
W. Bush administrations, especially as the latter increasingly made sense of international 
security threats and subsequent security  policy in terms of state-weakness and state-
building, and within the context of the global war on terror.
1.1. Shifting the national security agenda
Despite frequent criticism for his “squandered presidency” (Haas 2000) in terms of a 'soft' 
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foreign policy characterised by its 'relentless subordination to domestic policy' (Muravchik 
1996: 139), leading some to doubt whether there was ever anything like a Clinton Doctrine 
governing US foreign relations during most of the 1990’s (Dumbrell 2002), Bill Clinton 
was far from a neophyte who paid no attention to international affairs and recoiled from 
action in the world stage. In fact, as highlighted by another account of his presidency, 
Clinton “was better educated in foreign affairs that many of his predecessors” (Hyland 
1999: 15). However, and unlike Bush Sr., he had no real direct experience of foreign policy 
making (Cameron 2005: 18, Hyland 1999: 15). While he may indeed have downplayed this 
throughout his first election campaign (Hyland 1999: 15-18), and while during his first 
mandate in office he indeed followed a fairly hands-off and delegated style of conducting 
the nation’s foreign affairs, he was certainly  intellectually  prepared to comprehend the 
challenges posed to American security  and foreign policy wrought by  the demise of the 
Cold War. 
A good illustration of this is how in 1993, his very first year in office, he oversaw a much 
commented (and much maligned) “bottom-up-review” of U.S. defence policy, goals and 
institutions by his Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin. Facing constraints such as a budget 
deficit, and a military establishment concerned with any cuts in defence spending, Clinton 
nevertheless proceeded to downsize the armed forces. While his cuts have been the target 
of scathing criticism (e.g. DiRita, Spring & Luddy  1993; Spring 1993; Gouré and Ranney 
1999), most critics missed the fact that the overriding objective was a leaner and more 
nimble force, adapted for what the Clinton administration saw as a new, emerging security 
environment.75  As one commentator puts it, “Clinton presided over a judicious and 
inexpensive, yet effective, modernisation program”, which “despite some fraying at the 
edges (...) retained high standards in military personnel and readiness, as proved on the 
battlefields of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq” (O’Hanlon 2003: 134).
This is, however, not the only instance in which a revisionist stance is sorely needed. The 
mainstream treatment of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy – both from critics and 
  
75 Nevertheless, one of the key elements of Les Aspin's defence review was that the U.S. military should 
maintain the ability of engaging simultaneously in two major regional conflicts, even if without any 
relevant, direct support from its allies. This was a reversal from policy since Nixon, and a throwback to 
Kennedy-era defence planning. It is also one of the key legacies of Coin Powell as chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff – a position he occupied until 1993, already under the Clinton team, thus ensuring the 
permanence of the two-major regional conflict doctrine from the “Base Force” doctrine into the “Bottom 
up Review” that followed it (cf. Korb 1997: 1, Williams 2001: 42).
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supporters – seems at times strangely at odds with the facts. While his emphasis on trade 
policy and economic relations are routinely  emphasised, and sometimes his second-term 
concern with democratic enlargement (Brinkley 1997), rogue states (Hoyt 2000) and 
nuclear proliferation (cf. Arkin and Mazarr 1996; Cox 1995: 47-52) are thrown in for good 
measure, Clinton’s active agenda on major foreign and security  policy  issues  - including 
the use of force, and participation in multilateral interventions - is often downplayed, 
misrepresented or ignored by  his more hawkish critics. This is particularly  surprising in the 
field of U.S. policebuilding, and associated efforts in delivering various forms of security 
governance and security sector reform in the wake of complex emergencies. Indeed, even 
in his first mandate, Clinton’s foreign policy  team (under the direction of Warren 
Christopher) was confronted by several important challenges which would become 
important ‘learning experiences’, and significantly  drive the administration’s persistent 
efforts to face the post-Cold War world with a flexible but successful national security 
strategy. The importance of the Clinton years as a decisive (re-)structuring phase in U.S. 
national security policy is particularly  evident in its efforts to internationalise law 
enforcement, as we shall see next.
The initial focus of this chapter will be on three closely  related dimensions of U.S. security 
governance as they  evolved during the crucial Clinton administration. First, the chapter 
focuses on the shifting rationalities informing the U.S. National Security Strategy, which 
led to a conceptualisation of American security policy  increasingly in terms of facing up to 
transnational threats of a criminal character. Secondly, the chapter examines the growing 
realisation under Clinton of the importance of policebuilding and security sector reform 
(including CivPol) in the wake of interventions seeking to tackle complex emergencies. 
Finally, one should pay  close attention to Clinton’s strategy of institutional creation and 
reform, aimed at effectively  integrating the two previous issues into the routines of U.S. 
policy-making. 
1.2. Confronting new threats, creating new institutions for security governance
Barely one year after entering office, Bill Clinton oversaw what was – at the time – a 
seemingly minor bureaucratic transformation within the State Department, the renaming 
and re-structuring of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. The Bureau had been 
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created in 1978 to fight President Nixon's “war on drugs” (Isacson 2005: 18-19)76. Its 
competencies in the field were therefore rather circumscribed, given its mandate to 
concentrate almost exclusively in developing and implementing a counter-narcotics 
strategy (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 171). However, by  signing Presidential Decision 
Directive 14 (PDD-14), and later by renaming it the Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Clinton had taken the first institutional step in the 
reorientation of his administration's strategies towards combating crime and enhancing law 
enforcement capabilities of the U.S. and other countries. Since this quiet transformation in 
1994, the Bureau has become known as the “drugs-and-thugs” branch of the State 
Department, and has taken on a host of activities related to international crime control 
(Hinson 1997, 1999; Shinnick 1999). Crucially, this institution has also played a crucial 
role in U.S. assistance in reforming and rebuilding foreign criminal justice systems and 
foreign police forces. 
According to David Bayley, only 10 years after Clinton’s re-tasking, in 2004, “two-thirds 
(71%) of INL's expenditures should be classified as direct or indirect police assistance”. 
This is without factoring in the civilian police program, which is responsible for funding, 
recruitment, training and deployment of US CivPol contingents worldwide (Bayley 2006: 
33). The INL, largely empowered by the Clinton administration to take over a host of 
activities, had in fact emerged in the early  2000s as the cornerstone of U.S. policebuilding 
efforts – both in terms of multilateral CivPol missions, and in terms of American bilateral 
initiatives such as the ones now present in Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, as the ICITAP faced 
policy-implementing difficulties (such as in Haiti) and was marred by scandal in the mid- 
to late-nineties, the INL became the Clinton administration's alternative for carrying out 
police assistance and policebuilding activities (DC21, personal communication with the 
author 14th Dec. 2006; DC29, 19th Dec. 2006).  
  
76 For a comprehensive overview of the role played by the Department of State in the 'war on drugs' since 
the Nixon years, including the INM (later INL),  see (Payan 2006: 140-170). The Department of State's 
Office of the Historian offers further details about the creation of the agency in 1978: “On Oct. 1, 1978, 
Congress, in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal Year 1979 (P.L. 95-426; 92 Stat. 969), 
authorised the position of Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, to be 
responsible for the overall coordination of the role of the Department of State in the international aspects 
of narcotics problems. This title had been given in full in each appointee's commission.  The new Assistant 
Secretary, who headed the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters, replaced a Senior Adviser to the 
Secretary of State on Narcotics, who had served with a rank equivalent to an Assistant Secretary of State 
since 1971. The Department of State first supported the Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Narcotics 
in 1909. The title of this position was changed from International Narcotics Matters to International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Feb. 10, 1995” (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/12260.htm )
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The History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency, produced and 
released by the Office of the Historian at DoS, details some of the steps through which 
INL's centrality in the counter-crime strategies of the day (DoS/HO 2001). Apart from its 
original mission to combat international narcotics flows, INL's efforts under Clinton grew 
exponentially in two major areas: efforts to combat international crime, and enhancing 
American participation in civilian police operations.
In terms of combating international crime, the re-branding, re-orienting and growth of the 
INL to pick up the implementation tab for Clinton's new counter-crime and support for 
criminal justice policies, is a good example of what Andreas and Nadelmann have 
described as the creation and expansion of global prohibition regimes (2006: 17-21, 
51-58). The INL has been at the forefront of this process, having evolved capabilities on a 
wide range of issues that include to tracking and seizing illegal assets, tracking and halting 
small arms trafficking, combating trafficking of persons and the smuggling of migrants and 
fighting corruption.77  Moreover, the INL has developed a series of bilateral co-operation 
efforts with other governments. Through these, the bureau co-ordinates other American 
law enforcement agencies, so that they  provide technical assistance in a host of policing 
techniques to foreign governments, so that that their authorities acquire “the skills, 
confidence, professionalism, contacts, and resources necessary  to identify  and investigate 
the most serious forms of international crime”. As a result of such programs, “the amount 
of training provided under the Clinton administration more than doubled, from 166 courses 
in 82 countries (1993) to 401 courses in 96 countries (1999)” (DoS/HO 2001). In addition 
to these bilateral efforts in providing technical assistance has also been involved in the 
creation and maintenance of International Law Enforcement Academies, which aim to 
promote (American) best practices in policing techniques and combating transnational 
crime (DoS 2003).
In addition to this set of programs and initiatives, the INL also gained prominence during 
  
77 The State Department's website elaborates: “The State Department actively worked with other concerned 
governments through extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance agreements,  information exchanges, law 
enforcement training, and technical assistance to combat transnational crime. INL's global training and 
technical assistance programs addressed criminal activities including trafficking in persons and 
smuggling of migrants,  money laundering, and related financial fraud, small arms trafficking, and public 
corruption.” (DoS/HO 2001))
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the Clinton administration in terms of enhancing American participation in CivPol 
missions. In addition to being involved in the drafting and unveiling of Presidential 
Decision Directive 71 (see below for further details), the INL sought to overcome 
coordination obstacles and thus facilitate the participation of American police experts in 
international missions. As a result, the bureau managed the deployment of over 850 CivPol 
members in the 1990's. This meant that the U.S. became the largest  worldwide contributor 
to such programs under the tutelage of the INL. Additionally, the information available 
through the Office of the Historian mentions that the INL was involved in creating a 
“ready-roster” of pre-screened and available civilian police, so that vetting and deployment 
would become much simpler and quicker. However, that program did not materialise, and 
INL ultimately  managed its CivPol personnel needs – and continues to do so until this day 
– through contracts with private security firms (DoS/INL 2009; DC1, DC16, DC13, DC9, 
personal communications with the author, December 2009).
1.3. Brave new world –  U.S. intervention & policebuilding in the 1990’s
1.3.1. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope
The chapter has so far focused on the Clinton administration’s steps towards building an 
institutional capacity adequate to the tasks of international crime control. Moreover, it has 
already been mentioned how the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, on top of its mandate of anti-narcotics and combating 
transnational crime, also began developing capabilities in the raising, management and 
deployment of CivPol contingents. Perhaps the first event to test these nascent CivPol 
capability, and underscore both their importance and the obstacles associated with their 
deployment, was the American intervention in Somalia. 
Following the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia was engulfed in protracted and violent 
civil strife as the Somali National Movement of Mohammed Farah Aideed clashed with 
other factions for political control (Wheeler 2003: 173-177). The result, not only  in the 
capital Mogadishu but also throughout most of the country, was a state of widespread 
lawlessness, violence and famine (ibid.). In 1992, shortly after a ceasefire was agreed on 
March 3rd, the United Nations deployed military  observers to Mogadishu to monitor the 
agreement. This paved the way for a UN humanitarian relief mission, UNOSOM  I, which 
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was launched in August. However, it wasn’t  long before the political situation had 
deteriorated significantly, effectively  thwarting the UN’s humanitarian efforts, aimed 
chiefly at  distributing food to the Somali population. Soon convoys were being high 
jacked, distribution points looted, and aid workers attacked. This resulted in relief goods 
being diverted to the black market and used to bring sectors of the populace under control. 
In response to these developments, the UN issued a plea for help to its member-states, 
since its own small contingent of 500 Pakistani Blue Helmets were unable to tackle the 
public security issue. Thus, on December 1992 the Security Council unanimously voted to 
pass Resolution 794, which brought into being the United Task Force (UNITAF) with a 
clear mandate to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (UNSC 1992: 3). This force 
was to be led by the United States78. 
On December, US Marines landed in Mogadishu, as a first wave of forces charged with 
securing the environment for the relief efforts to proceed. UNITAF was negotiated and 
deployed under the Bush administration, and Bush was initially quite insistent that the 
mission’s mandate should not extend into the Clinton administration that was about to take 
over (Halberstam 2001: 252). However, this was not feasible, and Bill Clinton and his 
foreign policy team inherited a complex intervention in a chaotic environment. One crucial 
problem for both administrations when it came to Somalia was precisely how to tackle the 
scenario: was this simply a food issue? Was the mission to merely enforce pockets of peace 
in order to allow aid-workers and international relief efforts to operate and deliver basic 
goods to the Somalis? Or was the mandate more elastic, more expansive, its relatively 
ambiguous language implying a larger obligation to attempt peace-building and the reform 
of the security sector? 
While this discussion of how to intervene in Somalia raged between agencies during the 
last months of the Bush administration (cf. e.g. Woodward 2006: 61-64), the Clinton 
foreign policy team is regularly  accused of having “dropped the ball” on the issue, so that 
events on the ground gained a life of their own and overtook the policy process, essentially 
forcing the broader issues of security  governance on the US. Whatever the case, both 
  
78  This lead is most apparent in purely military terms, as the US clearly dominated the UNITAF contingent,  
with 28.000 troops out of a total of 38.000 authorised by the international community (Thomas and 
Spataro 1998: 183).
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actors on the ground (including the U.S. envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley) and the UN 
Secretary-General, Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali, realised that despite the U.S. being keen on 
keeping the mission limited, some structural efforts in the security field were very much 
needed if the narrow objectives of the mandate were to be accomplished (cf. DiPrizio 
2002: 47-48; Hawk 2002:  49-50; Perito 2004: 102-103). It was understood, for instance, 
that without a semblance of a viable police force operating on the ground, the withdrawal 
of U.S. UNITAF troops and the transition to UNOSOM  II – a UN led peacekeeping 
operation, once again - would be severely delayed. Additionally, establishing a functioning 
police force would free military manpower for more crucial tasks in the context of an 
expanding mission (cf. Lyons and Samatar 1995: 42). As a result, a significant effort was 
put into restoring a semblance of public order and security through police assistance – 
which was made explicit in the UN mandate for intervention (Halim 1996: 72).
Contrary  to its heavily partisan Army, which had been a prime tool of General Barre’s 
dictatorship, and remained heavily  intertwined with factional fighting during the civil 
conflict that followed, the Somali civil police “… provided one of Somalia’s most 
stabilising influences” (Kaplan et al., quoted in Thomas and Spataro 1998: 176). Further, 
the police were “…generally respected, well administered, and relatively apolitical”, and 
“had an undisputed reputation for professionalism” (ibid.; Hirsch and Oakley 1995: 87) 
The Somali Police Force (SPF) had grown out  of a host of colonial police forces 
established by the Italians and the British, generally  speaking along the constabulary model 
discussed before (Fitzgerald 2002: 68). Although most commanding officers were initially 
white, this experience did create a cadre of indigenous police officers who eventually  rose 
through the ranks, until finally – in 1958 and under Italian tutelage – this resulted in an all-
Somali police force (ibid.). Throughout the period, the Somali police received assistance 
and training from West Germany, Italy and the US, and although assistance during the 
1970’s was provided by East Germany during a period of rapprochement with the Eastern 
Bloc, the late 70’s saw a return of West German and Italian police assistance (Fitzgerald 
2002: 69-70). 
During the politically  unstable period of the Cold War, the Somali police had remained 
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relatively functional, and neutral, as an institution (cf. Hirsch and Oakley 1995: 86)79. 
However, following the departure of Barre from power and the outbreak of internecine 
fighting between clans, a very sizeable police force of roughly  15.000 people basically 
withdrew from the public domain (Thomas & Spataro 1998: 176-77). Most officers simply 
stopped exercising police functions in order to ensure their safety  and that of their families, 
with some members of the police returning to their clans (ibid.). For all practical purposes, 
the Somali police had ceased to exist.
So, even as the international community under UN auspices and the U.S. in particular, 
stepped in to deliver aid and attempt a complex peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the very 
basic conditions for public security – including the police, but also the justice system – 
were simply  not in place. Without having that  vocabulary  available to them at the time, 
American policy-makers were confronted with a ‘security gap’. It soon became apparent 
that the rapid re-establishment of a professional, working Somalia police force was a 
necessity and that the U.S. would have in some way to lead the efforts in this novel 
instance of policebuilding.
U.S. forces, as well as U.S. diplomats on the ground, set about recreating the Somali police 
under UNITAF, so as to achieve a modicum of public order with a sustainable local basis 
that would make transition to UNOSOM II possible (Hirsch and Oakley  1995: 87-89). 
However, given that the parameters of their mission had not anticipated an exercise in 
policebuilding – nor a protracted stay with a long, well-structured and sustainable police 
assistance program – the U.S. efforts were rather limited in nature. In fact, when deploying 
for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, U.S. forces did not even incorporate civil affairs 
units tasked with rebuilding the local police – a procedure which had been followed 
previously  as American forces deployed to Kuwait (Ganzglass 1996: 113; Zaalberg 2006: 
  
79  Writing in 1969,  one author described it so: “The Somali police force is founded on the basic premise 
that it is the servant of the law rather than its controller,  and the police are dedicated to the legal 
framework rather than the regime in power. This achievement, coupled with what amounts to polyarchic 
decision making in the political realm, partly explains why Somalia is one of the few new states in which 
opposition leaders have become the government and government leaders have been voted out of office 
while remaining significant in the national politics.” (Potholm 1969: 156). For a concise but detailed 
overview of what the Somali national police force looked like immediately before the tumultuous events 
of 1991, see Martin Ganzglass’s account, heavily based on personal experience (Ganzglass 1996: 114).
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190-91)80. 
Nevertheless, results of American efforts in policebuilding looked promising at first – at 
least in terms of boots on the ground. Having entered the country in December 1992, “by 
mid-January 1993, the first police patrols were on the streets in Mogadishu, soon followed 
in other regions as well. Eventually, a 3,500 strong Auxiliary Security Force was 
established” (Schmidl 1998). Under the coordination efforts of Ambassador Oakley, and 
under the authority of General Ahmed Jama, it was therefore decided to encourage local 
police to resume their duties in areas where the population supported them, and which 
were under UNITAF control (Ganzglass 1996: 117). The resulting arrangement was a 
combination of remnants of the Somali National Police, especially in the capital 
Mogadishu and surrounding areas, backed up  by  U.S. military forces – usually  with 
heavily armed and armoured contingents stationed near each major police precinct  in the 
city (cf. Bentley & Oakley 1995: 4). While these developments were far from country-
wide, they seemed for a while to produce in some areas a semblance of public order. 
Martin Ganzglass concurs, stating that “[b]y March 1993 there was a 3,000-man Police 
Force in Mogadishu, (an additional 2,000 in the rest of the UNITAF zone), security had 
noticeably improved and the police were arresting criminals for the first time in nearly two 
years” (Ganzglass 1996: 118)
Apart from this ad-hoc arrangement, General Jama also suggested to American military 
and political officials that a more structural and permanent step be taken, and an institution 
for the coordination of policebuilding be created in the capital. The resulting plan was the 
establishment of a Police Committee in early 1993, which was supposed to represent all 
the major parties to the conflict (including the key warlords Ali Mahdi and Muhammad 
Aideed) and promote coordination of policing activities. However, conditions were lacking 
(apparently, this extended even to basic infrastructure to support the Committee, and 
  
80  Ganzglass further details: “The original operational plans for Restore Hope included the activation of 8 
to 10 US Army Reserve Civil Affairs units. These units would have assisted in restoration of 
governmental functions, particularly the police and judiciary. The decision not to activate these units was 
made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS apparently opposed activating reserve units because 
Operation Restore Hope was scheduled to take only six weeks and its purpose was to feed starving 
Somalis, not to rebuild institutions. The US State Department was either unable or unwilling to push the 
National Security Council to reverse this decision.” (Ganzglass 1996: 116). Given the time at which this 
decision making process was taking place (just as the Clinton administration was inheriting the Somali 
operation from its predecessors), one can safely say this was not an intended outcome by Clinton’s 
foreign policy team, and one can only speculate what would have otherwise happened…
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Ganzglass indicates that the first meetings were held in Ambassador’s Oakley office) and 
the Committee ran into problems for the start (Kelly 1999: 25-26). One of the initial 
difficulties was the composition of the Committee itself: Ali Mahdi had only nominated 
one officer to attend meetings, clearly snubbing the arrangement; several of the appointed 
officers were members of the Siad Barre's repressive and generally  hated secret police (the 
National Security Service)81; and General Jama refused the command of the existing police 
force which the Americans offered him (Ganzglass 1996: 118-199).
To make matters worse, a host of other issues plagued the functioning of the institution: the 
city of Mogadishu was divided by the Green Line, thereby complicating police work 
(when not  making downright it impossible); the lack of adequate records about  the 
previous police effectives made it extremely difficult to adequately vet new recruits, and – 
perhaps most crippling of all – since there had been no planning provisions for an efforts of 
this kind on the part of U.S., there were few if any funds available for these activities. 
Some funds were obtained from the previous UN mission, but that was clearly not 
sufficient for the magnitude of the task at hand (Ganzglass 1996: 118-119). These factors 
may help to explain why there was never any real attempt on the part of the American 
authorities under the UNITAF mandate to extend policebuilding to the rest of the Somali 
territory.
1.3.2. Transition to UNOSOM II and the Somali police
One can therefore see that a modicum of success was attained with the Somali Auxiliary 
Force under UNITAF, but meanwhile the rest of the country had little or no police 
coverage. Trying to deal with this situation, the UN “sent a three man Police Technical 
Team (PTT) to examine the Auxiliary Security  Force (ASF) and see whether a national 
police force could be established” (Ganzglass 1996: 120). This UN team was also tasked 
with exploring “what could be done to rebuild the judicial system, and whether a civilian 
police component of UNOSOM was desirable” (120). The team produced a report 
  
81 Not to be confused with the civil Somali Police Force (SPF), which pre-dated the Barre regime. The 
National Security Service was created at the beginning of the Barre regime in close collaboration with the 
Soviet KGB, and so resembled the latter in organisation and methods for quelling internal dissent, 
essentially a “state security” institution (cf. Patman 1990: 120-121).  It was created as part of a legislative 
package (the National Security Laws of 1970) aimed at tightening Barre's grip on power and quelling any 
internal dissent, and as such operated hand-in-glove with the special National Security Courts (Besteman 
1999: 12-13)
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suggesting the immediate creation of a Somali National police force, detailing necessary 
force levels and funds, and making several suggestions about the appropriate deployment 
of a UN CivPol contingent with UNOSOM II, the UN mission that was to take over from 
the American-led UNITAF interim authority  (ibid.). This was followed by an enthusiastic 
written response in a report by the Secretary-General (ibid., Hawk 2002: 50; Kelly 
1999:71). However, little action was taken in preparation for the transition to UNOSOM II, 
and there was a failure on the part  of both the U.S. and the UN in either maintaining the 
policebuilding efforts, or preparing and deploying an adequate multilateral CivPol 
contingent to take over the police reform process (cf. Perito 2004: 107-108). The UN 
vacillated with regards to a fully-fledged program to reform and restart the police as well 
as the justice system, along the lines suggested by  both its technical police team, and the 
U.S.. Such a plan was seen as too ambitious and perhaps neo-colonial and initial support 
for it fizzled out as time went by (Kelly 1999: 71-75).
Meanwhile, in late 1993, an attack on Pakistani Blue Helmets was perpetrated by forces 
linked to Aideed. This triggered an increasingly fierce response of the part of UNITAF, in a 
confrontation that  went on escalating, until U.S Special Forces became heavily involved to 
effect what  was essentially a domestic law enforcement task. This was because the Somali 
police was incapable of performing crucial functions such as serving a capture mandate 
against Aideed and arresting him. The operation that ensued has become sadly famous as 
the “Black Hawk down” incident of October 1993. In the sequence of a raid by U.S. 
special forces on a political meeting of Aideed’s men (and failing to apprehend the warlord 
himself), a series of incidents took place in which 18 American Rangers were killed, and 
75 injured (Bowden 1999). The images of U.S. soldiers’ corpses being burned and dragged 
behind jeeps through the streets of Mogadishu were covered by  CNN, and had an immense 
impact on American public opinion. Soon thereafter, the U.S. would announce its intention 
to retreat the bulk of its force by March 1994 (barely 6 months later), in the face of 
mounting public opinion pressure back home (cf. Lyons and Samatar 1995: 59; Wheeler 
2003: 198-99).
However, the U.S. did try  to maintain its policebuilding efforts alive in Somalia, even in 
the face of such constraints. Whether this was a way to save face (Ganzglass 1996: 127), or 
to maintain its commitments to the transition to UNOSOM II, the Clinton administration 
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pledged to contribute “$12 million for police training, $6 million to the judiciary  and about 
$25 million in DOD excess equipment, mainly vehicles.” (Ganzglass 1996: 128). 
Moreover, the U.S. agreed to fund a post-intervention program to train and partly equipped 
the future Somali National Police, and the Department of Justice sent an ICITAP team of 
instructors to Mogadishu in March 1994, in order to implement a two-step program. 
Having started the first phase of the instructional program, focused – like previous efforts – 
in the urban police around the capital, the ICITAP initiative never saw its second phase, 
which had programmed to steadily extend police training coverage to the rest of the 
country  (Ganzglass 1996: 129). Despite its enthusiastic start, the ICITAP mission to 
Somalia was too little, too late. Amid a deteriorating security situation – and perhaps 
anticipating the burden of preparing a large operation for Haiti – the ICITAP team left the 
country  in mid-June 1994, having accomplished few, if any, of the core objectives of its 
policebuilding mission.
1.3.3. Summary – lessons learned from Somalia
The events analysed above, despite their short duration, were instrumental for setting the 
tone for subsequent American interventions and the development of policebuilding 
strategies therein. Somalia certainly triggered a mentality of lessons learned, or perhaps 
more accurately, of lessons to be learned for the future (Clark and Herbst 1997; Thomas 
and Spataro 1998: 209-214). This type of American intervention to ensure transitional 
security on such a large scale was terra incognita, and in the absence of long-standing 
experience in this kind of environment – policebuilding in post-conflict complex 
emergencies – there was a lot of improvisation, not all of it producing good results. In fact, 
Somalia is often touted as a classic case of unmitigated failure in terms of American 
policebuilding experiences, and as a pool of lessons to be learned for future operations 
(Menkhaus 1997; Perito 2004: 112, 2007: 4-5, 11; Taw 2004: 15; Thomas 2004).
When examining the Somali case, one of the first things to become apparent is that there 
was a woeful lack of planning for the security  gap and the enforcement gap in post-conflict 
interventions. This, in turn, underlines the fact that there was no functioning legislation or 
policy-process in place in the U.S. to include policebuilding capabilities into American 
(military) interventions, where security governance in the wake of violent conflict  would 
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be a foreseeable need. In other words, the Clinton administration needed to develop such a 
framework for effecting security governance in the wake of such interventions.
The Somali case also demonstrates how far U.S. policebuilding models had moved away 
from earlier regimes of practice – most of the capability  having been moved to civilian 
agencies (especially ICITAP, within the Department of Justice) as detailed in chapter three. 
Somalia's debacle also illustrates the extent the U.S. military was unwilling to deploy what 
little capabilities it had in such scenarios in the 1990's – not even true constabularies, but 
civil affairs units with experience in policebuilding under similar contexts. This may  well 
have been lack of vision, or fear of mission creep and long-term entanglements, but it 
confirms that policebuilding in the wake of intervention was no longer a core feature of 
U.S. military deployments, as had notoriously been the case in before the 1930’s, and again 
during World War II. 
This showed the Clinton administration that in future operations with parameters similar to 
those of Operation Restore Hope, there would have to be some consideration of integration 
and coordination of efforts. Policebuilding programs would have to rely on better synergy 
between the Department of State (which in this case had acted merely as a co-ordinator of 
efforts, under the auspices of Ambassador Oakley), the Department of Justice (at the time 
still the main purveyor of expertise in policebuilding through ICITAP), and the Department 
of Defence (the first on the ground, and likely  the agency whose actions would determine 
the future of security  governance in a given operation). Additionally, key officials within 
the Clinton administration were made aware that in such scenarios there should be an 
immediate deployment of units capable of addressing the public security  needs of the 
population – be they  fully fledged constabulary forces or, more likely, Civil Affairs units 
which could quickly establish local capacity (Perito 2007: 11). Such units, if employed, 
would be instrumental in developing training, mentoring and logistics capabilities for 
policebuilding, so that military  “first responders” can nonetheless quickly  address the 
security gap82, but do so by  helping local police forces in their job, rather than doing it for 
  
82  In fact,  the very next such operation – in Haiti, in 1994 – the Clinton administration seemed to take some 
of these lessons to heart. Not only did it immediately deploy Civil Affairs units, but it also mobilised 
ICITAP for a much more comprehensive program of police assistance,  and the U.S. sought to coordinate 
its efforts with its international partners on the ground (Perito 2004: 109-112). However, this was not 
unproblematic, with at least one source complaining that ICITAP was not at all ready for the complexity 
of the operation, and therefore this translated into a very shaky record (DC21, personal communication 
with the author 14th Dec. 2006).
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them.
Finally, that the U.S failed to contribute to the planned UN CivPol contingent under 
UNOSOM II, and indeed failed to support the initiative entirely (sending instead a small 
assessment team from ICITAP), highlighted the need to integrate its own efforts with 
multilateral efforts by  partners in the international community, whether the UN or specific 
countries (such as the Italians and Dutch who assisted in rebuilding the police in 
Mogadishu, or the Australians who operated their own policebuilding program in the Bay 
Area). In short, it would seem that U.S. government under Clinton needed some sort of 
domestic focal point to promote American capabilities for post-conflict peacebuilding, and 
to improve inter-agency  and multilateral coordination of such efforts internationally. The 
result was a prescient piece of legislation, under the unassuming name Presidential 
Decision Direction 71.
1.4. Lessons learned – PDD-71 and the future of policebuilding under Clinton
The lessons learned from the failures in both Somalia and – to a lesser extent – in Haiti, 
and especially  the lessons learned from its protracted operations in the Balkans did not fail 
to make an impression on military planners and commanders, as well as on Bill Clinton 
and his foreign policy team (DoS 2000; Perito 2004: 237; Marten 2004: 103). As early as 
February 2000, and in the wake of U.S. operations in Somalia and East Timor, the 
president promulgated Presidential Decision Directive 71, titled “The Clinton 
Administration's Policy on Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace 
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Operations” (see Annex 1) or PDD-71 as it became known83. While Clinton had already 
tackled issues pertaining to the challenges posed by the post-Cold War security 
environment – especially the rise of military  intervention in response to complex 
emergencies – in previous Presidential Decision Directives84, PDD-71 stands out because, 
for the first time, law enforcement and the strengthening of criminal justice were 
acknowledged as key  tasks of U.S. foreign policy. The document was nothing short of 
remarkable, for it  was both concise and comprehensive – and it remains, to this day, one of 
the most topical policy documents in examining the rise of policebuilding as a key issue in 
American foreign policy.
First of all, the directive clearly identified a number of issues and governmental problems 
in post-intervention contexts, incorporating lessons learned from past deployments (it 
makes specific references to the problematic situations that arose in Somalia, Haiti and 
Bosnia). As a consequence, PDD-71 effectively enshrined the notion that “effective 
indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are necessary for a society to 
achieve and maintain durable peace”, and that therefore “helping to re-establish an 
indigenous criminal justice system is often, and appropriately, a fundamental aspect of a 
successful peace operation or other complex contingency  operation” (PDD-71 2000). In 
other words, while PDD-71 follows from previous documents in conceptualising the 
changing security  agenda, especially  in what regards shifting U.S. national security policy 
towards security  governance tasks in complex emergency/post-conflict settings, it  is the 
  
83 Presidential Decision Directives, or PDDs,  are the name given during the Clinton administration to 
national security directives. These reflect the role of the President as a director of national security,  and 
are akin to the (older) executive orders, although unlike the latter they are not subject to Congressional or 
public scrutiny – due to their sensitive nature, they are usually classified (Knight 2004: 444). Such 
documents usually take a long time in planning and consultation before being signed,  and have 
traditionally emphasized inter-agency coordination towards specific foreign policy goals (Marcella 2004: 
247-8). These policy instruments are instances of executive authority (Howell 2003, Relyea 2007), and 
often offer the best way of surveying the exercise of power and the priorities in foreign and security 
policy of individual presidents. Over time, different administrations have named the documents 
differently – they were variously known as National Security Decision Directives (NSDD's) under Bush, 
National Security Decision Memoranda under Reagan, and National Security Action Memoranda under 
Kennedy (and Johnson) (GAO 1988: 3-5, Knight 4: 444). Whatever their name, presidents have issued 
them prolifically to direct and implement significant changes in US national security and foreign policy 
during their presidencies (Marcella 2004: 247).  For the purposes of this study, and in Foucauldian terms, 
the PDDs signed into action under Clinton are especially important as a focal point in the US 
policebuilding apparatus. They simultaneously define – often in an extremely concise and powerful 
manner – the governmental problem in need of intervention (as Foucault would put it, “the urgent need” 
in response to which an apparatus is formed), and they seek to structure the possible field of 
governmental action by setting goals, suggesting legislation, creating programs, etc.
84 These were PDD-25, on “US Policy on reforming multilateral peace operations”; and PDD-56 on 
“Managing Complex Contingency Operations”.
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first document at this level to focus specifically on the importance of the police (and 
criminal justice structures more generally) to U.S. security policy. Assisting and reforming 
foreign police forces thus became, under Clinton's leadership, a key concern of American 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. 
The document originally met with stiff resistance from the Department of Defence, where, 
in the words of one scholar who was involved in the process, there was an unwillingness 
on both the part of the military command (the Joint Chiefs) and the civilian leadership (the 
Office of the Secretary  of Defence, or OSD) “to allow U.S. military forces to handle 
lawlessness and civil disorder during future peace operations” (Perito 2004: 238). Robert 
Perito’s assessment of the reasons for this reluctance resonates with the arguments made in 
the previous section: the scripts of U.S. foreign policy  – and especially  its national security 
policy – had changed dramatically since the earlier regimes of intervention in the 
1890s-1930s. As a result, there was a genuine distaste for protracted operations in foreign 
soil, let alone engaging in nation- or even policebuilding. As he puts it,
U.S. military leaders believed their job was to “fight  and win the nation’s wars”. 
Participation in peace operations dulled combat  skills, expended resources, exhausted 
troops and equipment, and reduced readiness. In addition, soldiers were neither trained nor 
equipped to deal with  civilians and to  handle tasks related to fighting crime and 
maintaining public order. This predilection to avoid “nation-building” was reinforced by 
the traumatic experience of Somalia. (…) Representatives of this group were quick  to 
point  a myriad of problems and uncertainties involving legal authority, funding, 
administrative restrictions, and interagency differences as reasons why the U.S. military 
should avoid peacekeeping and could not perform police functions. (Perito 2004: 238, 
emphasis added)
One of the likely sources of this reluctance surely lies in the centrality  of the Powell 
doctrine to the 'American way of war' since the mid-1980s85. Formulated in 1984, in large 
measure as a response to the traumatic military  experiences of Vietnam, the doctrine hinges 
upon the idea that conventional warfare is the only proper task for military forces 
  
85 The doctrine was initially also known as the ‘Weinberger doctrine’, after Casper Weinberger, the 
Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan who originally formulated its central tenets in 1984. After 
that, given the role of Gen.  Colin Powell in developing, reformulating and applying the doctrine 
(especially in his role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Clinton), the doctrine became known as the 
‘Weinberger-Powell doctrine’, or simply the Powell doctrine, as it is today most commonly known (cf. 
Kurth 2007: 74).  For further information on the genesis and development of the Powell Doctrine, cf. 
(Campbell 1998; Kurth 2007: 72-91).
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(Zaalberg 2006: 66). In order to avoid protracted engagements and massive casualties, such 
as in the Vietnam War, two of its core principles are that the use of force must be 
overwhelming (so as to lead to decisive and swift victories), and that there must be a clear 
definition of mission success, and clear exit strategies every time forces are committed (so 
as to avoid 'mission creep'). Therefore, the Somalia experience, which had already  caused 
initial friction between Gen. Colin Powell (then Clinton's Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of 
Staff) and Madeleine Albright86, reinforced this aversion to multilateral peacekeeping and 
re-establishment of public order, which were seen as detrimental examples of 'mission 
creep' (Zaalberg 2006: 243). It was clear that what the Clinton foreign policy team 
envisaged as the future of American interventions  - multilateral peace operations, 
humanitarian intervention in the wake of complex emergencies, post-conflict stabilisation 
– did not fit the terms set by  the Powell Doctrine (cf. DiPrizio 2002: 3-4; Western 2005: 
133-174; Litwak 2007: 52-4).
Given this antipathy of the American military commands for operations other than war, the 
drafting of the document on the part of the Pentagon was moved to the small and 
somewhat marginal Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, at the Department 
of Defence87. After much wringing of hands and redrafting, however, a minority at the 
Pentagon had managed to produce a document that would once again insert the American 
military at the core of post-intervention policebuilding – albeit in an uneasy partnership 
with the Departments of Justice and State (Perito 2004: 239-40).
PDD-71 provides several insights into the overall architecture devised by  the second-
mandate Clinton foreign policy team to tackle security governance in post-intervention 
scenarios. First and foremost, it enshrined that task as a core component by assigning “lead 
agency” status to the State Department88, and by containing specific instructions that a new 
  
86 Thijs Zaalberg details this confrontation with regards to the Somalia intervention, and adds that the 
military plan that eventually emerged was in line with Powell's doctrine (Zaalberg 2006: 173-4). This 
may well explain the non-deployment of Civil Affairs units, as detailed above. Theo Farrell has similarly 
linked the debacle in Somalia to the evolution of American military doctrine, torn between foreign policy 
advances in terms of peace operations, and the straight-jacket of the Powell doctrine (Farrell 1995)
87 The Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian affairs was in turn part of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the civilian leadership of the Pentagon.
88  The text specifically reads: “Create a Lead Agency: The State Department shall create an office, or 
modify an existing one, to assume lead agency responsibility for the full spectrum of issues related to 
U.S. Government involvement in the reform of criminal justice systems during peace operations and 
complex contingencies.” (PDD-71 2000)
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office should be created within State Department's structure, tasked with assuming “lead 
agency responsibility for the full spectrum of issues related to U.S. Government 
involvement in the reform of criminal justice systems during peace operations and 
complex contingencies.” (PDD-71 2000) In his own analysis of the document, Robert 
Perito notes that the unveiling of the document at  the State department rather than the 
White House was illustrative of bureaucratic infighting on the one hand (he quotes DoS 
officials as having “issued a virtual ultimatum to the NSC staff to get the directive signed 
by the president, because it was going to be announced by the secretary of state”), and that 
this was prompted by  a need to have a more coherent legal and institutional framework 
already in place given that fears were mounting about the situation in Kosovo (Perito 2004: 
239) However, the fact  that the State department did take charge, and that the decision was 
first announced publicly  by Madeleine Albright can be understood as a powerful symbolic 
message. It signalled that henceforth this kind of task would become one of the key 
concerns of U.S. foreign policy, and that coordination of such policebuilding efforts would 
remain firmly ensconced in civilian hands – even if its deployment may not, as we shall 
see below.
1.4.1. Looking back, looking forward - justifications for PDD-71
According to both the official sources and Robert Perito’s account, the document arose 
from a growing awareness on the part of the U.S. government under Clinton that 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding and complex emergencies in countries rising from conflict 
would be the dominant scenarios of American intervention in the future. Moreover, there 
was a perception that the issue of restoring and maintaining public order would become 
central in such interventions, and that it would fall to the intervening power(s) to both 
ensure transitional security, and bolster the local security institutions with a view to 
sustainability – especially the police. This form of assistance was justified by  pointing out 
that often local forces have “been destroyed, rendered ineffective by the conflict or 
corruption” or else they have “become part of the conflict  due to partisan 
behaviour” (PDD-71 2000).89  In this respect, it  is worth quoting Secretary of State 
  
89  Drawing on the (then) recent experiences in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans, the document further 
elaborates on this theme of compromised local police forces: “In Somalia,  for example, the police simply 
left their posts in 1991 when a new government failed to emerge after the Siad Barre government was 
deposed. In Haiti and Bosnia,  the police were involved in the conflict and consequently were viewed as 
biased combatants rather than public servants by large segments of the population. Even before the 
conflict arose, the public safety forces in Haiti, as in many areas where peace operations are conducted, 
were the primary instrument for state-sponsored repression of the citizens.” (PDD-71 2000)
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Madeleine Albright, who in the press conference at the unveiling of PDD-71 concisely 
described the reasons behind the document’s formulation by making reference to recent 
American experience with breakdowns in public security, law and order in the wake of 
conflict and/or intervention: “This step recognises the foreign policy importance of 
preventing security vacuums from arising in post-conflict situations.” (DoS 2000).
The White Paper on PDD-71, released simultaneously with the legislation, goes further in 
detailing the reasoning behind this move. In line with themes already pursued in chapters 
one and two – namely, the linking of security governance to the changing national security 
agenda of the U.S., and emphasising the role of the police as a key instrument of 
government -, the document elaborates at some length on how
Effective indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are necessary for a 
society to achieve and maintain durable peace. Therefore, helping to re-establish an 
indigenous criminal justice system is often, and appropriately, a fundamental aspect  of a 
successful peace operation or other complex contingency operation. (PDD-71 2000)
Moreover, in addition to highlighting the links between policebuilding and the security of 
developing countries, the document draws explicit links between policebuilding – or the 
strengthening of criminal justice and law enforcement systems, in the letter of the law – 
and the national security  of the U.S.. The first reason adduced is that “promoting public 
safety  in the short term and developing responsive criminal justice institutions over the 
long term, can successfully and economically support American interests” (although no 
further details are given of this putative link between policebuilding and the economic 
agenda so dear to President Clinton). Furthermore, in the estimation of the document’s 
authors, policebuilding along the lines established by  PDD-71 would also help “to deter 
the presence of criminals who seek to base their operations in areas where they can operate 
without fear of arrest  and prosecution” (PDD-71 2000). This latter aspect is salient in at 
least two distinct ways.
First, the White Paper neatly  links this legislative initiative on policebuilding with the 
Clinton administration’s strategy of international crime control, and it enumerates some of 
the criminal activities that can happen in such transitional security  vacuums, echoing 
themes in the International Crime Control Strategy: “Such wrongdoers often include 
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organisers of terrorism, illicit drug and arms trafficking, and international criminal 
syndicates.” (PDD-71 2000). On the other hand, the document anticipates the Bush 
administration’s securitisation of ‘ungoverned spaces’ as a key  enabler for American post-
intervention policebuilding. The White Paper thereby supports one of the key claims of this 
chapter, namely that in terms of policebuilding, the Bush administration owes largely to the 
vision of the Clinton foreign policy team.
1.4.2. Local ownership of police development 
One other salient aspect of PDD-71 for the purposes of the present analysis is its emphasis 
on indigenous/local ownership – or at least co-ownership  – of the long-term process of 
renewing policing systems. As discussed briefly  in chapter two, liberal regimes of 
assistance and development do not usually  govern by  coercion or injunction, but rather 
seek to align the desires, needs and capabilities of the governed with the objectives of 
government. As such, in liberal, and especially in advanced liberal forms of 
governmentality 90, the emphasis is on an ethos of individual responsibility, where the State 
steers but the subjects of government must do the rowing themselves. 
Accordingly, the text of PDD-71 is emphatic about the need for participation and 
ownership of policebuilding by locals in the host nation, who are to benefit from American 
help  and supervision, but are also to be heavily engaged in building their own security. 
Explicit  references to this are peppered throughout the document: “ultimate responsibility 
to conduct law enforcement should not be taken away from local police forces as this may 
breed dependency” (PDD-71 2000). This is expounded more fully under a section 
appropriately entitled “Executive authority”:
Generally, the U.S. Government  shall advocate that  CIVPOL not  be given responsibility to 
enforce local law (executive authority) -- the responsibility for local law enforcement will 
  
90 In discussing the characteristics of advanced liberal governmentality, Nikolas Rose summarises it as logic 
of rule whereby “the social and the economic are now seen as antagonistic: economic government is to be 
desocialized in the name of maximizing the entrepreneurial comportment of the individuals” and 
therefore “politics must actively intervene in order to create the organizational and subjective conditions 
of entrepreneurialism”, which includes restructuring “the provision of security to remove as many as 
possible of the incitements to passivity and dependency”. (Rose 1999: 144). For more on “advanced 
liberalism cf.  (Rose 1993, 1996, 1999: 137-166; Dean 2007: 192-3). Other authors have characterised 
advanced liberalism in terms of the rise of the “regulatory state”, which “steers” (manages and regulates) 
fields of activity but  encourages as much as possible individuals and other private entities to do the 
actual “rowing” (cf. Osborne and Gaebler 1993). This has had an enormous impact on the field of 
security governance, including developments in contemporary policing (Braithwaite 2000; Johnston and 
Shearing 2003: 35; Wood and Shearing 2007: 123-131).
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remain with  the indigenous police forces. In some instances, it  may be appropriate to give 
monitors the authority (if not the responsibility) in  their mandate to  respond to local 
crimes when indigenous police are unable to take action. This authority  may include the 
right  to  use detention and deadly force, for example, in an instance where there is a risk  of 
death or serious bodily harm. (PDD-71 2000)
This passage illustrates an important point. Two things are immediately noticeable: that 
American policebuilding efforts are discussed under the issue of executive authority, and 
that it draws on the language of 'responsibility' of local forces for participating in their own 
development. This is indicative that, even at a time when the concept of executive policing 
was at its height  (having been experimented with in Kosovo and then East Timor, (cf. 
Dwan 2003)), the U.S. government wanted to emphasise the notion of responsibilisation 
(Muncie 2005: 355-58; Rose 1999: 74-75, 154). In other words, it does not want to wield 
the “power to make live and let die” as a sovereign (Foucault  2003: 241), but  rather it 
seeks to develop, deploy and manage a set of governing technologies which promote self-
regulating, self-securing individuals at the local level.
1.4.3. Walking a tight-rope: Military power & constabulary forces
One aspect of particular significance to the arguments advanced here is how the document 
specifically returns to the language of constabulary forces. What is interesting, though, is 
the general tone in which this is present: the deployment of constabulary power for 
policebuilding is seen as a de facto necessity, but it must be approached cautiously and 
employed only temporarily.
The first aspect – the necessity  of deploying constabulary-type units given their specific 
skill-set is the most adequate for post-intervention security governance – is quite explicit in 
the Clinton Administration’s White Paper on PDD-71: it unambiguously  states that “[t]he 
U.S. Government will advocate that UN missions make use of a suitable mix of military 
and paramilitary forces to accomplish the assigned tasks of any new peace operation” since 
“[s]uch forces bring specialised skills, such as crowd control capabilities, that are not 
common to traditional military or civilian police organizations”. (PDD-71 2000). Further 
on, in its section on policy guidance, the paper devotes an entire sub-section to 
“constabulary  activities”, and once again reinforces the point: “in some cases indigenous 
police forces are unable to provide adequate public safety  when peacekeepers arrive. In 
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these cases, outside agencies may need to assist in ensuring basic public safety until this 
function can be accomplished effectively  by newly strengthened indigenous 
police” (PDD-71 2000).
But the White Paper is very  careful to define a narrow range of functions to be performed 
by such forces. In addition to stressing again the notions of local ownership highlighted 
above, it also details that 
outsiders may be given  responsibility to carry out  a more narrow range of activities to 
create and maintain  a reasonable measure of public safety. Such tasks may include actions 
to regulate movements which may  be necessary for the cause of safety; intervene to stop 
civil violence, such  as vigilante lynchings or other violent  public crimes; stop and deter 
widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots, or other mob-type action; and disperse 
unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances, among other tasks. 
(PDD-71 2000)
Moreover, the document is quite precise in stating that “the United States shall prefer that 
constabulary functions, when they are necessary, be conducted by a paramilitary force such 
as exists in many other countries”, and that while the U.S. military should “maintain the 
capability  to support constabulary  functions abroad, and if necessary  carry  out 
constabulary functions under limited conditions for a limited period of time”, this in “no 
way obligates the U.S. military  to conduct these tasks in any particular operation or to 
develop specialized constabulary units dedicated to this mission.” (PDD-71 2000, 
emphasis added). Whatever the reasons for this cautiously pessimistic approach to 
developing and maintaining specialized constabulary capabilities within the U.S. military 
(cf. Schultz 2005: 1-32), they  signal two extremely important points, in line with the 
general arguments advanced in this thesis. 
First and foremost, the White Paper bears witness to the fact that both the governmental 
rationalities and the security practices involved in U.S. policebuilding had decisively 
transitioned from a former regime of militarised, ad-hoc policebuilding to one of long-
term, much more structural and civilian ethos in delivering American police assistance (as 
detailed in the previous chapter). Second, it becomes apparent that  the Clinton 
administration in particular realised this shift and its implications, and thus wanted to 
institutionalise this principle for the future. Even when maintaining and deploying 
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constabulary capabilities to effect security governance in post-intervention scenarios, the 
U.S. would define such tasks in a narrow manner, deploy such capabilities for a limited 
time, prefer that allies take on that responsibility, and place control of such forces under 
UN auspices. In other words, constabulary forces are per se not enough to effect the liberal 
model of policebuilding envisaged by Clinton, they merely establish the base conditions of 
public security  so that capacity building programs – of the kind exemplified by such 
civilian agencies as the ICITAP or the INL – can take hold, and local police forces can be 
empowered to act themselves. This marks a shift from the deployment of sovereign-
disciplinary  mechanisms of social control exemplified by constabularies, to a liberal 
pedagogy of security.
* * *
Whatever the process through which PDD-71 saw the light of day, one thing seems to be 
certain: already  in the second mandate, without hope of re-election, and less than a year 
before leaving office – Clinton’s foreign policy  team definitely  meant this legislation to be 
a structuring one. PDD-71 is written in a tone that seeks to push the national security 
agenda of whoever would follow in the White House to have to deal with the complex 
issues of policebuilding and security governance in the wake of interventions. Clearly, it 
sought to provide a solid institutional and legislative base from which future 
administrations could build on in their future policebuilding efforts. 
That the legislation was passed after all the interventions abroad that shaped Clinton's term 
in office (cf. fig 4.1, below), seems to prove that this was a forward-looking decision. It too 
disproves the widely-held popular opinion that Clinton's foreign policy was unremarkable 
in terms of national security, and adds weight to the overall argument of this section: that 
President Clinton and his foreign policy  team purposefully  presided over a major shift and 
overhaul of the tenets of American foreign policy. Indeed the Clinton administration 
pushed through structural reforms that his predecessors had not undertaken. This effort was 
an attempt to respond to the changes brought to the security agenda of the U.S. by  the 
period following the end of the Cold war. It was in this context that the extension of police 
power internationally  – both as an international crime control strategy, and post-conflict 
police assistance – became one of the central pillars of U.S. security policy. The next 
  
149
section will investigate what the succeeding Bush administration did with this legacy.
Fig. 4.1 - Clinton Administration Timeline
First term
1993 – Bottom-up-review (BUR) of US defence policy
 Somalia operation “Restore hope” (UNITAF) with police reform component
1994 – May, PDD 25 on U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
 Renaming/restructuring on INL
Participation in first ever CivPol mission in Haiti
1995 – Participation in IPTF (Bosnia), until 2002
 PDD-42 on International Organised Crime (Oct.)
Creation of ILEA Budapest
Second term
1998 - International Crime Control Strategy, in May
 White House issues “National Security Strategy for a new century” (Oct.)
 Creation of ILEA Bangkok
1999 – Participation of CivPol contingent in UNMIK (Kosovo)
 Participation of CivPol contingent in UNTAET (Timor), last left May 2005
 INL organises Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity 
among  Justice and Security Officials in February
2000 – PDD-71 on Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations
Establishment of ILEA Gaborone, in July
US signs UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in Palermo, Italy 
(Dec.  13th)
2. The Bush Transition
2.1. Modulating a new insecurity domain - State-failure and “ungoverned spaces” as 
security problems
As the previous pages, particularly in chapter one, have highlighted, the post-Cold War 
world saw the development of a new security  environment, trends of which intensified in 
the post 9-11 period but spanned the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Within 
this framework, security  studies and policy-makers both have come to conceptualise 
security threats - and the adequate responses to them - increasingly in terms of criminal 
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flows such as drug trafficking, terrorism, money-laundering, and a host of other illegal 
activities constituting varying patterns of risk. Implicitly or explicitly, most literature tends 
to make the connection between these new transnational security  threats and the places 
whence they  originate or pass through unconstrained, characterising these as ungoverned 
(or sometimes misgoverned) spaces (cf. Elrich 2007; Groh 2006; McNeill 2008). This 
perception of insecurity  as a function of poor or non-existent governance has spawned a 
prolific response: at the academic level, a host of related issues under the collective 
heading of security  governance has come to the fore, while policy-making circles have 
similarly  highlighted the nexus between development and governance (or their lack) and 
security.
Given this security-development nexus, where security is seen as a condition best achieved 
through the practices of good/strong governance, the security apparatuses of Western states 
have become heavily intertwined with development efforts, in an effort to promote 
effective liberal (security) governance in developing nations (see, e.g. Duffield 2006, 2005, 
2001). Nowhere is this linkage more apparent, or stronger, than in the budding field of 
post-conflict state-building. Indeed, as the opening quotation to this chapter illustrates 
neatly, state-weakness and state-failure have been emphatically identified as key vectors of 
international security by most Western liberal states, most prominently in the United States 
of America. As the National Security Strategy of the United States of America succinctly 
puts it, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones.” (White House 2002) Consequently, the US government agencies dealing in both 
security and foreign policy have been gradually shifting paradigm since the 1990’s in order 
to do more and better “state-building” as a means to enhancing their security, as recent 
policy pronouncements and especially recent interventions neatly demonstrate. The 
sections above already suggested that the seeds of this linkage between American 
intervention in post-conflict settings and the provision of police/security assistance as a 
way towards both peacebuilding and political development are to be located in the Clinton 
administration, and specifically in PDD-71.
David Bayley, in a recent survey  of U.S. efforts on international police assistance (Bayley 
2006), summarises the trend neatly. Within the context of post-Cold War security agenda, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (and, one should add, the deepening of the globalisation 
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process) was perceived has having left liberal, market-oriented democracy as the sole 
victor model. In the somewhat triumphalist consensus that emerged in the early 1990’s, 
democracy  promotion became an overarching (some, including Bayley, would say  the 
overarching) goal in U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, a third change took place, in that the 
perceptions – both scholarly  and in policy-circles - of the role of the police in political 
order went gradually from obstacle to enabler with the result that “(…) assistance to 
security institutions abroad (…) was no longer viewed as dangerous, unsavoury, 
diversionary and politically retrograde, but as a key component of social stability and 
economic development.” (Bayley 2006: 10). This was then coupled progressively in the 
1990s with a concern about failed states, leading to the view that ‘security sector reform’, 
as it would be later termed - and particularly  the reform or reconstruction of police as a key 
component of SRR, - were in fact vital means to achieve democracy promotion abroad. In 
Bayley’s words, 
For a variety  of reasons, then, criminal justice reform, in particular that  of the police, 
became an important  element  in  the foreign  policy of the developed world during the last 
decade of the 20th century. (…) [I]n the 1990s the international community  rediscovered a 
lesson that had been marginalized during the Cold War, namely the importance for peace 
and prosperity  of creating effective law-enforcement institutions that  operate under the 
rule of law and with  respect  for human rights . The 1990’s were unique in the scope and 
explicitness of attention given by the international community to  police reform of a 
democratic character. (Bayley 2006: 10-11)
David Bayley’s analysis underscores the importance of this linkage between providing 
security assistance and promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the 
American foreign policy  mantra of the 1990s. That particular modulation of state failure 
seems coherent with the approaches of the Clinton administration analysed above. But in 
the decade that followed Clinton’s tenure, what connections did the Bush administration 
draw between security assistance, state failure, and the goals of American foreign policy?
Given the sheer volume of literature on state-failure in the last ten years, it is firmly outside 
the bounds of this chapter – indeed, this dissertation – to provide a comprehensive survey 
of theoretical and policy approaches to the problems of state-failure, let alone engage in 
critical fashion with all the arguments raised. Rather, the objective of this section is to 
sketch some of the main lines of argumentation emerging from the literature, especially  as 
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they  seek to link state-failure and the problem of “ungoverned spaces” as security 
problems, thereby  opening such areas up  to international governmental technologies such 
as policebuilding. This provides a useful backdrop against which to analyse changes and 
continuities in American regimes of security assistance, particularly since the end of the 
Cold War. 
The literature on state frailty and state building mentioned above seems, on the whole, to 
emphasise the functional failure of states, i.e. the weakness or failure of state capacity  to 
provide its citizens with three major bundles of public goods: security, first and foremost; 
representation, as a channel to address needs and grievances in a non-violent way; and 
welfare (Milliken and Krause 2003: 1-13). The failure of states to first assert their 
institutional presence, visibly and/or effectively, and in second place to fulfil their 
obligations to citizens in this liberal, social-contractarian view of statehood, is thus what is 
portrayed as causing the breakdown of social and political order (cf. Gros 1996; Potter 
2004; Rotberg 2003: 1-26; Einsiedel 2005: 14-16; Kreijen 2004: 86-96).
The analogy can be – and is often - made with the influential “broken windows” theory  of 
crime control proposed by  prominent neo-conservative author James Q. Wilson and 
sociologist George L. Kelling in the early  1980’s (Wilson and Kelling 1982). According to 
these authors, the inability  or unwillingness of the authorities (at the local or national level) 
to respond to exterior signs of urban decay (“broken windows” or “litter on the sidewalk”), 
and to tackle petty  crime (especially vandalism) sends a signal to criminals in the area – 
emboldening them to escalate their activities. Thus, if failure of public order and public 
safety  at  the most basic level becomes tolerated, this empowers “criminals” of all sorts. 
Wilson and Kelly argue that this encourages unlawful behaviour, opening up opportunities 
for criminal threats to emerge in these ungoverned spaces, which might spill over into 
other areas. In this view, spaces which are not subject to governmental gaze, governmental 
presence, or any sort of regulation, represent a security threat.91
  
91 In addition Wilson and Kelling go on to stress two ideas that (unwittingly) resonate with the Foucauldian 
analysis adopted in this thesis. On the one hand, they highlight the role of community involvement in 
public order – that is to say, they see 'community' as rife with potential for engagement, so that it becomes 
part and parcel of security governance strategies (Wilson and Kelling 1982: 2). Governmentality studies 
have often referred to this idea of 'working through community' as key to liberal governmental projects 
(cf. Rose 1996, 2001; Singh 2008: 114-115).  On the other hand, the authors focus on the idea of 
individual citizens having to take responsibility, indeed ownership, for their own security provision 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982: 4-5), which resonated with the themes of responsibilisation already broached 
above.
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Although the theory  was originally offered in response to debates about criminal justice 
within the U.S., and has since come under heavy  criticism, one can see the parallels that 
have been – implicitly and explicitly – drawn from this domestic analogy  for the politics of 
international security governance (cf. e.g. Bumgarner 2004: 10).  In particular, links have 
been explicitly drawn between it and contemporary American efforts in the police 
assistance field (Axe 2008). Also, during fieldwork, at  least three individuals made explicit 
reference during the interview process to the “broken windows” theory as a paradigm for 
US international police assistance efforts, and recent U.S. interventions more generally 
(DC21, personal communication with the author, 14th Dec. 2006; DC23, 18th Dec. 2006; 
KB6, 10th April 2007). The frequency – and vehemence – with which the “broken 
windows” metaphor cropped up  in fieldwork interviews in Washington is telling, as it 
indicates that several key individuals have made sense of U.S. international policebuilding 
efforts, and their own role therein, through this imagery. As such, modulating state-failure 
as a domain of insecurity through the use of criminological metaphors such as the “broken 
windows image” opens it  up for security interventions by experts (cf. Huysmans 2006a: 
6-10), who mobilise their particular knowledges – in this case, the solution for both seems 
an increase in police presence/activity/capability as a means of signalling the territorial 
control of the state.
In this way, areas at the international level which are deemed ungovernable or ungoverned 
– for instance, in cases where a state is unable (or unwilling) to extend the rule of law and 
the monopoly of the legitimate means of violence to the whole of its territory - warrant 
intervention, lest these “black holes” become sanctuaries for terrorists, or thoroughfares for 
drugs and other contraband. This linking of state frailty, ungoverned spaces, criminal 
threats and international security is often found in the literature on state-failure, but also, 
tellingly, in axial policy documents of US foreign policy. Consider, for instance, the 
rationale for the 2005 National Security Presidential Directive number forty-four 
(NSPD-44), which clearly  states that the US has a “significant stake” in stabilisation and 
reconstruction operations in order to “enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty 
over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of 
operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who 
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pose a threat to US foreign policy, security, or economic interests.” (NSPDD-44 2005: 2)92. 
Moreover, as early  as December of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice echoed this 
conception in an article in the Washington Post, stating that “(…) the greatest threats to our 
security are defined more by  the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the 
borders between strong and aggressive ones” (Rice 2005). And Marcia Wong, Deputy 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation at the State Department, expressed this 
view in unequivocal terms: 
Where there is a failure of governance, and the state is too  weak to control its territory 
and provide for its people, it can become a haven for terrorism. (…) A vacuum of good 
governance and rule of law can lead to a host of dangers – organized crime, drug trade, 
human trafficking, weapons proliferation, terrorist safe havens. (…) So, this is not  a small 
problem in far-flung places. State collapse has wide repercussions – creating a ripple 
effect  through a region, and affecting the international community. This focus on state 
weakness is not new. (…) What  is different today is that we understand better the 
interaction between state failure, humanitarian crises, and our own security. It's not 
enough to focus only on strong states, when our security  is so closely tied to  the success 
or failure of societies in weak ones. Addressing state weakness is consistent with our 
national values. And as we have come to understand, it  is also in our national interest. 
(Wong 2006)
In this vein, the linking of such “ungoverned spaces” to security threats to the US has 
become increasingly prevalent in the ever-changing Department of Defence internal 
vocabulary. As early back as 2003, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was discussing 
the difficulties of the war on terror thus: “The second thing I would say  is that there are 
ungoverned areas in the world, as the general said, and that is a problem. That makes it 
easier for people who are trying to evade attention and capture to continue to function, 
because -- literally areas that no one is governing.” (Rumsfeld 2003, emphasis added). 
When queried by the press about other global concerns in the war on terror, besides the 
high profile interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Director for Strategic Plans and 
Policy, Lt. Gen. Victor Renuart  described the problem thus: “Well, we spent a lot  of time 
talking about a term that may have been mentioned by  the secretary  and chairman in the 
past, and that is, ungoverned spaces (…) [A]nd in that kind of environment it's easy  for 
  
92  The directive,  signed by President George W. Bush, supersedes previous Directives by the Clinton 
Administration.
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illicit trade -- smuggling, piracy, narcotics trafficking, as well as terrorists, all move 
through that kind of environment.” (Renuart 2006) Additionally, the DoD now possesses 
an “Ungoverned Spaces” initiative (cf. Wong 2006), prompted by Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for African Affairs Theresa Whelan’s presentation on “Africa’s 
ungoverned space – a new threat paradigm” (Whelan 2005).
Whether in the parlance of state failure (DoS), fragile states (USAID) or ungoverned 
spaces (DoD), the fact is that U.S. security  practices have changed substantively, so that 
“(...) [i]t now extended to the penetration of the state, the socialization of its polity and the 
administration of rule of law to groups and individuals within it” (Freeman 2007). In a 
security environment characterised by  criminal threats emanating from, or passing 
unhindered through, fragile states, the solution presented is loud and clear: intervention in 
order to create or restore, quickly and visibly, public order and security – much like the 
recommendations the original “broken windows” article mentioned above, made to chiefs 
of police about their poorly governed neighbourhood with high crime rates. It is in this 
context that assistance to security governance becomes paramount, especially in terms of 
(re)building internal security institutions.93  One obvious area in which this has had 
application by the Bush Administration is in states emerging from conflict, such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan. As a recent and comprehensive RAND study on “Establishing law and 
order after conflict” summarises in its opening page:
Providing security and reconstructing internal security institutions is a key component of 
nation-building operations. As the U.S. military’s Field Manual 3-07.31 Peace Ops notes, 
these tasks are vital to establish “a secure environment” in  order to “create the conditions 
for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities.” They are also 
vital to lay the foundations for a strong and legitimate state. (Jones et al. 2005: xi)
In other words, the Bush administration began modulating their security  assistance efforts - 
including policebuilding programs in the wake of conflict  - through the language of state 
failure, and the attending dangers of ‘ungoverned space’. One the one hand, this firmly 
anchors American police assistance under Bush to the tasks of state-building in places like 
  
93  This chapter, and indeed this dissertation, focus on US efforts in policebuilding – i.e. programs and 
techniques of government aimed at assisting third countries to (re)build or (re)develop their internal security 
apparatuses, mostly within the framework of the rule of law, and criminal justice reform. However,  it seems 
quite telling that the other main arm of international security assistance – that of training armed forces in pos-
conflict environments such as Afghanistan or Iraq – is disproportionately focused on internal security as well.
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Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other, this modulation of ‘ungoverned space’ as a security 
threat neatly  links with some of the dominant themes of President Bush’s Global War on 
Terror. In particular, American security  assistance thus becomes a central tool in denying 
terrorists sanctuary (cf. Innes and Scheuer 2007), and also in bolstering the institutional 
security capabilities of states in the frontlines of the war on terror (cf. e.g. Fair and Chalk 
2006; Isacson and Ball 2005: 414-421). As one senior official ambitiously put  it, in a 
statement prepared for Congress on the matter:
Our government must be prepared to help partner nations protect themselves, and by extension 
the United States, from terrorism with a wide spectrum of assistance and delivery platforms. 
Elements of this spectrum may include the most basic cop-to-cop training in community 
policing on the streets of foreign capitals, tactical training of police SWAT teams and explosive 
ordnance disposal experts, investigative training in arcane areas such as the encrypted cyber 
communications and reverse money laundering schemes known to be used by terrorist 
organizations, the fostering of interagency cooperation through effective joint terrorism task 
forces, institutional reform of ponderous and sometimes corrupt security institutions,  assistance 
in intelligence collection and analysis,  and military training and assistance at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels. (...) We must provide that assistance and training in a manner 
that complements the partner’s existing security infrastructure and can be sustained. (Pope 
2005)
One can thus observe change of emphasis in the discursive regimes that underpin 
American policebuilding - from a strategy of international crime control and promotion of 
democracy  and rule of law under Clinton, to a strategy of security  assistance as part and 
parcel of both state-building and the objectives of the ‘war on terror’. In the next section 
then, we shall examine how the Bush administration went about pursuing that goal.
2.2. Back to the drawing board? Bush administration policebuilding strategies
2.2.1. The death of PDD-71?
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, Clinton’s largest  contribution in terms of 
U.S. policebuilding was the drafting and putting into force of PDD-71. The legislation 
provided clear guidelines for future policy in the area of post-intervention security 
governance. It also sought to place the capabilities of the U.S. government in terms of 
policebuilding on a decidedly multilateral path in its application abroad (setting it in the 
context of multilateral peacekeeping and complex emergency operations). Moreover, the 
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directive relied primarily on civilian agencies of the U.S. government to lead police 
assistance efforts. It was also focused on ensuring human right and (at  least notionally) on 
empowering local populations to co-own their security  reform processes. Finally, PDD-71 
was extremely cautious about the use of the military  in providing constabulary capabilities 
in support of policebuilding but resigned to its deployment, given the special set  of skills 
required by the U.S. military, and the fact that it was likely to be the first on the ground.
However, many of these aspects would seem to be at odds with the policies of the Bush 
administration that followed Clinton into the White House. Not only had Bush’s 
campaigning centred around the idea that nation-building was not an adequate priority for 
America (Dobbins 2005: xv, 2006: 29; Flournoy  2006: 86; Neal 2003; Woodward 2002: 
192), but the first months in office of his foreign policy team seemed to augur a less-than-
congenial attitude towards multilateral institutions and power-sharing arrangements in 
general (e.g. Garrison 2004: 52; Murphy 2004: 207). 
Upon assuming office, President Bush indulged in bureaucratic and legislative house-
cleaning, and by signing a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-1), his 
administration effectively  nullified Clinton's legislative edifice (Perito 2004: 278). This 
was not followed, however, by any specific legislation to replace PDD-71's framework for 
police assistance, or indeed improve American security  assistance efforts in post-conflict 
settings. By failing to either renew or replace PDD-71, Bush, perhaps unknowingly, landed 
his administration once again in a legislative limbo in what concerned policebuilding 
activities. This transpired less than a year after the birth of PDD-71. According to Perito:
This was particularly  true concerning issues related to justice and reconciliation that  fell 
within  the purview of PDD-71. In the absence of the directive, the new administration did 
not  have a clear policy concerning what  assistance the United States should provide 
towards restoring public order, law enforcement, justice and the rule of law in postconflict 
environments. There was no  indication  of what  agency, office or individual was 
responsible for providing leadership, or how interagency programs should be coordinated. 
(Perito 2004: 279)
When the 9-11 attacks took place, Bush’s initial reluctance regarding interventions abroad 
vanished. Subsequent operations in both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) slowly 
revealed themselves as long-term exercises in nation-building, a task to which the Bush 
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foreign policy team committed itself to without a key  instrument of security  governance in 
place, PDD-71. In the absence of such a focal point – and also perhaps reluctant  to 
recognise or hark back to Clinton achievements in the foreign policy arena – the Bush 
administration saw itself having to reinvent the wheel when it came to police assistance 
(Flournoy 2006). Moreover, the linking of such interventions to the overall theme of the 
Global War on Terror, and the specific security problematic of ungoverned states in need of 
security governance, would give U.S. policebuilding policy under Bush a very distinctive 
flavour. As we shall see in the next chapter, this translated into the re-introduction of a 
strong militarised constabulary element in both Iraq and Afghanistan theatres, with the 
issue of policebuilding increasingly linked to rapid bolstering of local security capabilities, 
and increasingly disconnected from the more ambitious developmental goals of liberal 
technical assistance.
2.2.2. The military loves metrics! Developing expert knowledge about post-conflict 
policebuilding
The Bush administration’s thus reoriented of American policebuilding strategies to centre 
heavily around the notions of state-building and the war on terror. Moreover, the Pentagon 
gradually took more responsibility for such policy efforts. Although nominally only  a co-
equal partner in delivering American policebuilding in post-conflict scenarios, the 
evolution of police assistance regimes under Bush would effectively increase the 
militarisation of police reform in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. Before moving on to an analysis of that, this final section briefly  examines 
the strategies of developing and mobilising expert, technical knowledge about 
policebuilding under the Bush administration. This strategy, will become apparent, 
completed the shift in conceptualising police assistance predominantly as a tool in state-
building.
As suggested in chapter two, one of the key  characteristics of liberal government is that it 
operates through security apparatuses, and that these are both producers and products of 
very specific, expert  knowledges. To once again borrow from Foucault’s conceptualisation, 
every  regime of power engenders, and is simultaneously  reconstituted by, a corresponding 
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regime of specific knowledges94. As discussed above,  one of the key characteristics of 
modern liberal government is the way it operates through mechanisms of problematisation 
(therefore defining bounded, intelligible fields for governmental action), and rendering 
technical. Liberal government thereby translates the problem into a series of knowledges 
and mechanisms that allow for the creation, deployment and management of governmental 
programs – in the case of the present dissertation, policebuilding programs. To recall the 
words of Tania Li, both mechanisms “co-emerge within a governmental assemblage in 
which certain sorts of diagnoses, prescriptions and techniques are available to the expert 
who is properly trained” (Li 2007: 7). 
Government through security apparatuses is, moreover, dependent  less on specific 
disciplinary  intervention over the body of this or that individual, than on knowledge of the 
natural mechanisms of the population. This has led to contemporary  forms of liberal 
government through security to increasingly  develop, and rely  on, statistical/actuarial 
forms of knowledge that seek to capture the essential mechanisms and trends of 
‘insecurity’ within a given population – often presented in the language of risk – so as to 
make such problems more amenable to expert  governmental intervention (cf. Rasmussen 
2001, 2004; Leander and van Munster 2007; Aradau and van Munster 2007). 
While the police as a social function of modern states has been inextricably linked to the 
formation and application of these expert knowledges about security  – identifying spaces, 
population sectors, social activities or individual behaviours as sites of dangerousness in 
need of governmental intervention for the continued “health and wealth” of the general 
population – this section is more worried about governmental knowledges about the police 
itself. To clarify, if police forces in states emerging from conflict are sites of American 
governmental intervention through policebuilding programs (as detailed so far), then one 
must also analyse what kind of knowledges and expertise underpin contemporary 
American discourses of police assistance. In other words, and recalling the discussion in 
chapter two of governmental knowledge practices, one must question how are American 
  
94  Cf. For instance his formulation of the power/knowledge nexus in Security, Territory, Population: “A 
constant interplay between techniques of power and their object gradually carves out in reality, as a field 
of reality, population and its specific phenomena. A whole series of objects were made visible for possible 
forms of knowledge on the basis of the constitution of the population as the correlate of techniques of 
power. In turn, because these forms of knowledge constantly carve out new objects,  the population could 
be formed, continue, and remain as the privileged correlate of modern mechanisms of power.” (Foucault 
2007: 109)
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policebuilding efforts rendered technical.
These kinds of knowledges are of course not new, nor original in the Bush administration’s 
latest application of policebuilding strategies. On the contrary, every  regime of 
policebuilding mentioned before – from the Caribbean constabularies at the end of 19th 
century to the interventions in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans a hundred years later – has 
relied on a series of conceptual instruments to make sense of the police assistance task at 
hand. But because as we recede in time such kinds of specific knowledges become less and 
less sophisticated, and access to them becomes increasingly  difficult, the mobilisation of 
expert knowledge claims to legitimise policebuilding has become much more visible and 
amenable to investigation during the last decade.95
The political sensitivity and visibility of policebuilding in recent years, especially in the 
wake of the deteriorating security  situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have had the side 
effect of spurring the creation and dissemination of metrics to evaluate the success of 
policebuilding programs. Moreover, the increasing weight of the Pentagon in American 
policebuilding programs under the George W. Bush administration has also meant an 
increased emphasis in ‘metrics’ – military parlance for a series of data collection and 
analysis instruments designed to assess the progress, costs, needs and shortcomings of 
American policebuilding programs in both Iraq and Afghanistan.96  Additionally, the 
pressures for public scrutiny and public approval mentioned before have resulted in much 
more readily availability of such technical, expert documents.
In the context of the present chapter, the previous section has already  examined how the 
incumbent Bush administration began to problematise and diagnose state-frailty  and the 
  
95 This also coincides with a period of greater visibility of policebuilding programs, especially in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and greater accumulated literature dealing with various aspects of American 
security assistance, including policebuilding. This is not surprising – given the need of the Bush 
administration to seek legitimisation for its course of action in the global war on terror,  as well as the 
theatres of war in which it is involved, it is only normal that more studies quantifying the needs and 
consequences of security assistance should emerge.
96  One interviewee offered anecdotal evidence of this in 2006, during an interview, and again during a 
public lecture on policebuilding and SSR, saying that since the U.S.  military had largely “taken over” 
police training efforts in Iraq, there had been a huge stress on producing “metrics, metrics, metrics!”, to 
the point where Iraqi police station chiefs were required to fill in and submit weekly questionnaire forms 
spanning several dozen pages on everything from how many rounds had been spent,  to how many lamps 
had been substituted. This had lead to vociferous complaints from Iraqi police officers, who had 
complained to the interviewee that this emphasis on measurement, targets and logistics was interfering 
with their ability to perform actual police duties.
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existence of ungoverned spaces as key  sites for American security interventions. American 
policebuilding after the demise of PDD-71 thus became discursively  linked to the problem 
of extending state-capacity following American (military) intervention. This – nation-
building or state-building - has become a prime way for American policy-makers under 
Bush to make sense of policebuilding in particular, and U.S. efforts in security assistance 
in general. But what  of the “prescriptions and techniques” that  follow from such 
problematisation? Having surveyed both sites of change and lines of continuity in the 
evolving American regimes of policebuilding, it  is now time to move down the dispositif to 
a series of micro-practices that underpin this liberal technology of security governance.
In this section, we examine a more general set of knowledge claims and knowledge 
production mechanisms which constitute the field of visibility, intervention and correction 
for American policy-makers working on policebuilding.
Of particular significance in policy  documents relating to the Bush administration 
policebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially post-2005, is their reliance on 
techniques for visualising the size and impact of American police assistance programs. 
This is especially true as the U.S. military tries to grasp  its new role in providing 
policebuilding abroad, and tries to adapt itself to the situation. One of the earliest (public) 
instances of this (re)development of expert  knowledge about policebuilding in the Bush 
administration is a study conducted by the RAND Corporation on Establishing law and 
order after conflict (Jones et al. 2005). An example of how statistical expert knowledge has 
been brought to bear on regimes of U.S. police assistance is instantly available. In trying to 
establish the claim that “all societies in transition experience a rise in crime and an increase 
in violence as old security institutions are dismantled and new ones are built” (thus 
rendering the issue technical, as discussed in chapter two) and legitimating the task of 
American policebuilding, the authors muster a series of data about previous operations 
(some of which discussed here) and plot a graphic that establishes – through a statistical 
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analysis of crime rates97 – the relative success of failure of previous policebuilding models 
(see Figure S1, below).
(Source: Jones et al. 2005)
The authors of this study  go on to emphasise the need for reliable statistical knowledge, 
given that only by generating such technical data can one model it, and produce a matrix of 
the trends at work in each policebuilding exercise. The methodology employed seems to 
derive from systems theory, given its repeated emphasis on inputs and outputs, and 
expected and real outcomes. Policebuilding thus becomes a statistically intelligible field of 
practice, a where risk, dangerousness and success or failure can be quantified, measured 
and acted upon accordingly. Policebuilding itself also becomes the aggregate of several 
  
97  The authors detail: “Thus, an increase in violence and crime, especially in the initial period after 
reconstruction begins, does not by itself demonstrate that the mission is failing. In addition, the overall 
objectives of a nation-building mission—such as the creation of a peaceful, democratic, and market-
oriented government—can be achieved against the backdrop of some increase in criminality and violence. 
However, rising levels of crime and political violence after several years do provide an important 
indication of the competence of police and other internal security forces. The issue, therefore, is one of 
degree and duration (summarised in Figure S.1). The x-axis indicates the level of violence; the y-axis 
denotes the rule of law. The locations of countries are rough estimates.  We plotted them according to the 
percentage increase or decrease in homicide or terrorist rates over the first five years of reconstruction, as 
well as the percentage improvement or deterioration in the rule of law” (Jones et al. 2005: xiv)
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statistical variables: homicide rates, deaths from terrorist and insurgent attacks, and the rule 
of law and civil liberties” (Jones et  al 2005: 192), and the authors wish to contend that 
“these indicators provide a useful metric of the security  environment for the indigenous 
population” (ibid.).
Such an encouragement for collecting metrics on criminal activity and security issues, 
stems from an emphasis on developing time-series that allow program managers to see the 
processes and trends operating through time in each case, thereby establishing establish 
patterns of the natural processes of security as they operate on the population. This bears a 
striking similarity  to Foucault’s description of how apparatuses of security come to know 
and act upon a population. In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault inserts this kind of 
knowledge/power into three modalities of thinking and acting governmentally upon issues 
of insecurity (in this case, he uses the example of theft). The third modality, precisely that 
of liberal security  is described thus: “The general question basically will be how to keep a 
type of criminality, theft for instance, within socially and economically acceptable limits 
and around an average that will be considered as optimal for a given social 
functioning.” (Foucault 2007: 20) He goes on to detail:
The third form is not  typical of the legal code or the disciplinary mechanism, but  of  the 
apparatus (dispositif) of security (…) Putting it  in a still absolutely general way, the 
apparatus of security  inserts the phenomenon in question, namely theft, within a series of 
probable events. Second, the reactions of power to this phenomenon are inserted in a 
calculation of cost. Finally, third, instead of a binary division  between the permitted and 
the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on 
the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded. In this way a 
completely different distribution of things and mechanisms takes shape. (Foucault  2007: 
20-21)
These variations in knowing security  phenomena can, and often do, make very  real 
differences, as they impact on the way security experts – including policebuilding experts – 
perceive and act upon the security  field. As an example, in Afghanistan – the case which 
forms the focus of the next chapter -, justifications for changing police force levels, for 
instance, have been given with basis on demographic instruments. What is potentially a 
key constitutional aspect of the Afghan government’s acting (the Tashkil or agreement on 
police force composition) has been altered on the basis of claims supported by a series of 
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statistics about ratios of police officers per capita (KB4, Personal communication with the 
author, 9th April 2007; KB30, 25th March 2008). In a document proposing the changes for 
higher numbers of police trainees, rather than engaging in the lengthy political negotiation 
process that in a transitional country is not always an easy or speedy task, American 
policebuilding experts presented a report where the issue was rendered technical, 
modulated in statistical terms: presenting a list  of countries in the region, and the average 
number of police officers per thousand individuals, it  was summarily argued that 
Afghanistan needed to boost its force structure (IPCB 2006). 
In short, the growing emphasis of the development of adequate metrics and diagrammatic 
representations in American policebuilding programs, which has surged during the Bush 
administration, shows an attempt to generate and/or improve technical knowledge of the 
security processes immanent in populations, a kind of knowledge that might enable the 
right calculations of government, and the right interventions (Scott 1999; Li 2007: 18).
2.3. Conclusions
Clinton administration George W. Bush 
administration
Nature
essentially multilateral primarily bilateral
Civil-military 
relations
mostly civilian
mixed model, increasingly 
militarised, return to constabulary 
themes
Key operational 
frameworks
Peace operations, humanitarian 
intervention, fight against 
transnational crime
War on terror, nation-building, 
doctrine of 'ungoverned spaces'
Institutional 
framework
ICITAP + INL ICITAP + INL + DoD + S/CRS
Essential 
legislation
PDD-71 DoD 3000.05ß
Key experiences Somalia, Haiti, Balkans Iraq, Afghanistan
Fig. 4.2 – Overview of differences in policebuilding regimes between Clinton and Bush administrations
As can be gleaned from the elements in Fig 4.2 (above), the transition between the Clinton 
and George W. Bush administrations marks yet another subtle shift in American regimes of 
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policebuilding. This shift has occurred along three main axes. First, the lessons learned 
from Somalia and other early interventions which required a police assistance component 
led the Clinton administration to focus its policy on improving the multilateral setting for 
American policebuilding. This was apparent in all three relevant directives signed by 
Clinton (PDD-25, PDD-56, and especially PDD-71). Moreover, this is also demonstrated 
by the growth of American deployments in multilateral CivPol contingents, and the attempt 
to develop multilateral training centres worldwide (such as the various International Law 
Enforcement Academies). The Bush administration, on the contrary, increasingly turned to 
bilateral policebuilding, emphasising the role of American institutions, programs and teams 
in delivering post-conflict police aid to select states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Secondly, while Clinton had strongly modulated his administrations police assistance 
regimes in terms of a fight against transnational crime, as well as the promotion of rule of 
law in countries undergoing democratisation, the Bush White House highlighted in its 
pronouncements the ideas of effective state-building and the theme of the fight against 
transnational terrorism. Finally, while Clinton fought hard to establish a legislative context 
conducive to effective policebuilding - which resulted in PDD-71 -, the Bush 
administration not only “killed” PDD-71, but in effect did very little until very late to 
replace it with a similar legislative compass (DoD 3000.05, which shall be examined in the 
following chapter)
To speak of a shift is of course not the same as to talk of a break – and there are, patently, 
some lines of continuity. For instance, the Bush administration did not significantly  alter 
the institutional structure that enables American policebuilding efforts to be delivered 
worldwide. Both ICITAP at the Department of Justice and the INL at  the Department of 
State were kept in place as central pieces in U.S. policebuilding strategies. They were, 
however, supplemented by the heavy involvement of the Pentagon in American 
policebuilding, and the creation, under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, of an Office of 
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). 
Therefore, it is not my intention to argue that there is a sharp  departure or displacement of 
the key characteristics of previous American policebuilding regimes during George W. 
Bush’s tenure. On the contrary, some of the key elements of policebuilding which mark it 
out as a liberal technology of rule through security (security governance) have remained 
  
166
throughout. However, if we are to view American policebuilding as an apparatus, then it is 
important to foreground the subtle ways in which its disparate elements are re-arranged in 
their relationships, or the way in which the object of the security apparatus – that is to say, 
the problem it addresses, and the urgent need to which its creation responds – is modulated 
differently.
As such, it becomes apparent that by  modulating American policebuilding as linked to the 
Global War on Terror, and by couching it in the language of “ungoverned spaces” linked to 
terrorism, policy-makers under Bush have done two things: first, they brought security 
governance programs to the fore, especially security assistance programs to foreign 
militaries and foreign police. But they have also introduced a wrenching tension between 
existing models or regimes of U.S. policebuilding. If, as we have seen in chapter 3, the 
existing regime had gradually moved away from a militarised, constabulary, ad hoc 
policebuilding scheme in the wake of military intervention to a much more structured, 
civilian and long-term set of programs in transitional countries, preoccupied chiefly  with 
effecting liberal development schemes of the local subjects, and promoting democracy, 
under the auspices of Bush such programs now seem to be moving in the opposite 
direction.
To investigate this trend, and indeed to look at the finer grain of how policebuilding 
becomes instantiated, and policy-programs seek to act upon and (re)constitute the 
subjectivities of distant populations, we must look at the shifting application of 
policebuilding technologies in Afghanistan. The next chapter will offer a brief overview of 
the institutional set-up of American policebuilding in the context of Afghanistan's post-
conflict stabilisation, before moving down to an analysis of the micro-practices of security 
governance.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PRACTICES OF POLICEBUILDING - 
AMERICAN POLICE ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2008
We are not trying to conquer Afghanistan, we are trying to help 
Afghanistan conquer itself.
(anon., American ex-Embedded Tactical Trainer with the Afghan 
National Police)98
You have no family and no tribe.  The ANP is now your family and 
your tribe.
(Anon. Afghan police commander)99
1. New beginnings – U.S. policebuilding efforts in Afghanistan
As our car moves through the cacophony and chaos which is Kabul traffic, circulation 
slowly grinds to a halting pace shortly  before one of the major roundabouts, near the 
historic Macroyan quarter100 and the Ministry of Public Works. I look around, trying to 
understand the sudden slowing, and query our pensive driver, a bear of a Pashtun: 
“Trouble?” He shakes his head, and sighs in resignation: “Security check...” As we inch 
our way towards the roundabout itself, the picture is bizarre. Two traffic policemen, in their 
dapper green-grey uniforms with white insignias, are trying to slow down and order the 
traffic so that police and army personnel can pick out and search vehicles. Their best 
efforts notwithstanding, their frantic gesturing is of little or no avail, as Afghan drivers 
typically ignore them, and greedily  move forward in short bursts of acceleration, cutting 
  
98 Quotation can be found online at http://billandbobsadventure.blogspot.com/2009/02/adventurist-gut-
punches-hts-shades-of.html (last accessed 20th Feb. 2009).  The author of the sentence and owner of the 
milblog (or military weblog) posts anonymously under the pseudonym Bill and Bob's Excellent Afghan 
Adventure or Old Blue. The author describes himself as a “citizen soldier with 26 years of service. 
Volunteered to go to Afghanistan to advise the Afghan National Army as an ETT (Embedded Tactical 
Trainer.) Wound up as a Police Mentor Team (PMT) mentor working to improve what for most people is 
their first contact with the government of Afghanistan.”
99 Quoted anonymously in a joint DoD/DoS assessment of police training in Afghanistan: “The Afghan 
commander at one of the RTCs told the assessment team that he tells the recruits being trained, “You 
have no family and no tribe.   The ANP is now your family and your tribe.” (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 17, fn. 
20)
100 The Microrayan or Macroyan quarter (transliterations vary) was built by the occupying Soviet forces after 
the 1980 invasion to house party cadres, and is a distinctive reminder of Soviet influence in the urban 
culture of Kabul (for an overview of its historical and social significance,  cf. Issa and Kohistani 2007: 
54-55). Today, it houses some 60.000 people, and many government offices are located in its vicinity.
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off slower drivers and speeding through any holes in the traffic to their destination. Our 
driver, used as he is to such things, does exactly the same, lurching the SUV forward in an 
effort to escape the bottleneck, and in the process leaving a nearby  traffic cop waving him 
down both ignored and frustrated. As we enter the roundabout at relative speed, a soldier 
with the Afghan National Army notices our manoeuvre to avoid the police officer, walks 
up to us in the middle of the road, and decisively opens our door, while still in motion, to 
force us to stop. Clad in his new, American supplied uniform, and sporting a shiny  M-16, 
he barks a question to the driver in Dari: “Weapons?” The driver smiles, shakes his head, 
and motions to indicate us, the Westerners in the back. The soldier takes off his strangely 
incongruent American jungle hat, fidgets his radio uncomfortably for a moment as he peers 
inside, and then just  shuts the door noisily, walking away without a word, an apparent sign 
we can proceed. We speed off once again, as our driver mutters under his breath, with a 
patronising smile: “Security, crazy!”101
This scene, by  no means uncommon in 2008 Kabul, could well be a metaphor for the state 
of security  sector reform in Afghanistan. As I reviewed it  in my head, inside the car, it 
seemed apparent that security forces in Afghanistan, and especially the police, command 
very little respect, and very little by  way of authority, even after 6 years of security 
assistance efforts by the international community. Traffic cops in Kabul are, generally 
speaking, bereft of automatic weapons - a true exception in a country which could be a 
poster for the popularity of the AK-47 assault rifle. But while to my Western eyes their 
somewhat gentler demeanour proved reassuring in traffic, to them it proved to be an almost 
insurmountable obstacle in doing their job with any  degree of efficacy. Since the police in 
general are seen by the Afghan public as part of their daily  insecurity problems, rather than 
as a solution, they do not really embody the government's authority in any significant way 
– safe with a gun on their hands. 
The notion that Afghan police are seen by  the larger population as a source of insecurity 
rather that law and order has historical roots and is often quoted in reports justifying the 
reform of the ANP by the international community (cf. ICG 2008: 5-7; Wilder 2007: 1). 
Further, such a charge is amply corroborated by anecdotal evidence and my own fieldwork 
  
101 KB18, personal communication with the author, Kabul, 14th March 2008.
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in 2007 and 2008, in and around Kabul102. However, a recent survey conducted by the Asia 
Foundation presents a somewhat different, somewhat more confusing picture: 80% of 
respondents agreed with the statement that the “ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan 
people” (40% strongly agreed, 40% agreed somewhat), the same percentage agreed with 
the statement the “ANP helps improve the security” (same proportion). Additionally, 73% 
agreed with the statement “the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed 
crimes so that they  can be brought to justice” (34% strongly agreed, 39% agreed 
somewhat). (Asia Foundation 2008: 33). This corroborates their findings that 82% of 
respondents manifested some degree of confidence in the ANP as a public institution (Asia 
Foundation 2008: 25). However, this jars with several other findings by  the same survey: 
49% of respondents indicating some degree of fear when encountering the police (34% 
some fear, 15% a lot of fear), and 60% agreed that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly 
trained (22% strongly  agreed, 39% agreed somewhat), while 69% agreed that the ANP 
“needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself” (Asia Foundation 2008: 
32)
As I thought about it, I began noticing re-enactments of this general disregard for police 
authority all over town: cops having to physically  block the traffic by standing in the 
middle of the road, risking their own life to make their orders obeyed, or sporting 
automatic weapons to bolster their claims to authority in the public space. In short, since a 
modern, professional, incorrupt, state-run, community-friendly police institution is an 
historical oddity  in Afghanistan, in order to do their work, more often than not police 
officers find themselves deriving their legitimacy  not from the law, but from the barrel of a 
gun.
This trend was made sadly and violently  apparent in May 2006, as Kabul was engulfed in 
popular, spontaneous riots, leavings at least 14 people dead, and scores more seriously 
injured (Gall 2006). The Washington Post called it “the worst street violence since the fall 
of the Taliban in 2001 (...)”, as angry  mobs roamed the streets of Kabul, “(...) many of 
them shouting slogans against the government and United States, set fires, attacked 
buildings and clashed with police for about seven hours.” (Constable and Hamdard 2006). 
The event which sparked all of this was a relatively  banal occurrence in post-conflict 
  
102 Interviews with KB2 (9th April 2007); KB3 (9th April 2007, 25th March 2008), KB11 (12th April 2007); 
KB18 (25th March 2008) and KB21 (19th March 2008), Kabul (cf. Supplementary Sheet).
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Kabul: a US military convoy was involved in an accident, ramming into civilian vehicles 
and causing at least one dead and several injured among Afghan civilians. But as the angry 
populace began to mass around the crash site, US forces and Afghan police made a show 
of force, trying to contain and disperse the crowds. There are conflicting accounts, with 
some suggesting that both US military  and the Afghan National Police (ANP) fired into the 
crowd, while official reports deny this and said only warning shots were fired into the air. 
What is clear, however, is that weapons were held and fired by the security forces, and that 
the Afghan police were perceived by the populace on the spot to be supporting and 
protecting the American contingent – rather than being impartial instruments of the Afghan 
justice system. That was enough to spark a wave of violence that soon turned from anti-
American to anti-Western manifestations, leaving behind a litter of broken windows, 
charred automobiles, and very scared international aid workers (KB1, personal 
communication with the author, 8th April 2007, Kabul).
In light of this last example, it becomes obvious why Security Sector Reform has risen to 
its contemporary prominence, virtually  at the heart of today's post-intervention efforts by 
the international community and the US in Afghanistan. Without  some semblance of 
security guaranteed to both the local population and the host of international aid workers in 
post-conflict scenarios, the mantra goes, little or no reconstruction can be achieved, let 
alone the loftier ideals of democracy-promotion so central to contemporary U.S. foreign 
policy103. And of course, of all the institutions targeted for reform in the SSR process, the 
police often constitute the most  visible, the most ubiquitous, the most common daily 
interface between people and their security providers (usually States). Additionally, the 
police is a special kind of social institution, for it simultaneously  embodies both legal 
restraint and discretionary powers; crime-prevention and peace keeping; the right to take 
life and property but also the duty to foster and protect them. 
As shown throughout the previous chapter, American policy-makers of both the Clinton 
and Bush administrations realised very  soon that in post-intervention, especially post-
conflict scenarios, the police are key to maintaining a modicum of law and order structure 
the social and political field in ways receptive to further assistance. After over a quarter of 
  
103 This idea of security as a precondition for reconstruction and development, and the attending “security 
first” agenda in post-conflict operations,  is becoming widespread in the literature (cf. Brzoska 2003: 27-30; 
Etzioni 2007: 20-31; Krause and Juttersonke 2005: 455-56; Ottaway and Mair 2004; Schwarz 2005) 
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a century of violent, internecine, factional conflict, American policy-makers contended, 
few places on the planet were more in need of police assistance than Afghanistan.
1.1. Plugging the security gap
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. intervened in Afghanistan, in an 
incursion dubbed by the Pentagon Operation Enduring Freedom. For the Bush 
administration, this was a dual-purpose intervention. It was conducted as a key step  in 
rolling out the Bush administration's Global War on Terror, but also as a means to tackle 
the problem of state failure and ‘ungoverned spaces’, which was being modulated as a key 
security issue for the U.S, as we have seen in the previous chapter. As such, the Bush 
administration resorted to the discursive regimes of 'humanitarian intervention' and 'nation-
building' from which it had initially  shied. However, for all the earnestness and excitement 
with which the U.S. represented and conducted Enduring Freedom, the Bush 
administration – particularly the neoconservative elements within it – failed to foresee the 
consequences of a strategic bombing campaign for the future of Afghanistan, and 
America’s role in it. 
Afghanistan, ravaged almost incessantly by internal violence for almost a quarter of a 
century, had one of the most inadequate public infrastructures in the world (cf. Coyne 
2007: 163-4; Goodson 2001: 92-97). Sure enough, Afghanistan was now free from al-
Qaida training camps, and according to the nascent narratives of securitised “ungoverned 
spaces”, it presented an opportunity for a new Afghan state to establish its remit, and 
Weberianly claim the monopoly  of force within its territory, with the assistance of the 
international community. However, what the U.S. military  had failed to foresee was that 
the rapid collapse of the Taliban regime, and the strategic retreat of its al-Qaida guests 
suddenly left the U.S. armed forces in charge of a country  without a real state – from 
public sanitation to public police. The ‘light footprint’ advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, 
neoconservative advocates and policy-makers in Washington - based on small special 
forces units, extensive use of air power, and precision guided munitions - had lasting 
political ramifications, and left  the U.S. particularly ill-fitted to establish a comprehensive 
regime of security provision and governance in Afghanistan (Lock-Pullan 2006: 164; 
Vaishnav 2004). And it would surely  take some time to produce from the ashes a viable 
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Afghan state, complete with an Army and police, to provide security  to its own people. In 
short, the U.S. had just created “a security gap”. 
In the abundant literature that has appeared recently on transitions from conflict (what the 
Pentagon identifies as Phase IV of operations (Crane 2005)), the “security gap” refers to 
two intertwined phenomena. On the one hand, the more common and widespread meaning 
of this concept is the partial or total collapse of law and order in post-conflict societies, that 
is, the vacuum of security  provision by the state as one regime falls and another seeks to 
establish effective mechanisms for security  provision and the rule of law for its population 
(i.e. the security gap as a “deployment gap” cf. Dziedzic 1998: 8-10). On the other hand, 
the concept has also come to mean the gap  between expectations of security - by the new 
regime trying to provide it, by the intervening forces, or by the local populace -, and the 
actual delivery of security  on a day-to-day  basis (i.e. the security  gap as an “enforcement 
gap”, as well as an “institutional gap” cf. Dziedzic 1998: 10-16)104. In the case of 
Afghanistan, the security  gap has come to mean – at least in the parlance of U.S. officials - 
the institutional shortcomings of the Afghan state in achieving a sustainable, autonomous 
capability in security governance since 2001 (DC25, personal communication with the 
author, 18th Dec. 2006; KB17, 13th March 2008).
In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. did not have a clear plan for addressing the security 
gap immediately after the invasion, nor did it  envisage using a CivPol contingent, or 
ISAF’s troops as peacekeepers. Instead, it relied initially on the various Afghan militias 
which had helped American forces oust the Taliban regime, which in turn created an ever 
greater security  problem, as many engaged in unlawful behaviour rather than plug the 
security gap (Goodson 2006: 149). In the longer term, however, American policy-makers 
understood the need for a full-fledged security sector reform process, so as to help the 
fledgling Afghan state set up its own security forces, and thus take responsibility for 
plugging the worsening security gap (149).
  
104  The notion of a security gap in post-intervention scenarios has generated a fair amount of literature 
(Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 323-325; Feil 2002; Jones et al. 2006; Pugh 2008:  418-419; Stromseth, 
Wippmann and Brooks 2006: 147-149), especially with regard to the role of police forces in plugging the 
gap. Regarding the latter,  there is now some discussion as to what is the best model to adopt with several 
authors pushing for the deployment of paramilitary/constabulary type units (or “formed police units”) 
(Agordzo 2009; Dziedzic and Stark 2006; Perito 2008), and other authors severely criticising that option 
(Hill, Berger and Zanetti 2007).
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2. Early days – 2002-2006
2.1. Geneva Process, SSR and “lead nations”
After the military intervention by the U.S. in the Fall of 2001, there was an urgent need to 
fashion a new, transitional government, and lay the foundations for a post-Taliban political 
order. For that purpose, a number of Afghan notables – leaders and representatives of the 
various political factions, minus the Taliban – met in Petersberg, near Bonn, Germany, 
under the auspices of the UN's Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Afghanistan. Given that no stable, internationally  recognised Afghan government had 
existed in exile, the agreement established the bases for an “Interim Authority” to assume 
formal sovereignty  on behalf of Afghans in December 2001. Its purpose was to ensure the 
smooth transfer of power into Afghan hands, and to make all the preparations for the 
convening of an Emergency  Loya Jirga, presided by the ailing Zahir Shah, within six 
months. The purpose of this Emergency Jirga would be to “decide on a Transitional 
Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until 
such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair 
elections (...)” (Bonn Agreement 2001). In the mean time, the process of reforming 
Afghanistan's security sector, because of the urgency of plugging the security gap, was 
officially  launched with a series of G-8 and donor meetings, held in Geneva in early 2002 
(Sedra 2004: 3).
The security sector reform (SSR) process was divided into five pillars, with each of them 
being assigned a “lead nation” that should coordinate all efforts: military reform under the 
aegis of the U.S.; police reform (Germany); the disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration of ex-combatants (Japan); judicial reform (Italy); and counter-narcotics (UK). 
Germany, through its Ministries of Interior and of Foreign Affairs, established the German 
Police Project Office in March 2002, which started functioning in Kabul in early  April of 
the same year. In its capacity as lead, co-ordinating nation, its duties were to establish (or 
more accurately, re-open) the Kabul Police Academy, to assist in the recruitment and 
training of Afghanistan's police recruits, to implement and contribute to funding assistance, 
and to advise the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) with regards to police reform and rule 
of law. (FFO/FMI 2005: 8) By  April 2007, the GPPO had field offices in Mazar-e-Sharif, 
Kunduz and Feyzabad, 327 police advisers had worked on the mission, and Germany had 
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provided over 60 million Euros for rebuilding the Afghan police (GPPO 2007). 
It is unclear what exactly the decision-making process was during the talks that led away 
from the more usual framework (a multilateral, UN sanctioned mission with a CivPol 
component) and to such a division of labour on the crucial issue of security  governance. 
Some decisions looked fairly justified - the US has had extensive experience with security 
assistance to foreign armed forces, probably having done it more often, longer and in more 
places than any other nation105, while Germany has a well-documented relationship in 
assisting Afghanistan's police that stretches back at least 50 years (Amstutz 1994: 268; 
Girardet 1995: 120-22; Macoun 1996: 112-114; Rubin 1991: 83; Schreiber et al 1995: 
162-3). Other choices, however, appeared rather arbitrary: Japan had little local knowledge 
of the Afghan case, and precious little experience dealing with warlordism. One choice in 
particular was risible – the important issue of justice reform and rule of law being handed 
to Italy, who had neither the experience with such processes in post-conflict operations, nor 
the necessary knowledge of the Afghan legal context. 
Given the large disparities between the lead nations in terms readiness, available funding, 
political culture, national public opinion, and available personnel, it soon became apparent 
that security sector reform in Afghanistan - instead of being a co-ordinated, parallel and 
relatively well-integrated process - was doomed from the start to suffer from a series of 
wrenching tensions. In an analysis of the difficulties that thus plagued the Geneva process, 
Mark Sedra states: “The rationale behind the scheme was sound; it assumed that giving 
donors a direct stake in the process would guarantee long-term support. In actuality  the 
scheme has disjointed the process preventing the formation of much needed synergies 
across the breadth of its programs” (Sedra 2004: 3). Nowhere was this more apparent since 
the beginning than in the reform of the Afghan National Police.
  
105  As chapter two briefly indicates, this tradition extends at least to the late 1800’s. In addition to 
constabulary operations, the U.S. has provided training and assistance to a host of foreign nations. Apart 
from the modicum of literature on policebuilding already mentioned, there is also a significant body of 
writings on American military assistance/advising to foreign forces throughout history (cf. Becena 1993; 
Bolger 2006; Gibby 2008; Grube 2008; Hermes 1966; Lumpe 2002; Marks 2001; Mott 1999; Porch and 
Muller 2008; Waghelstein 2008; Westermann 2008). In 2006, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort 
Leavenworth organised a symposium on military history precisely on the topic, the result of which was an 
edited volume entitled Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives (Gott & 
Brooks 2006), in which one of the participants was Gen. David Petraeus (now the Commander of the U.S. 
CentCom, and therefore responsible for the Afghan theatre of operations).
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2.2. The INL steps in - the Afghan Police Program
As it became clear that individual lead nations did not have enough funds to kick-start their 
SSR projects with the speed and intensity  which would correspond to U.S. wishes, ISAF 
strategies and the needs of the Afghans, the Bush administration stepped in. Interviews in 
Washington DC during fieldwork in the Fall of 2006 revealed a widespread sentiment that 
Germany's efforts to rebuilding and reform the Afghan police was clearly insufficient. 
Almost no one questioned the technical abilities of the German police advisors on the 
ground, nor did anyone think that the establishment of a very professional, high-level, fully 
staffed, curriculum-intensive Police Academy was a bad idea. But the (perceived) slow 
pace of recruit  turnover, the small size of the German operation (it did not cover the whole 
country), and the relatively low number of German advisors in-country at any one time 
anguished American officials working in policebuilding (DC13, 15th Dec. 2006; DC29, 
19th Dec. 2006; DC15, 6th Dec. 2006; DC27, 18th Dec. 2006, personal communications 
with the author). 
The Afghan government, alongside its international partners, most prominently Germany, 
had agreed on a force level ceiling of 62.000 for the Afghan national Police106. Although 
the figure was a ceiling and not a floor, and no specific targets and deadlines had been 
agreed upon in either the Geneva (April 2002) or London (January 2006) talks, the U.S. 
was growing impatient at what it perceived as insufficient results on the German part. 
Germany initially sought to reach an accommodation with the U.S. on the matter, and there 
were high-level meetings between the State Department's Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and their German counterparts. But 
conversations stalled since Germany's proposal was to negotiate extra-funding from the US 
government, so it could expand its operations while keeping to the same strategic 
framework. U.S. officials on their part insisted vehemently  that  if they were going “to fork 
over the big bucks, they should be calling the shots”, i.e. Germany would become an 
implementer, but overall strategic decision should follow American guidelines (DC29, 
  
106  A US interagency assessment of the Afghan Police Program details: “The Afghans and the coalition 
partners agreed to set the ANP force ceiling at 62,000, a figure based on a calculation by representatives of 
the government of Afghanistan and German planners as to the minimum number that could function 
effectively and be supported and financed by the Afghan government over the long term.  That figure 
included 44,300 uniformed police,  12,000 border police,  3,400 highway police, and 2,300 counter narcotics 
police.  During the January 2006 international donors conference in London,  conferees reconfirmed the 
62,000 ceiling while adding a standby reaction police force and adjusting the size of other ANP 
subdivisions” (OIG DoS/DoD 2006: 5)
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personal communication with the author, 19th Dec. 2006).
The Department of State decided instead that it would ‘complement’ Germany's strategy, 
taking charge of the all the basic training below officer level, and inject massive amounts 
of money and personnel into the Afghan scenario. For that purpose, it tasked an Afghan 
Police Program inside the INL, and in mid-2002 it built  its own, parallel police ‘academy’ - 
a Central Training Centre (CTC) in Kabul, which it finished in 2003. This meant that 
initially the nascent U.S. policebuilding program was addressing police needs in Kabul, but 
it would soon need to move beyond that, and so the CTC was followed by  the building and 
opening of seven more Regional Training Centres (RTC's), operating out of in Kandahar, 
Kunduz, Jalalabad, Gardez, Bamiyan, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. As for curricula, they 
were built on the basis of the curricula previously  used by the INL in Bosnia and Kosovo 
during the 1990's, although major adjustments had to be made to adapt to the Afghan 
context, where illiteracy was a crippling and pervasive problem107. 
With an initial budget of approximately  24 million dollars, the INL channelled recruits into 
two “tracks”, according to their level of literacy (INL-APP 2006: 7). However, while the 
shortest course initially  ministered by  the GPPO to officers at Kabul's National Police 
Academy was 1 year (the longest taking 3 years of formal training, plus field experience), 
INL's focus on high-volume, high-turnover meant that courses lasted 5 to 9 weeks initially, 
depending on the track, with the possibility  of recruits taking “speciality courses” later on 
such issues as criminal investigative skills, tactical skills, pistol and rifle qualifications, or 
crowd control, among others (INL-APP 2006: 3, 8-10; DC13, 30th Nov. 2006; DC29, 19th 
Dec. 2006; KB4, 9th April 2007, personal communications with author). 
Additionally, the U.S. policebuilding program in Afghanistan focused on structuring 
logistics – the most recent UN Human Development report on Afghanistan concisely states 
that efforts and funding “(...) have largely concentrated on the rebuilding of police 
facilities, providing uniforms and equipment, training, and pay and rank reform.” (UNDP 
2007: 84). In fact, this trend of focusing large parts of the policebuilding budget on 
  
107 Afghanistan’s literacy problem, especially in the context of security assistance programs, is well 
documented (Clifton 2008: 13; OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 28-30; Wilder 2007: viii, 30),  and the U.S. 
Government even contracted with a private security firm (a branch of MPRI) to develop special, image-
based curricula for military training programs (DC8, personal communication with the author, 
Washington, 16th Nov. 2006)
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equipment and logistics has continued unabated – a 2008 report by the Congressional 
Research Service detailed that in order “to address equipment shortages, in 2007” the U.S. 
government would be “providing about 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new weapons 
of all types.” (Katzman 2008: 36)
3. New developments – 2005-2008
3.1. The Pentagon steps in – DoD directive 3000.05
Since the end of the Clinton administration, as we have already seen in the previous 
chapter, the Bush administration saw itself in the unenviable position of having to 
continue a policy of intervention abroad that would include extensive issues of transitional 
security and long-term objectives of state-building and the establishment of sustainable 
security governance capabilities. However, it  had already revoked PDD-71, the one piece 
of American legislation that effectively  established the focal point for a coordinated, clear 
response of the U.S. government to such emergent needs.
Given that limitation, and the fact that by 2004 the U.S. was deeply embroiled in effecting 
post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation in both Afghanistan and Iraq – with a record 
of very mixed success, to put it  charitably – the Bush administration commissioned or 
encouraged a series of studies from Washington think-tanks, consultancies, and the 
Pentagon itself, to devise long-term strategies for improving American post-conflict 
capabilities, including issues of security governance in post-intervention scenarios. 
Particularly influential was a working group, established in the summer of 2004, to deal 
with policy recommendations regarding transitions to and from conflicts, organised by the 
Defense Science Board (DSB 2004, DSB 2005). One of the key messages in the ensuing 
report was that the future operations the U.S. military  was likely to face would look a lot 
more like Afghanistan and Iraq (or Somalia and Haiti) than World War II, and that, 
therefore, the Pentagon should pay  close attention to developing a set of capabilities for 
stabilisation, reconstruction and transitional security (DSB 2004: iii-xviii). Among these, 
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the Defense Science Board panel recognised that “when daily life in a country  is largely 
shaped by violence of a magnitude that cannot be managed by indigenous police and 
security forces, progress is difficult” (DSB 2004: 12), and the report specifically mentions 
an “ability to train constabulary  forces and indigenous police” as one of several critical 
capabilities for DoD stability operations (43). 
In fact, the document puts forward an explicit argument for developing a series of expert, 
technical capabilities in the domains of transitional security, rule of law, and governance, 
and links it quite openly with American objectives of promoting a particular kind of liberal 
order in post-intervention settings:
By establishing a secure environment, military forces open a window of opportunity 
during which  political and economic changes can take place,  thereby allowing a society to 
move from conflict  to  peace and democracy. The civil elements of an S&R mission  must 
promote such changes. It is police, judges, civil administrators, and  technical advisors 
who help build new institutions for security, rule of law, governance, civil society, free 
press, and political parties. If these civil capacities are not carefully  planned, prepared, 
deployed, and employed in a timely fashion, then the window opened by the military 
intervention eventually will close, possibly leaving the situation no better than before. 
(DSB 2004: 58, emphasis added)
Donald Rumsfeld, then still Secretary  of Defence and an ardent proponent of ‘force 
transformation’ (Rumsfeld 2002; Else 2004: 65-123), took these suggestions to heart, and 
decided to turn them into policy guidance for all American forces.
From those origins, a document was born under the name ‘Department of Defense 
directive 3000.05 on Military  Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations’, which became known in U.S. governmental circles 
simply  as DoD 3000.05 (DC 24, DC25, personal communication with the author, 
Washington D.C., 18th Dec. 2006). The unassuming name, however, should not blind us to 
the key fact about  this piece of legislation: less than four years after the untimely demise of 
Clinton’s PDD-71, this was the George W. Bush administration’s answer to the need for a 
coordinated policy  of security  governance in post-intervention scenarios. The greatest 
difference, however, is that while Clinton’s PDD-71 had emphasised the essentially 
multilateral and civilian nature of such efforts – carefully  circumscribing the opportunities 
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and ways in which paramilitary  instruments such as constabulary forces could be 
developed and deployed – directive 3000.05 shifts that balance towards bilateral relations 
between the U.S. government and the host nation. Simultaneously, the directive injected 
the Pentagon as a – if not the – key player in post-intervention security  governance 
schemes in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While the document goes to some length to distinguish between civilian and military 
competencies and mandates in post-intervention scenarios, and speaking in a language of 
inter-agency co-operation – whereby the U.S. military  is merely  another “supporting 
agency” within a “whole of government approach”, – nonetheless its pages and 
recommendations are nothing short of revolutionary, in that  they advocate the involvement 
of the Pentagon in all areas of post-conflict policy108. Of course, the document recognises 
that, under optimal conditions, “many stability operations tasks are best performed by 
indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals”, but “U.S. military forces shall be 
prepared to perform all tasks necessary  to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot 
do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help  secure a lasting peace and facilitate the 
timely  withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.” (DoD 2005: 2). Within this context, the 
directive then establishes a series of core competencies, the first of which is – tellingly – to 
“rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional 
facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilise the environment.” (DoD 
2005: 2). In other words, albeit with a change of language (from multilateral peacekeeping 
operations to security and stabilisation in post-conflict environments), and a much greater 
emphasis on the central role of the military, the directive establishes the DoD as a key 
player in American policebuilding under Bush, in the same way  as PDD-71 had 
legitimated the actions of the State Department in general, and INL in particular, under 
Clinton.
  
108  In several interviews in Washington, in late 2006, and as the directive was moving into the 
institutionalisation and implementation stages, Pentagon staffers were eager to promote it publicly. 
‘Revolutionary’  was one of the adjectives most bandied about to promote the document (DC24, DC25, 
DC 30, DC4, personal communications with the author). This was especially so since Sec. Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld had placed it within the context of long-term transformation of the U.S. military (to 
respond to the changes in the security agenda traced in chapter one), and given stability operations equal 
priority to combat operations. As the document makes explicit at its very start, “It is DoD policy that … 
[s]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to 
conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly 
addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, 
exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.” (DoD 2005: 2, emphasis added)
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Having thus reviewed the shift in thinking and planning security governance and 
policebuilding policy during the first four years of the Bush administration, the chapter 
now moves to tracking the effects these changes in modulating the problem had in the 
implementation of governmental solutions on the ground in Afghanistan.
3.2. CSTC-A and the “Police Reform Directorate”
From the shortcomings of Somalia’s early  policebuilding mission to Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs had steadily 
become the focal civilian agency for U.S. policebuilding, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter. Unencumbered by the negative historical connotations of USAID's police 
assistance, and relatively free of the internal problems that rocked the ICITAP in the 
mid-1990's, the INL had become a key player in the outgoing Clinton administration's 
strategy of international crime control. However, its experience so far had been mostly 
connected to the deployment and management of American CivPol contingents within 
multilateral peacebuilding operations, and in the main outsourced through contracts to 
private security  companies, especially DynCorp (DC1, personal communication with the 
author, 2nd Nov. 2006). Afghanistan represented, for all sorts of reasons, a different kind of 
challenge for INL's staff. For one, there was the issue of logistics – how to effectively 
implement such a large policebuilding program in such a far away, landlocked country? 
Secondly, in a country with very little by  way of available, intact, suitable real estate, and 
still swamped in daily  violence, how to provide for adequate construction materials, 
accommodation, timely shipping of training materials, and the supply of police weapons?
Until 2005, the INL was, by  and large, tackling these issues on its own, but more and more 
its staff realised that improvements were urgently necessary in the terms of training 
infrastructure and equipment for the ANP. Since the DoD possessed the best strategic airlift 
capability, was hampered by no restriction whatsoever in supplying ‘lethal equipment’ to 
the Afghan police, had plenty of experience in the planning and delivery of  security 
assistance, and seemed relatively eager to step into the field of policebuilding, the INL 
started a working relationship  with the Pentagon. The Office of Military Cooperation in 
Afghanistan (OMC-A, established May 2002) was the Pentagon's focal institution in 
liaising with the Afghan security forces, especially  the Ministry of Defence and the Afghan 
national Army. In July  2005, given its extended responsibilities in the whole gamut of 
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security assistance, it was re-created as the Office of Security  Cooperation – Afghanistan 
(OSC-A). Inside the OSC-A, and in consultation with the INL, a “Police Reform 
Directorate” was established – a military  organisation, led by a civilian staffer appointed 
by the INL. A recent unclassified review of the US policebuilding efforts characterised the 
PRD as responsible 
for mentoring and training the MoI and ANP staff and for installing a program to develop 
an effective national security institution.  The directorate played a large role in determining 
the process for implementing the ongoing pay and rank reform effort  (...)  and is assisting 
the MoI in developing methods and processes for manning, training, and equipping the 
national police force.  In addition, the Police Reform Directorate assists the MoI in 
rebalancing the ANP, ensuring that  the appropriate numbers of trained and equipped police 
are stationed in the highest-risk areas (USG, DoS/DoD 2006: 18)
In April 2006, the OSC-A, based off Camp Eggers in the centre of Kabul, was renamed the 
Combined Security  Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), given its combined task 
of training and liaising in both military and policy aspects (USG, DoS/DoD 2006: 8, fn. 7). 
However, the Police Reform Directorate endured, and retained its essential mission – to be 
the key institution in Afghanistan for implement the US overall strategy  of police 
assistance and reform. In order to do this, the Directorate functioned as a focal node within 
a network of military officers, private contractors, and INL staff. At an institutional level, 
this produced “parallel” policy structures for the U.S. policebuilding program in 
Afghanistan (cf. GAO 2008: 5). On the one hand, policy oversight lay with the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul (where INL program officers were officially based), through its 
“Narcotics Affairs Section” - an old fashion terminology  from the before the re-branding of 
the INL in Clinton times, which nonetheless had several sub-sections: a counter-narcotics 
arm, a justice section, and a police section. On the other hand, CSTC-A and its police 
directorate were tasked with policy-implementation. Both arms of the program relied 
primarily, until early 2007, on DynCorp private contractors for ultimately  providing 
training to the Afghan police forces.109  This dual structure is mirrored in Washington, 
  
109 Additionally, the strategically crucial job of liaising, advising and mentoring the Afghan Ministry of 
Interior officials has been sub-contracted to MPRI, another private security company based in Virginia 
(DC8, personal communication with the author, 16th Nov.  2006). MPRI contractors working on 
mentoring officials in the Ministry of Interior were a very commons sight during both my field-trips to 
Afghanistan. Significantly, and as an illustration of the influence of the mentoring strategy not only over 
police recruits but also ministry officials when I set up an interview at the Afghan Ministry of Interior 
with a senior official, I was surprised to see him walk in accompanied by ‘his’ MPRI mentor (KB22, 
KB23, personal communication with the author, 22nd March 2008). Not only did the American mentor 
remain present for the duration of the interview, much to my surprise he partook in it, directing the flow 
of conversation and the topics broached and talking even more than the Afghan official himself. The latter 
seemed intent on following the lead of his mentor in every declaration, and it was common for him to 
seek approval of his words in the mentor’s expression and body language before addressing the questions 
posed to him. 
182
where the INL Police Program manager directs and oversees policy, and dedicated staff at 
the Department of Defence makes sure that CSTC-A implements it  on the ground (DC14, 
personal communication with the author 6th Dec. 2006).
Fig. 5.1 CSTC-A’s Afghan National Police Transition Readiness Strategy, 2006
(Source: CSTC-A, inserted into OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 17, fig. 4)
Fig5.2.CSTC-A’s Afghan National Police Capability Assessment Milestones
(Source: CSTC-A, inserted into OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 16)
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Perhaps the most  interesting aspect to analyse in the CSTC-A’s earliest developments in 
policebuilding, for the purposes of this chapter at  any rate, is their representation of their 
own role and its relationship to Afghan forces. Specifically, I want to take some time here 
to analyse to what extent their own discourse of technical assistance to the ANP conforms 
to some of the themes developed in chapter two. One good way to do so is to look at the 
documents produced by the CSTC-A itself, as well as supporting U.S. government reports, 
where a series of ‘capability milestones’ is proposed and described. For instance, one such 
diagram establishes a teleology of progress within the process of reforming the ANP, 
starting out from a state of affairs where the Afghan Ministry  of Interior is characterised as 
“ineffective” and “poorly led”, sustainable security institutions are “non-existent” or 
“corrupt”, and the ANP are “poorly equipped” (see figs. 5.1, 5.2, above). 
One could, of course, dispute the factual basis for this characterisation, but what is 
interesting here is precisely that such a rhetoric is employed, and how it paints the 
assistance relationship between the governing agents of improvement (CSTC-A, and the 
U.S. more generally) and the subalternised subjects of that improvement (the ANP and the 
Ministry of Interior). In other words, American official discourse on policebuilding has 
characterised the formal policing sector in Afghanistan – prior to the stepping in of CSTC-
A enlightened assistance – as incapable of performing the right kind of security, and hence 
the need for a policebuilding strategy  that is initially  only  for the Afghans, but not with or 
by them. The document then charts the blueprint  for success in a succession of capability 
milestones (four in total) to be achieved until 2010, as can be seen in greater detail in 
figures 5.1 and 5.2. Besides reinforcing the dichotomy and implicit hierarchy between 
those doing the policebuilding, and those being ‘built’ as proper performers of liberal 
security, there a few important aspects in such analyses that are worth mentioning.
The first of these aspects is the emphasis displayed on all documents pertaining to Afghan 
policebuilding to the idea of empowerment. The stated goals of American police assistance 
in Afghanistan are always defined ideally  in terms of the empowerment of Afghans 
themselves. For instance, the recent overview and evaluation of the American police 
assistance program in Afghanistan conducted jointly by the Departments of Defence and 
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State clearly states that: 
The intended end state of the U.S.-funded APP is an effective, well-organized, professional, 
multiethnic national police force that is trained and equipped to provide a safe and secure 
environment for the people of Afghanistan and a force committed to the rule of law.  The ANP 
need to be led well, paid decent salaries, and trained and equipped to carry out their assigned 
security and law and order missions.   The program’s goal is to establish a self-sustaining ANP 
– a police force able to attract and retain qualified candidates and to operate with minimal 
international assistance (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 5, emphasis added).
However, such emphasis on local ownership, capacity-building and sustainability  is always 
tempered with deferral – in an initial phase, Afghans must be told what they should be 
doing, rather than queered about their needs and desires. In a second phase, Afghans 
should be consulted and brought into the process of developing their own policing 
capabilities, and are promised their own steering of the process. However, this last step 
towards self-governance in security matters can only be taken when they are judged – 
according to an American, liberal matrix of success in policing – autonomous and 
responsible enough, through the acquiring of specific skills, knowledges and the 
incorporation of certain disciplining mechanisms. 
With regards to this point, it is worth mentioning again the work of Tania Li. In examining 
the linkages between governmentality, sovereignty  and discipline inherent in 
developmental drives since at least colonial times, uses the work of Gary Wilder to 
introduce the notion of a “structure of permanent deferral” at work in colonial 
improvement projects: subjects of native societies were “destined to become rights-bearing 
individuals, but [were] always too immature to exercise those rights” (Wilder, quoted in Li 
2007: 15). Similarly, then, in American policebuilding programs in Afghanistan, ANP 
recruits are deemed as subjects capable of (self-)improvement so that one day they attain 
the ‘capability milestone’ of autonomously performing their policing duties110. In the 
meanwhile, however, they must be supervised, disciplined and led through a series of ever-
more stringent requirements to prove their ‘operational autonomy’ (KB15, KB16, personal 
communication with the author, Kabul, 13th march 2008).
  
110  The ultimate goal of the American policebuilding program, as defined by CSTC-A, is to achieve 
‘capability milestone CM1’,  a state of affairs which is defined thus: “The unit,  agency, staff function, or 
installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may 
require specified assistance from the Coalition or international community” (GAO 2008: 6)
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The ability to monitor this development of the Afghan police personnel thus becomes a 
major issue. Only  through adequate monitoring of their evolving capabilities can the U.S. 
trustees pass judgement on their maturity and effectiveness. This is precisely  why the 
Department of Defense was keen on developing it’s ‘capability milestones’ framework, 
complemented by monthly assessment and reporting by American police mentors on the 
ground (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 15). Moreover, DoD has made efforts to put in place what 
they  have called a ‘Readiness Reporting System’ within the Afghan Ministry of Interior. 
The purpose of such a system is to “produce timely and accurate readiness system reports, 
provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive level brief”, which in turn 
would “enable the MoI and ANP to conduct analysis of readiness data that will recognise 
shortfalls and allow MoI and ANP leadership to make corrective actions” (DoD 2008b: 
24). However, one of the criticisms most often raised about the American policebuilding 
policy in Afghanistan is precisely  the need to develop more and better instruments to 
assess the progress of police assistance (e.g. GAO 2008: 15). This emphasis on mobilising 
expertise in order to create technical knowledge of each policebuilding program, in order 
to better assess, monitor and manage its subjects, strongly parallels developments already 
alluded to in chapter four.
A second noteworthy aspect in this mobilisation of expert knowledge to assess and direct 
the progress of Afghan policebuilding is its almost exclusive focus on the formal policing 
sector. In other words, the ‘capability milestones’ framework developed by the Pentagon 
takes as its starting point, and focuses exclusively  on, the institutional structures of the 
Afghan National Police. As such, in mapping out the policing terrain to be intervened upon 
in Afghanistan, and in establishing the technical blueprint for governmental intervention 
and improvement, the informal security/policing sector is woefully absent from American 
policy documents. This loud silence is especially significant inasmuch as the informal 
policing and justice sectors have been crucial in achieving some degree of social order in 
Afghanistan, historically speaking (Mohammad and Conway 2003: 162). Such preference 
for an institutionalist model (as opposed to a more culturalist model premised on ‘local 
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knowledge’ and ‘indigenous practices’) thus runs counter to historical precedent111; and 
even the recommendations of experts from within the American national security 
establishment112. 
In fact, if there is one – controversial – lesson the U.S. seems to be ‘learning’ from the 
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan is about the importance of cultural knowledge, and 
of engaging with local traditions of security, governance and justice, so as to turn such 
knowledge into an advantage in its counter-insurgency strategy, deemed ‘population-
centric’113. Why then, ignoring the informal policing sector, in particular the tribal tradition 
of the arbakai114? One can only conjecture that this preference on the American side has so 
far endured given the need to effect a behavioural change in large numbers of recruits, and 
a change in organisational culture in an institution. This may  have led the various U.S. 
government agencies on the ground to remain wedded to the institutionalist model, 
complete with its disciplinary and normalising advantages, as we shall see below.
3.2.1. The initial curricula
Having surveyed the way American policebuilding efforts in Afghanistan became 
  
111  Tania Li does a good job of highlighting how colonial schemes of improvement relied, among others, a 
tactic of improving through native authenticity: “Improvement for natives did not mean becoming like 
their colonial masters, it meant being true to their own indigenous traditions… Intervention was needed to 
teach (or oblige) natives to be truly themselves” (Li 2007: 15). This is an idea which resonates with the 
colonial/administrative practices of the British empire – including in the fields of security governance and 
the rule of law – alluded to in the introduction.
112  The influential report by the Defense Science Board referred to previously,  mentions this preoccupation 
in several places, and defines an “understanding of the cultural and historical context” as one of the keys 
to the planning and execution of post-conflict operations (DSB 2004: 19)
113  This realisation has prompted the Pentagon to refocus its counter-insurgency strategies on mapping and 
working through the “human terrain” in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. This in turn has led to the 
creation of a controversial “Human Terrain System”, whereby teams of social scientists are embedded 
with combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan (cf. Gonzalez 2009; Kipp et al 2006; McFate 2005). Their 
purpose is to understand,  translate and mobilise local/ indigenous knowledges and social practices with an 
aim to decrease casualties and augment the counter-insurgency success of the American forces. For an 
explicit discussion of the role of American police assistance in such a context, cf. (Kilcullen 2009: 61-62).
114  The arbakai are a tribal institution with similarities to a community policing scheme, or a neighbourhood 
watch. Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra define them as a “Tribal police, in Pashtoon communities, utilized 
to enforce internal rules and decisions of Jirga, and to protect the community from external forces. 
Depending on the tribe, also pronounced and spelled as arbakee, robakee, harbakai.” (Bhatia and Sedra 
2008: xxvi). They should not be confused with tribal militias (lashkhar) or the private militias or warlords 
and local strongmen (cf. Wilder 2007: 14, esp.  fn.  43). The arbakai have historically represented an 
important and legitimate source of public order in Afghanistan, especially in the rural areas of Eastern 
Afghanistan (cf. Tariq 2008; TLO 2005; Sammon 2008: 55). Despite efforts by Afghan civil society 
organisations (such as the Tribal Liaison Office) to raise awareness of,  and support for, arbakai reform 
and funding with American policy-makers, such initiatives have been for the most part ignored in favour 
of the government-run, centralised ANP (KB 14, personal communication with the author, Kabul, 12th 
March 2008; KB21, Kabul, 19th March 2008).
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institutionalised on the ground, and after an analysis of the liberal ethos of improvement 
through technical assistant patent  in key  official policy documents, it  is now time to turn 
our attention to the curricula themselves. Given the framing of American policebuilding as 
a technical form of aid to improve local police skills, one would be forgiven for thinking 
that the courses taught to ANP recruits would consist  mostly of such prosaic matters as 
handcuffing a suspect, or how to walk a beat, or how to diffuse a tense situation in a street 
confrontation through dialogue and the exercise of public authority, especially since the 
courses offered were of such short duration115. However, even a cursory look at the 
curricula developed and implemented by INL’s Afghan Police Program such a much richer 
picture, where on top of practical skills related to policing trade craft, recruits are also 
taught such subjects as “police officer values and ethics, democratic policing and human 
dignity” (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 64). In addition to these contents in the Basic Courses, 
supplementary  short courses were offered by the APP on a wide range of topics, including 
“the basics of democratic policing, protection of human rights, non-discrimination, and 
compliance with international law.” (65), as well as management for beginners and police 
ethics (65, DC13, personal communications with the author, 30th Nov. 2006, 15th Dec. 
2006).
Given that such courses ranged in duration from one to five weeks, and that the profile of 
recruits entering such courses was highly uneven - including a large population of illiterate 
Afghans, as well as recruits with an extensive background in asymmetrical warfare, and 
sometimes individuals implicated in previous human rights abuses -, it is reasonable to 
doubt the ability of American private contractors to effectively  teach such exotica as 
compliance with international law. But for the purposes of our analysis here, that is almost 
entirely  beside the point. What  matters is to note that such topics were indeed included as a 
set of very  particular knowledges which Afghan police recruits are expected to master and 
internalise in order to perform their duties as proper policemen. 
  
115  Before 2006, the INL, in coordination with CSTC-A, and a private contractor (DynCorps), were 
ministering two basic courses to Afghan police recruits. Basic I was “a nine-week entry-level police 
course for literate students designed to provide ANP personnel with a basic understanding of accepted 
international police techniques and theory of democratic policing” (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 64). In addition 
to this,  the Basic II course was “a five-week entry-level police course for illiterate students designed to 
give ANP personnel a beginning awareness of police techniques and principles of democratic policing. 
This course follows the same general outline as the Basic I Course, but omits 32 classes that can only be 
practically taught to literate students.” (64). 
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One can obviously disagree as to what exactly counts as human rights. It is only  natural 
that illiterate, rural Afghan recruits from around Kandahar would at times disagree in their 
understanding of this concept with, say, a veteran police officer from the Miami Police 
Department under contract as an instructor. But  the central point here is that ANP recruits 
are expected to understand INL’s roster of human rights. And, perhaps more significantly, 
they  are expected to act upon themselves as students so as to internalise the fact that good 
policemen uphold these (perhaps alien) standards. In other words, the inclusion of such 
topics into the compulsory training of ANP recruits reveals an attempt to radically alter/
(re)constitute the subjectivities of the recruits themselves (towards a liberal understanding 
of their duties as policemen, and their internalisation of human rights standards), as well as 
structure the field of action for the police in general, as a regulatory social institution. The 
latter represents a very  significant shift from its historical role as an often violent 
instrument of political centralisation and suppression of dissent under the rule of the 
Afghan monarchs, to a liberal service responsible for upholding the human and civil rights 
of the Afghan population. 
The point here is neither to question the benign intentions of the American policebuilding 
program in Afghanistan, nor to suggest that human rights’ training is an oddity in a police 
curriculum. Nor is it  to suggest that Afghan society should not benefit  from a heightened 
awareness of human rights issues and have those protected by the police. The key point is 
simply  that the inclusion of this specific issue demonstrates the inherently political nature 
of American police assistance programs, which seeks to effect a kind of liberal political 
pedagogy through security reform schemes, and thus (re)produce, in Afghanistan as 
elsewhere, a very specific kind of liberal subject of/by security.
* * *
In any case, this initial plan (2002-2007) as analysed here, was deemed too slow and too 
parochial. In terms of the security sector reform process, the ANP were lagging behind the 
Afghan Army (ANA) in achieving their prescribed capability milestones (cf. DoD 2008b: 
4), and the objective of more universalised and effective police coverage in the whole of 
Afghanistan remained a political desideratum (KB17, personal communication with the 
author, 13th Mar. 2008). In fact, the 2006 joint report by the Office of the Inspectors 
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General of both the Department of Defense and the Department of State, while finding that 
the American policebuilding program in Afghanistan was “generally well conceived and 
well executed”, nonetheless cautioned that “long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least 
beyond 2010, is required to institutionalise the police force and establish a self-sustaining 
program”. The report further recognises that  despite American efforts, the “ANP’s 
readiness level to carry  out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is 
far from adequate”, and that “the obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are 
formidable” (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 1). The report therefore includes recommendations for 
increased coordination between civilian and military components of CSTC-A, a revamped 
and much larger mentoring component, and an ability to extend training and supervision to 
the field activities of the new police once they have left  the training centres. It  is in light  of 
these developments that a new plan was thought out and implemented by CSTC-A, as we 
shall see in the next section.
3.3. Focused District Development
Throughout 2007 - possibly  because of the increased deterioration of security  conditions 
throughout Afghanistan, as well as the bold escalation of hostilities undertaken by the 
Taliban, the Hiz-e-Islami movement, and insurgents affiliated with Al-Qaida - the U.S. 
government began paying more and more attention to the status of the Afghan security 
forces. This meant an express preoccupation with the progress of efforts to reform the 
ANP (KB17, personal communication with the author, 13th Mar. 2008). 
The period between 2005 and early  2008 had in fact shown an increasingly bleak security 
situation, on almost all indexes, with the numbers speaking for themselves. ISAF troop 
deaths in Afghanistan has steadily risen, from 130 in 2005, to 191 in 2006, to a massive 
232 in 2007, Afghanis killed in 2007 alone amounted to 6500, and throughout 2007 there 
was an increase in reported incidents involving humanitarian workers killed, humanitarian 
workers abducted, as well as humanitarian convoys and facilities attacked (Guardian 2007, 
cf. UNDSS-A 2007). These trends in the security situation were marked by  two, relatively 
constant, patterns: for one, the bulk of incidents and casualties occurred in the most rural 
parts of the country, away from the major cities, predominantly in the South and South-
East of the country; secondly, the pattern of the incidents showed the insurgents moving 
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progressively  away “from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-
style attacks” (UNDSS-A 2007: 2). Additionally, while there are no reliable statistics 
analysing non-insurgency criminality  in Afghanistan, anecdotal evidence gathered during 
fieldwork seems to indicate that it too is on the rise, including in Kabul, where robbery, 
extortion and kidnappings were daily occurrences.
Neither the Department of State nor the Department of Defense could ignore these issues. 
This was particularly  the case given the criticism directed at the ANP, especially  from 
within Afghanistan itself, that it  lacked the capacity to tackle mounting insecurity (cf. 
Bruno 2008). In Washington DC, as we have seen, the Pentagon had – between the 
summer of 2004 and late 2006 – achieved a much more prominent position in delivering 
security governance in the post-conflict setting of Afghanistan and Iraq. With the passing 
of DoD Directive 3000.05, and the seeming successes in rebuilding the armed forces of 
Afghanistan, the Pentagon’s weight in shaping CSTC-A policy in Afghanistan grew, and 
this obviously had an impact in policebuilding.
A new plan, dubbed “Focused District Development” or FDD, was developed by CSTC-A 
– purportedly a joint effort of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, but 
in reality  leaning heavily towards Pentagon pre-eminence – that sought to re-launch the 
Afghanistan policebuilding program along more ambitious and more rigourous lines, or, in 
the words of CSTC-A, “improving the Afghan police, one district at  the time”116 
(Votroubek 2008b). 
Initial assessments showed that the logistics which were put in place in the previous years 
by the INL-led Afghan Police Program were woefully inadequate, and that the small 
Regional Training Centres (RTC's) were not capable of ‘processing’ enough trainees. In the 
process of conducting such an assessment, CSTC-A officers fanned out into the 
countryside beyond Kabul, and attempted to talk to regional (provincial) police chiefs, in 
order to obtain a better and more up-to-date picture of the security needs of the whole 
country. Interviews conducted during a stint of fieldwork in early 2008 revealed that in 
some of the provinces, those conducting the assessment  on the ground during the summer 
of 2007 felt the need to conduct interviews at the district and sometimes village level. 
  
116  Afghanistan has 364 districts, distributed by 34 provinces.
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When they came back from the field, all the data was centralised, compiled and analysed, 
in order to produced an assessment that was as close to a census as possible (covering over 
76% of the ‘declared’ or official police force numbers), detailing the conditions of the 
Afghan police forces on the ground. The results were, to put it  mildly, disappointing: 
besides a large number of ‘missing’ police officers (policemen who had been listed as 
having gone through training and having been issued a weapon and a position somewhere), 
between 40-50% of Afghanistan's ‘policemen’ had not been properly  trained, or even 
properly ‘institutionalised’ through a Regional Training Centre (KB17, personal 
communication with the author, 13th March 2008).
In view of these disappointing results, CSTC-A decided to re-task a military  outfit – Joint 
Task Force Phoenix, out of Camp Phoenix in the outskirts of Kabul – with (re-)training, 
vetting and mentoring the Afghan police forces (KB15, personal communication with the 
author, March 13th 2008). January of 2007 saw the setting up  of a small “cell” within 
CSTC-A, in order to plan and coordinate the new efforts to reform and rebuild the ANP. In 
the October issue of the CSTC-A newsletter, The Enduring Ledger, Major General Robert 
Cone (CSTC-A’s commanding officer) officially  announced the rolling out of the new 
plan:
Over the course of a year, we have had great  success building the Afghan army into a 
respected organization. Today, we are at juncture that  requires us to readjust our emphasis 
and efforts. We are moving forward with a new plan aimed directly at improving policing 
force-wide. Titled the Focused District  Development  Plan, this plan calls for placing 
greater reformation efforts at  the district  or community level. The strategy is to screen 
those selected district police and replace them with  a qualified and competent force, 
assisted by police mentoring teams. The endstate is a well-trained, well-lead and well-paid 
district police force that has the trust of the people. (Cone 2007b: 2)
What follows below is an analysis of this latest American strategy  of policebuilding in 
Afghanistan, which tries to break down “Focused District Development” into a series of 
sub-programs, techniques and rationalities aimed at achieving the improvement of Afghan 
policemen. As such, and after briefly defining or reviewing each separate component of the 
program, the aim is to highlight how each reveals traces of liberal governmentality.
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3.4. “The Afghan government gave them the authority, the U.S. military gave them the 
skill”117 – FDD and the pedagogy of security
Focused District Development is described a program driven by both a bottom-up and a 
top-down approach (CSTC-A 2009a: 12). It includes several initiatives, aimed at  not only 
disciplining the new recruits and model them through a pedagogy of security, but also at 
reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) – the institution formally tasked with the 
supervision of all Afghan police forces . Its specific goals involve efforts to 
“transform the loyalties of the AUP [Afghan Uniformed Police] to the Afghan nation and 
to the people of Afghanistan—whom they protect and serve” as well as to “further develop 
the capacity of the Ministry  of the Interior”, among others (CSTC-A 2009b: 13, emphasis 
added). In fact, CSTC-A documents regularly  talk of FDD as a program devised by the 
Afghan Ministry of Interior:
Focused District Development, or FDD, is a Ministry of the Interior program to reform the 
Afghan Uniformed Police, a component of the ANP, which simultaneously achieves 
improvements in local governance, public works, and elements of the Rule of Law. FDD 
allows the MoI to take a focused approach toward assessing, training, mentoring, and 
validating the uniformed district police” (CSTC-A 2009b: 13). 
However, it would be closest to the truth to say the plan was devised by CSTC-A in 
consultation with the MoI – and that is putting it charitably. In the early  days of its 
implementation (during the spring of 2008), military  Public Affairs Officers were keen to 
stress its origins in CSTC-A (KB15, KB16, personal communications with the author, 
March 13th 2008). It was only later that the theme of Afghan authorship of the plan 
becomes prominent, no doubt to boost its legitimacy, and point out an element of ‘local 
ownership’.
The plan itself consists of six phases. In the first  phase, “a District Assessment and Reform 
Team (DART) assesses districts and sets the conditions for successful reform of the 
district’s police and Rule of Law” (CSTC-A 2009b: 13). The local police units – when they 
exist or can be found – are then rotated out to a regional training facility, while a unit of the 
newly created Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) takes their place for the 
  
117  Statement of Army Capt. Curtiss Robinson of the Shahjoy District police mentoring team (quoted in 
Votroubek 2008c: 7)
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duration (phase two). In the third phase, approximately 8 weeks in duration, CSTC-A 
trainers attempt a “reconstitution of the new District Police at the Regional Training 
Centre”, meaning that “the unit is reorganised, retrained, and re-equipped” while “District 
Police facilities are concurrently renovated” (13). The newly trained unit is then reinserted 
into their district of origin to resume their duties, which constitutes phase four. In the two 
final phases (V and VI), which last a minimum of four months, “Police Mentor Teams 
overwatch the newly reformed police and continue collective training until validation by a 
special team” (13). 
According to this document, significantly, the assessment of the needs of local Afghan 
policemen is best done by  American military  personnel, who then devise the appropriate 
curricula, supervise their teaching, and monitor the correct application of new police 
knowledge and attitudes on a daily  basis. They are then validated (or not) by  another 
CSTC-A team. All of this reflects and reproduces the ideas of trusteeship  and hierarchical 
structure of development schemes that are discussed in chapter two of this thesis. While 
the liberal ethos that  pervades the program often leads experts to emphasise that American 
efforts are designed to empower Afghans to help  themselves118, official documents are 
quite transparent about what kind of relationship this is, stating openly that  “the Afghan 
National Police force is improving everyday under the tutelage of coalition Police 
Mentoring Teams” (Seymour 2007a: 13).
Moreover, in terms of its objectives and results, FDD also shows the liberal governmental 
tendency of understanding security  – as discussed above in chapter two – as an acceptable 
bandwidth, worried about trends and processes within a population, rather than isolated 
events concerning individuals. As Foucault put it, while disciplinary  mechanisms regulate 
and prohibit everything, “the apparatus of security, by  contrast (...) lets things 
happen” (Foucault 2007: 45). In this liberal conception of security, the function of 
apparatuses of security such as the police is to “rely on details which are not valued as 
good or evil in themselves [but] are taken to be necessary, inevitable processes” and thus 
achieve governmental effects at the level of the population (45). This is apparent, for 
instance, in the world of Maj. Gen. Cone, commanding officer of the CSTC-A, when he 
  
118  Cf. “With insurgent activity and police corruption stemming from poor manning and inadequate training,  
the PMT’s assigned to the Regional Center South have devised a way to help the ANP help 
itself” (Seymour 2007a: 13, emphasis added)
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declares that “fully trained and capable districts have had a 66 percent decrease in civilian 
casualties -- they  are effectively protecting the population” (Cone 2008a: 2). In other 
words, in an understanding of security/policing centred on the welfare of the population, 
properly  trained and supervised Afghans attain a level of capability and maturity that 
makes the ‘natural’ mechanisms and processes of population (for instance, number of 
violent deaths, or criminality rates) regain ‘normal’ values.
Additionally, the language of changing values, internalisation of new norms and 
transformation of loyalties which pervades CSTC-A documents suggests that the ultimate 
objective of Focused District Development as a policebuilding program, then, is to instil a 
“behavioural change” at the level of individual policemen so that “once the policemen 
complete the class you begin to see more self confidence, a transition from the ‘I don’t 
know how’ to the ‘I can’ attitude” (Newborn 2008: 12), and also cultural change at the 
level of the police as an institution. In fact, according to one report “half the battle of 
standing-up  a capable and self-sustaining police force is instilling a behavioral change 
within the government  led institution” (Seymour 2007a: 13). Army Captain Dave Perry, 
speaking about his PMT’s efforts in that regard, specifically states that  previous efforts 
(referring to the program that preceded FDD) largely failed because “There was no 
opportunity to instil a behavioral change before. Our plan is going to fix that” (13). 
Speaking of the training Afghan policemen would receive at the regional training centre, 
Cap. Perry once gain emphasises the behavioural aspects: “It is there that we can provide 
more comprehensive training, and instil some of those core values into them… Then push 
them back up to their checkpoints with leadership integrated into their organization and a 
readiness to go out and conduct operations.” (13, emphasis added)
Let us then briefly  look at some of the specific techniques utilised by American 
policebuilding experts to attain this goal of behavioural change in ANP recruits, thereby 
linking American security assistance programs with micro-practices seeking to reform 
Afghan subjectivities.
3.4.1. Screening, vetting, and biometrics
Chapter two referred to the dividing practices inherent in liberal government – and in 
particular the liberal schemes of improvement such as policebuilding – that seek to 
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separate subjects into categories or groups characterised by  specific needs and subject to 
particular kinds of interventions and governing techniques. The first micro-practice 
deployed by  the Focused District Development program to be analysed here – the process 
of screening and vetting new recruits – is exemplary  in that regard. American Regional 
Training Centres, where selection and processing of new recruits takes place, have 
‘processing teams’ in charge of two main tasks: weeding out unsuitable candidates, and 
inserting suitable ones into the networks and databases that will allow for their training and 
monitoring in the Afghan policebuilding apparatus (DoD 2008a)119.
Regarding the first  task, Lt. Cmdr. Sheila Pearson, a recruiting mentor and a processing 
team leader at Regional Training Centre Konduz, gives an eloquent explanation: “The goal 
to cleanse the ANP is started here at the RTC… By cleanse, I mean to make sure the people 
the ANP are recruiting and training are good, trustworthy people. This is the start  of that 
progression” (quoted in Del Vecchio 2008a: 8). In other words, it is up to program experts 
to split the general population of recruits into two basic groups: those deemed good and 
trustworthy, who can then progress through the training and become proper policemen, and 
those dangerous individuals beyond improvement. In order to weed out the latter, two 
criteria are specifically mentioned: medical fitness120, and prior criminal record. 
Moreover, the program seeks to inculcate these techniques of population management into 
Afghans – this particular report specifically mentions that while the screening standards 
and procedures originate from the American mentors and CSTC-A, Afghans were 
encouraged to internalise these procedures and perform them on their own: “although the 
CSTC-A mentors, serving as subject matter experts, were on hand to advise their Afghan 
counterparts, the process was almost completely  Afghan-led” (Del Vecchio 2008a: 8). 
Apparently, these efforts to inculcate such practices into Afghans have had a measure of 
success, and the report mentions how “ANP Col. Hadid Khan, Konduz RTC training 
  
119  One should not miss the language used here of processing recruits. While data is to be collected about 
each trainee individually (“During their enrollment, the students meet with an Afghan personnel 
representative who collects their individual data, such as name, father’s name, rank, and district where 
they work” (Del Vecchio 2008a: 8)), once they are vetted they are depersonalised and inserted into a 
general population of like subjects (trainees), identifiable only by a ‘tracking number’ attributed during 
selection (ibid.). This is reminiscent of the systems used in such institutions as modern asylums or 
prisons, and extensively treated by Foucault (cf. e.g. Foucault 1977).
120  Cf. e.g. “The students also go through a medical screening for basic vital signs, sight and hearing tests,  
immunizations, and a drug screening. Based on the results of the medical screening, the Afghan doctor 
makes a recommendation on the student’s qualification or disqualification.” (Del Vecchio 2008a: 8)
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commander, echoed the mentor’s sentiments” by  declaring that “some people linked with 
the enemy try to join the police. This system will find the bad people and keep  them from 
our force. The people of Afghanistan will understand that.” (Del Vecchio 2008a: 9)
 
These mechanisms for screening and vetting recruits are the norm in most police recruiting 
and training schemes. However, the purpose of detailing them, with reference to the 
Afghan police program, is less to establish it  as strange, inadequate or oppressive, and 
more to raise questions about what effects it has on Afghans themselves. To put it simply, 
in an intensely personalised culture, where accession to the security  forces almost never 
depended on rigourous and anonymous vetting procedures, and where often entry into the 
police was a process mediated by personal, familial, tribal or clan affiliations (KB13, 12th 
March 2008), such techniques seek to foster new subjectivities and new formats of 
political participation. In other words, the micro-practices at work in the Focused District 
Development program neatly demonstrate some of the key  issues raised by a Foucauldian 
analysis of American policebuilding. They do so by taking as a starting point the Afghan 
population and its processes of security, but also by relying on a set of pedagogical and 
disciplinary  techniques aimed at each individual recruit (an example of the logic of omnes 
et singulatim, in Foucault's own phrasing).
In the same vein, the second issue raised by the screening and vetting process of Afghan 
trainees is their insertion into (biometric) databases. Governmentality scholar Nikolas 
Rose, while discussing some of the key characteristics of advanced liberal technologies of 
government through security apparatus, refers to networked security to mean the 
increasing management of security  systems through mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion 
such as databases and other digital technologies (Rose 2000: 188-191). In fact, forms of 
networked or nodal security, which often rely on such databases, have become the rule in 
advanced liberal governmental schemes (Pawlak 2007; Shearing 2005, Wood and Shearing 
2007: 12-34). However, and somewhat surprisingly  in a country  ravaged by grinding 
poverty  and three decades of almost continuous war, CSCT-A has begun implementing a 
series of digital security  measures in Afghanistan that rival in their complexity and 
sophistication those of any Western police academy (KB4, personal communication with 
the author 9th April 2007).
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Firstly, “once the students finish with the personnel representative, additional information 
is collected by the Afghan ID card team.” CSTC-A security experts then “check their 
database to determine if the student already has a national identification card and verify the 
expiration date as applicable” and in case “ student does not have a national ID, more 
personnel data is collected” (Del Vecchio 2008a: 8). Moreover, and as part  of the vetting 
process based on criminal record mentioned above, “the students also undergo a biometrics 
screening, which compares unique physical traits of the students to a criminal 
database” (8). 
This usage of biometrics in governing the conduct of Afghan police recruits highlights an 
important dimension of contemporary American policebuilding: it bears not only upon the 
soul of the subject - as we have seen above, in its attempts to effect a change in values and 
attitudes towards security and professionalism - but  also upon the body. The physical 
identity  of each individual within FDD thus becomes indelibly linked to the liberal security 
project America seeks to build in Afghanistan, through its inscription in a set of 
authenticating technologies and networked databases (cf. Aas 2006; Muller 2005; 
Woodward 2005). While it is doubtful that the majority Afghan recruits - many  of which 
can barely read and write at the inception of their training - fully grasp  the implications of 
this technology of security governance (cf. Hodge 2009; Schachtman 2007a, 2007b), the 
fact remains that the deployment of biometrics foregrounds the advanced liberal character 
of contemporary regimes of American policebuilding.
The use of advanced biometric measures121 seems widespread within the Focused District 
Development Program, and serves at least three explicit purposes. First, they facilitate the 
‘tracking’ of new trainees. Second, they are supposed to act as a deterrent. In the words of 
Army Sergeant Wayne Demar, biometrics co-ordinator, “if these men know that the system 
will identify anyone who has committed any crimes; it  will deter the criminals from trying 
to enter the force.” (Quoted in Del Vecchio 2008a: 8). Finally, these systems are used to 
tackle the thorny issue of corruption – electronic payment systems have been instituted in 
order to enhance accountability  of recruits (cf. DoD 2008b: 26), so that  no informal 
deductions are made when payment is handed down the chain of command (the traditional 
  
121  These include (digital) photos and fingerprints, but also hand prints and iris prints (Del Vecchio 2008a: 
8)!
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method in Afghanistan) (Del Vecchio 2008a: 9, DoS/INL 2008). Implicitly, the salary 
relationship  which is establish is between the recruit/trainee/officer and the Afghan state 
(or, in this case CSTC-A), direct and unmediated.
3.4.2. Mentoring
Another key technology of liberal security governance introduced by American 
policebuilding programs into Afghanistan has been mentoring. Through the deployment of 
mentors (usually, but not always, organised in Police Mentoring Teams or PMT’s), the 
emphasis of American efforts in Afghan policebuilding shifts from actually doing policing 
instead of Afghans, and toward empowering Afghans themselves to act  via the transference 
of skills and the close monitoring of their everyday performances. As one officer expresses 
it, “[PMT’s] aren’t there to give the ANP anything except advice, support and back-
up” (Del Vecchio 2008c). As such, mentoring can be seen as a form of co-location, which 
Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite identify as one of the key technologies of 
power/knowledge at work in liberal schemes of police reform. Merlingen and 
Oustrauskaite discuss this practice with direct reference to Foucault:
Domains of power can be brought  into existence through the construction of fields of 
visibility. This allows power to exercise its hold over those subjected to it  without  physical 
violence and material constraints (Foucault  1980: 155). A structure of social control based 
on visibility comprises three generic components: hierarchical observations, normalizing 
judgements and corrections (Foucault 1991b). Penetrating observations, which are 
organized around certain notions of normality typically defined by experts, constitute 
individuals as cases whose behaviour and characteristic features can be documented in 
detail... At  this point the disciplinary  gaze gives way to  a judgement: do  those who have 
been  brought under a certain description measure up to the established norms or deviate 
from them? Deviants are made the target of repetitive normative corrections.  Yet regimes 
of power based on visibility do not  simply  restrain  subjects. They also incite them  to 
constitute themselves as objects of their own gaze, exercising surveillance over and 
against themselves and subjecting themselves to the strictures of normality as defined by 
those in power. (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 105, emphasis added)
The American policebuilding program in Afghanistan proceeds through similar 
instantiations of the 'power of vision'122. Afghan capabilities are monitored and assessed 
through hierarchical observation that identifies individuals or practices as deviant and 
  
122 The expression is borrowed from Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, who thus succinctly define their concept of 
co-location (cf. Merling and Ostrauskaite 2006: 105)
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proposes technical solutions for their correction. But what is most interesting here is the 
way these practices come to bear upon police trainees through mentoring, a technology 
specifically designed to prolong governmental intervention well beyond the confines of the 
training centre, and into the everyday  lives of policemen. As General Cone put it, the 
“focused mentoring and validation portion of the strategy” are critical to the success of 
American policebuilding efforts, as it  “will rely  on the efforts of our police mentoring 
teams to ensure the training the police received at the RTC is reinforced and sustained 
while resuming responsibility for their home districts” (Cone 2008b: 2).
As Merlingen and Ostrauskaite put it, mentoring is a double-edged technique. While it 
depends on “the calculated administration of shame”, it  must also rely “on assisting their 
mentees in making concrete plans for improving their skills and conduct in line with the 
policing ideology of the missions” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 106). As such, one 
of the key tasks in the spirit of the latter is to promote changes in the subjectivities of the 
trainees, emphasising for instance leadership  qualities of a particular kind into a unit, or 
lauding the ability of a trainee to shed old methods and embrace the new training regime 
effectively, or even coaching trainee policemen in how to self-censor and discipline their 
declarations when dealing with the media. In the words of Lt. Cmdr. Steve Parks, a public 
affairs officer with the U.S. military, “one of the other ways we’re dealing with information 
operations is by  training the senior leadership of the Afghan security forces on media 
relations and what they should say when approached by the media… This way they say the 
right things and don’t compromise operational security.” (quoted in Seymour 2007a: 12)
In this context, then, another key  objective of mentoring is that while it extends the will to 
improve in time, thus lengthening the period of supervision of Afghan trainees by 
policebuilding experts, mentoring is implemented as a means to foster eventual autonomy 
of the mentees: in the words of one report, “international forces teach Afghan soldiers how 
to conduct  operations with an eye towards their independence” (Votroubek 2007: 16). 
Mentoring teams are routinely  described in CSTC-A newsletter Enduring Ledger as 
performing a two-step process: teaching Afghans a technique (or remind them of a 
technique learned during RTC training), and then ‘letting them’ perform the technique on 
their own, but under close supervision, to evaluate their ability  to perform: “When the team 
first began working with the ANP, they trained the police in patrolling procedures. Now, 
  
200
the police are on the front lines and are scheduling frequent patrols throughout Afghan 
villages.” (Newborn 2008: 12). 
In another report, Sgt. 1st Class Ronald Judson, a PMT leader in the Kandahar region, 
emphasises the pedagogical need for the trainees to develop autonomy in helping 
themselves negotiate the newly formed Afghan system, including procurement: “We can’t 
just give them what they need… We have to mentor them on requesting things through 
their channels. We advise them of processes that work for us and they find solutions that 
work for them” (quoted in Del Vecchio 2008c).
All of the above are prime examples of the regulatory  nature of liberal governance 
previously  discussed. Governing elements (in this case American police mentors) are there 
to supervise through surveillance, suggestion and training ('steering'), but Afghan recruits 
are supposed to be active participants in their own development as better policemen 
('rowing'). 
Fig. 5.3 – “An Afghan National Police officer leads Army Capt. Hunter Hill and his 
Zhari district police mentor team on a patrol near Kolk.”
(Source: CSTC-A’s Enduring Ledger newsletter, Dec. 2007 issue, p. 11)
Figure 5.3 (above) shows in some detail how the process unfolds. After receiving training 
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in a specific technique (in this case, patrolling), the trainee then leads the exercise in the 
field, closely  watched by the mentoring team, which follows for back-up, advice and 
corrections, all mediated by an interpreter (to the left, in the background, in blue). The 
same relationship  can be seen at work in figure 5.4 (below), where a police mentor (in full 
military gear) looks on as a policeman trainee pats down a local elder, checking for 
weapons, in order to evaluate/correct how well the trainee performs in the field.
Fig. 5.4 - photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Brian P. Seymour
(Source: CSTC-A’s Enduring Ledger newsletter, Dec. 2007 issue, p. 12)
Moreover, mentoring teams are not only responsible for this continued disciplinary gaze, 
they  also perform pastoral duties: while the PMT’s “will visit the district police after they 
have left the RTC and ensure they sustained those skills learned during training and are 
conducting their basic function as policemen”, they must “also ensure the police are 
getting paid and fed.” As Col. John Cuddy puts it: “If the ANP aren’t  paid, they go AWOL 
(absent without leave). If they aren’t armed, they  get killed in the night” (Cuddy, quoted in 
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Del Vecchio 2008b: 1).
Mentoring was adopted and emphasised within the Afghan policebuilding program through 
the involvement of the U.S. military: in fact, the adopted techniques were based on 
previous experience in training the Afghan National Army through the use of Embedded 
Tactical Trainers (ETT’s) and Operational Mentor Liaison Teams or OMLT’s. One report 
openly  traces this line of continuity  when discussing the design and early implementation 
of the Focused District development program: 
It all began with the establishment  of police mentor teams, and attaching them to each of 
the five Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands to focus specifically on 
provincial and district  ANP components. The goal was for them to mirror the efforts made 
by embedded training teams to train the ANA by  explicitly tackling key elements of basic 
policing. (Seymour 2007b: 12)
As such, the introduction of mentoring, neatly illustrates neatly a host of liberal techniques 
of government through the pedagogy of security. Importantly, it also demonstrates the 
growing militarisation of American policebuilding regimes today, which shall be discussed 
below.
4. The thinning blue line?
As shown in the previous two chapters, the growth of U.S. international police assistance 
as a technology of liberal security  governance and as a crucial foreign policy tool has been 
accompanied by two interrelated trends up until the end of the first mandate of the Bush 
administration: the demilitarisation of the process, and a gradual retreat from an ad hoc 
constabulary strategy with executive power. Both of these trends resulted in a structural 
and structuring preoccupation with the entire framework (legal, institutional, economic, 
and social) in which police assistance takes place. Policebuilding thus becomes framed as a 
question of technical foreign aid, and driven essentially  by civilian agencies such the 
ICITAP and the INL. However, developments since 2005 have signalled a contrary trend 
gaining momentum, as the Department of Defense has begun gradually  moving into post-
intervention security governance, to the point that today, in the two dominant scenarios, 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it  is virtually the dominant player, at least in terms of sheers 
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numbers. As the U.S. armed forces engage in internal debates about their role and the 
transformation in their skills, trying to come to terms with their move towards the 
performance of police-like tasks within the framework of nation-building (cf. Dalton 2005; 
Serafino 2007; Williams 2005), from the field in Afghanistan emerges another picture. This 
picture is one of decided militarisation of U.S. policebuilding apparatuses, mostly  in 
response to the strategic and operational imperatives of the Global War on Terror, and the 
counter-insurgency campaigns raging in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
4.1. The militarisation of ANP training and deployments
The current core program in the American policebuilding apparatus in Afghanistan - 
Focused District  Development or FDD - offers ample illustration of the growing 
militarisation of American policebuilding regimes since the end of the Clinton 
Administration. In addition to the discursive and legislative changes that occurred during 
the transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration, modulating the security  agenda 
and the need for effective security governance delivery in terms of the dangers of 
‘ungoverned spaces’ in the prosecution of the ‘War on Terror’, the militarisation trend is, of 
course, intimately  connected with developments on the ground in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq. In Afghanistan, in particular, the evolution of the post-conflict scenario into a mixed 
mission involving both state-building and fighting off a protracted and sizeable insurgency 
has led CSTC-A policy into increasingly turn to the Afghan police as a complement to the 
military doctrine of ISAF and the Afghan Army.
This trend can be observed at work in several aspects of the ANP reform program, aspects 
which furthermore are openly acknowledged in CSTC-A documents available to the 
public. To understand this, one must first note – as do most contemporary police studies 
and criminological literature, even at  its most basic level – that in policing there is no 
‘enemy’ (cf. Trebilcock and Daniels 2008: 108-110). In other words, the core functions of 
the police in today’s Western, liberal states are to enforce the law, investigate crimes, keep 
the peace, and foster a “well-ordered prosperity” (Grieve, Harfield and MacVean 2007: 
29-42). In fact, as detailed in chapter two, the evolution of American policebuilding 
regimes is marked by that stark realisation, scarred as it  is by the human rights abuses of 
American-trained police in Latin America and the ensuing Congressional ban on 
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international police assistance. Ever since then, the emphasis of American police assistance 
has moved in the direction of reforming foreign police forces towards a democratic police 
service for the community. In such an understanding of policing, there may be risks, threats 
or dangers, but there is no enemy – much less an ‘internal enemy’ – and the use of force 
(including deadly force) is seen as an option of absolutely  last resort, which is why most 
police forces usually do not sport heavy weaponry, when they are armed at all (cf. 
McKenzie 2000).
However, and at  least since late 2005, program managers, policy experts and police 
mentors seem intent in declaring that Afghanistan’s “National police are in the 
fight” (Votroubek 2008a: 5) and striving to “establish dominance over their 
enemy” (Cohen 2007). This trend can be seen at several levels, perhaps the most prosaic 
and immediate of which is the subtle change in nomenclature. While documents referring 
to the Afghan police program before 2006 always made mention of the Afghan National 
Police in isolation, with the inclusion of policebuilding into the mandate of CSTC-A – in 
addition to their previous charge of training the ANA – things began to change, and it now 
common in documents to see references to both institutions in the same sentence, 
indicating union of mission. For instance, in one of his first messages after taking 
command of CSTC-A in 2007, Gen. Cone writes: “Our goal is to build a “standalone” 
army and police force that can take on and defeat the Taliban, al Qaida and other enemies 
of Afghanistan” (Cone 2007a: 2). The formulation suggests not only unity and effort and 
unity  of mission, but also refers to, once again, fighting ‘the enemies of Afghanistan’ as an 
objective for the ANP.
Even more telling, the acronym that has started cropping up more and more in the relevant 
documents pertaining to the Afghan police reform program is the ANSF, which stands for 
Afghan National Security Forces – a denomination which for all practical purposes does 
not distinguish between the police and the armed forces (e.g. DOD 2008: 5; House 2007: 
4; Voutroubek 2008a: 5).
4.1.1. Training
One of the earliest pieces on the implementation of FDD to come out of CSTC-A, in the 
April 2008 issue of Enduring Ledger, epitomises the trend of militarised training which is 
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now current in the reform of the ANP: “’Taliban! Taliban!’ the instructor shouted. Instantly, 
two dozen Afghan National Policemen dropped into defensive positions and pretended to 
shoot at an imaginary enemy” (Votroubek 2008c: 7). The article delves into the new 
curricula devised for FDD recruits, and there are several interesting aspects to notice. The 
first is how a sort of division of labour in teaching parts of the curricula has become 
established: “DynCorp instructors with police experience handle the law enforcement 
training, while U.S. soldiers do the combat training and MoI instructors teach the Afghan 
customs, laws and constitution” (7). At first sight, it  seems that FDD training has been 
deployed ‘on the back’ of the previously  existing INL training scheme – which was indeed 
ministered by  DynCorp contractors and focused mostly on law enforcement – with the 
addition of military  infantry tactics. However, it is worth noting that even in the 2006 audit 
of INL’s program, one of the structural weaknesses pointed out was the lack of adequate 
numbers of DynCorp  instructors (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 25). The Focused District 
Development program is currently in place in 54 districts, and ultimately  aims to all 364 
districts that compose Afghanistan (KB17, personal communication with the author, 13th 
March 2008). Given that there have been no large increased in the DynCorp contract for 
more mentors, it therefore stands to reason that  the proportion of DynCorp  instructors – 
and consequently, the proportion of actual law enforcement training – will be diminutive in 
comparison with the military aspects drilled in the Region Training Centres and in the 
field, under military PMT supervision.
In fact, in describing what kinds of training are being offered through FDD, the article in 
question seems to confirm this militarisation, stating that the topics covered include 
“general police duties, weapons proficiency, conducting searches, tactical movement and 
building clearance, unarmed combat, first aid, human rights, community  policing and 
Afghan law” (Votroubek 2008c: 7). Moreover, ANP trainees are given specific training in 
“infantry skills they need to fight against heavily-armed insurgents” (ibid. emphasis 
added). This pre-eminence of infantry  skills in basic training was further and amply 
corroborated by interviews (KB15, KB16, personal communications with the author, 13th 
March 2008; KB28 25th march 2008; KB 10, 11th April 2007) and observations during 
fieldwork. 
An article entitled “Mentors teach combat skills to new ANP” provides a good example of 
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the emphasis on combat skills in training. As an example, Public Affairs Officer Beth Del 
Vecchio details how 
Army Staff Sgt. James Parks, an ANP  police mentor team member from Buffalo, N.Y., 
uses the bottle caps to demonstrate a wedge formation, a type of patrolling technique. That 
day, his group was working on the “rush and roll,” the “low crawl” and other basic combat 
reactions under fire. This is typically training done by soldiers; however, due to the 
counterinsurgency environment, the ANP need these skills to survive and defeat the 
enemy. (Del Vecchio 2008b: 5)
The logic of using a civilian police service to combat armed counter-insurgency is never 
adequately addressed and explained in CSTC-A documents however. But this trend is not 
limited to American military instructors, mentors and commanding officers. Even during 
the days of greater State Department input and management of the Afghan policebuilding 
program, the tendency to view the ANP as an integral part to the international community’s 
fight against terrorism was apparent. This is all the more strange given that INL – and 
indeed U.S. policebuilding programs for decades – had come to emphasise the civilian, 
democratic, law-and-order nature of the police as a core objective of technical 
interventions. 
When queried about this militarisation of training for the ANP, and the subsequent use of 
Afghan policemen in fire fights against insurgents, a police program manager stated that 
“it’s all about priorities”. Yes, he continued, the police are notionally  supposed to take little 
girls across the street and fetch cats from trees and regulate traffic. But, he added, these 
tasks are relatively low priority for police in the West, who will respond first to reports of 
someone stealing a car or trying to kill someone. Similarly, he concluded, in Afghanistan 
the police would have to first  deal with the greatest threats to the community  (i.e. insurgent 
offensive activities), and then they would come down in the list  of priorities to all their 
other duties. When queried about whether they were indeed trained to tackle the latter, 
given the RTC training emphasis on the former, he answered that in time they could be 
retrained for a more civilian mission (KB6, personal communication with the author, 10th 
April 2007).
4.1.2. Deployment of the ANP in militarised settings
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Given their heavily  militarised training, it logically  follows from the views of American 
policebuilding experts that the ANP would also be deployed in combat situations, 
especially in joint-operations with the Afghan Army  against ‘insurgent  activity’ in their 
various districts of origin. That has in fact been the case. In an article suggestively titled 
“National police are in the fight”, public affairs officer David Votroubek details the role of 
the police in a joint mission with the ANA and coalition forces in the provinces of Faryab 
and Baghdis:
Their role wasn’t limited to just  security, however. Not  only did the police discover and 
disarm at least  one improvised explosive device, they also helped conduct  raids that 
captured at least 24 insurgents during the operation. Several ANP officers also 
distinguished themselves during combat actions. (Votroubke 2008a: 5)
He further quotes an enthusiastic a U.S. military officer who thinks that  such joint missions 
with the participation of the ANP are “brilliant” because “unity of effort is definitely a 
combat multiplier” (Marshal, quoted in Votroubek 2008a: 5). Another officer joins the 
chorus, and emphasises the ease with which both security forces – the military  and the 
police – can work together (interoperability): “This is the first time we saw the ANP and 
ANA do what they were supposed to do: the ANA secured and the ANP searched” (Daly, 
quoted in Votroubek 2008a: 5).
Moreover, an alarmed official involved in police reform efforts, who is privy to the 
meetings of the International Police Co-ordination Board (IPCB) and the Joint 
Coordination & Monitoring Board (JCMB), stated that in at least one of these meetings, 
military officers and diplomatic staff representing the U.S. had suggested quite strongly, 
that ‘close air support’ should be made available to police units on the ground. Close Air 
Support, American officials argued, was crucial in supporting the Afghan Police when they 
engaged insurgents in their districts (KB28, personal communication with the author, 25th 
March 2008). The prospect of a police sergeant, operating in a province after only  8 weeks 
of training, and momentarily  engaged with what he believes to be counter-insurgents in a 
fire fight, calling in the awesome destructive power of an AC-130 Spectre gun-ship to rain 
down thousands of rounds is, to say the least, scary. More importantly, it speaks volumes 
of the lengths to which ANP deployments have become – conceptually  and operationally  – 
militarised, moving away from the “community-policing” and “democratic policing” 
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models initially proposed by the U.S. government (OIG DoD/DoS 2006: 2, 61). Ground 
conditions in all their specificity notwithstanding, the mere thought of having a British, 
American or Spanish police officer call in gun-ships during an escalation of violence with 
criminals in their own countries is simply inconceivable. 
But although this suggestion was rapidly discouraged/vetoed, and although it represents 
the extreme end of the spectrum in the militarisation of the police training in Afghanistan, 
it is by no means an isolated issue. Anecdotal evidence gathered during fieldwork shows 
that police officers sport pistols and automatic weapons (usually AK-47's); even while 
performing routine duties in crowded areas of Kabul. Moreover, they are fielded with 
heavy  machine guns (each ANP pick-up truck has a harness of top to fit on should the need 
arise) and rocket propelled grenades (RPG's). Given that CSTC-A is also in charge of 
equipping both the ANA and the ANP, it is not surprising to find in ANP’s inventory 
several items of military issue. While interviewing police recruits, Ministry of Interior 
officials, or American staff involved in the raining and mentoring of the ANP, it isn't at all 
uncommon for stories to involve lines such as: “we were under fire, and the sergeant  lost 
his RPG. We were taking heavy fire, and suddenly his AK-47 jammed, so I had to ask for 
cover from my unit and dash to get him” (KB10, personal communication with the author, 
11th April 2007).
While American policy as emanating from Washington DC (especially  from civilian 
institutions such as ICITAP and INL) has traditionally placed its focus on structural change 
in order to reform the police to become a civilian, democratic, community-oriented service, 
in practice American policebuilding efforts in Afghanistan have de facto become 
inextricably linked to the Pentagon's prosecution of post-conflict stabilisation, and counter-
insurgency. The U.S. simply  does not possess, at least since the end of World War II, an 
intermediary or constabulary force to tackle the vacuum in public order which almost 
inevitable follows regime change by delivering an executive policing service in the 
transitional period (cf. Perito 2004: 323-7). Having failed to plan or negotiate adequately 
on how to better engage coalition partners who do possess such a capability  to deploy it in 
concert with American strategic objectives, the U.S. policebuilding efforts in Afghanistan 
has almost inevitably been bogged down in addressing the (public) ‘security gap’. 
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As we have seen, this has resulted in overriding concerns on the part of American 
policebuilding policy-makers about speeding up training, emphasise numbers over quality 
of training initially, and prioritise the constabulary tactics in training that would later be 
needed to fight an insurgency. This was done at the expense of focusing wholeheartedly on 
performing community-policing duties, and has led to a state of affairs whereby the ANP is 
tactically deployed in tandem with the ANA and ISAF soldiers so as to “hold” territorial 
gains made by military offensives123.
This militarisation has important consequences for an analysis of liberal governmentality 
inherent in American policebuilding. In the first instance, it highlights the central tension in 
liberal modes of government between the subjects of development, and those deemed 
beyond the pale of liberal improvement – a key trait, foregrounded in chapter two. The 
Afghan policebuilding program, especially since the deployment of the FDD strategy, 
shows this dual approach at work: on the one hand it  illustrates how police reform 
operates, as an apparatus of security, by seeking to improve and (re)form particular 
subjectivities; while on the other hand the militarisation of training and deployment of the 
ANP highlights the coercive powers in store for those deemed not improvable by American 
efforts.
Additionally, this almost seamless joining of civilian and militarised ethos in contemporary 
American policebuilding – here highlighted through an examination of the Afghan case, 
but also present (perhaps even more strongly) in the Iraqi scenario – forces us to think 
about what Li has called the “limits of governmentality” as an analytical tool (2007: 
17-19). In fact, for the better part of three decades, authors working in governmentality 
studies have almost solely  focused upon what Nikolas Rose has called “governing through 
the social”, and the analytical and socio-political consequences of the retreat of this model, 
and the rise of neoliberal or advanced liberal modalities of government (cf. Rose 1999: 
98-136). Closely following Foucault's own intellectual move away from issues of 
punishment, incarceration and physical violence visited upon the body at extreme 
moments, such authors have focused predominantly on the routinisation and 
institutionalisation of liberal practices of intervening upon subjects, both in more physical 
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terms as ‘disciplines’ (Foucault 1977: 135-230; Rose 1999: 101-111), or as ‘techniques of 
the self’. Foucault aptly describes this as a gradual shift in the political economy of 
punishment from the body to the soul (Foucault 1977: 10-12, 16-18).
However, as Mitchell Dean has come to caution in his latest work, it is important  for 
governmentality  theorists to pay once again close attention to disciplinary modes of 
governing. Beyond that, even, it is important to re-engage analytically with sovereign 
coercive power, and its place in advanced liberal modalities of government, especially as 
they  deal with the distant populations – such as Afghans – which have become prime 
targets of liberal governance today (e.g. Dean 2002a, 20020b, 2007: 79-195).
4.2. Concluding remarks
Despite more than 6 years and almost as many billion dollars invested in reforming the 
Afghan police, the U.S. is faced today with persistent problems in its policebuilding efforts 
(OIG DoD/Dos 2006). A recent UN Human development report  phrases it  curtly and to the 
point: “Although the performance of the police is improving, several analysts view reforms 
to date as disappointing. Although the quantity of the police has improved, quality is still a 
significant issue. The quality of the ANP remains exceptionally low.” (UNDP 2007: 84). 
Sadly, however, much of the critical analysis that has focused on American policebuilding 
programs in Afghanistan has remained unimaginatively chained to this, and has thus 
concentrated on 'problem-solving' and lessons learned. This chapter however, and this 
dissertation more generally, have sought to go beyond such problem-solving discourses, 
and engage in a form of critical theory. Indeed, echoing Prozorov's Foucauldian analysis of 
another such technical assistance program seeking to govern through development, the 
attempt here is to question and disentangle the conditions of possibility  of such schemes of 
liberal governance (Prozorov 2004: 264). 
To do so, this chapter has highlighted the way  in which contemporary regimes of security 
assistance have been brought to bear on the Afghan population, with the aim of 
'developing' Afghans, and empower them to manage their own security. Through an 
analysis of the micro-practices of police assistance – mentoring, screening, and training – 
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the sections above have highlighted the asymmetric power relations inherent in these, and 
their ways of working upon the bodies and souls of Afghan police recruits. Through the 
idea of police reform and professionalisation, much more is being inculcated upon these 
Afghan recruits than simply the ability  to correctly perform a new script of security. 
Indeed, such American policebuilding efforts clearly seek to (re)constitute the 
subjectivities of their Afghan mentees – to be more autonomous, more self-sufficient, to 
gain the ability to constantly monitor their own shortcomings and act upon themselves.
This drive, however, based on liberal ideas of civil-society  and the potentials for 
development of non-liberal subjects, co-exists in an uneasy balance with a growing 
militarisation of American policebuilding. Given the hinging of policebuilding, under the 
Bush administration, to the master narrative of a global war on terror, Afghan police 
recruits now bear the weight of their own development, but also the responsibility  of 
fighting a counter-insurgency alongside the military. As this occurs, the parallels between 
the current American policebuilding regime and previous historical frameworks becomes 
more and more evident. As the previous pages show, the return to a constabulary ethos is 
now a reality – even though it is tempered by  advances in liberal modes of government. As 
such, although the Afghan National Police is not officered by American military personnel 
(as in previous historical experiments highlighted in the first part of chapter two), it is 
being trained by them. Recently, calls for a strategy of increased “Afghanisation” (cf. Karp 
and Ponzio 2007: 227-228; Giustozzi 2008) have made the parallel to American 
interventions in the circum-Caribbean area all the more obvious.
The reverse of this COIN is an increased governmentalisation of the U.S. military, as they 
increasingly  find themselves in a political context that demands a focus on developing 
expertise about, and implement technologies for, the rule of foreign populations, beyond 
the conventional tasks of war. The result is a ‘mixed’ regime of policebuilding riven by 
tensions and incongruence, not least  between the will to improve and the need to deal 
(illiberally) with those outside the pale of liberal development.
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CONCLUSION
Drawing inspiration from the social and political theory  of Michel Foucault, and from the 
work of those working after him in the broad tradition of  governmentality studies, I have 
sought in the previous pages to illuminate a specific policy field within the larger topic of 
American foreign policy – namely, policebuilding. By looking at the historical evolution of 
the regimes, policies and programmes of American bilateral post-conflict police assistance, 
I have sought to foreground and further illuminate aspects of what Mark Duffield has 
called the growing security-development nexus (Duffield and Waddell 2004; cf. Chandler 
2007). However, rather than following the same line of argument as Duffield - that 
contemporary  Western regimes of liberal development are suffused by a politics of security 
- I wish to make the opposite but complementary argument that American regimes of 
security, especially  as seen through their application in policebuilding programs, are 
suffused by  the liberal ethos of development, a ‘will to improve’ populations under its 
governmental gaze. In other words, if Duffield is persuasively arguing that the evolution of 
liberal forms of rule has led to an increasingly securitised understanding and practice of 
development (understood as a relation of governance); I have sought to argue that one must 
also look at the increased governmentalisation of security policy  that has evolved 
alongside the previous trend.
As such, in chapter one I examined the changing nature of security  discourses in the post-
Cold War world, emphasising how (predominantly) Western conceptions of security 
became increasingly  de-coupled from the problematic of inter-state armed conflict and 
state survival under nuclear strategic parameters. Instead, the chapter argues, the post-Cold 
War world saw a gradual, but nonetheless fast-paced, refocusing of security  agendas from 
concrete threats to diffuse risks, and from military to human security  – understood as a 
relation of liberal governance focused on distant populations. This rise of the human 
security doctrine, and its preoccupation with governing distant populations with a view to 
their self-improvement, coincided with the introduction of the concept of security 
governance at the end of the 1990's. Indeed, the more orthodox understandings and 
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applications of the term, which I have sought to critique, have gained some prominence in 
the security literature – especially in what concerns the 'growth industry' of post-conflict 
security sector reform. However, I have sought to introduce a more sophisticated notion of 
security governance, which highlights liberal forms of governing through security 
apparatuses – in particular, through policing. 
In chapter two I put forward some of the key concepts of governmentality studies, and 
sought to show how they could be related and applied to American policebuilding. In 
particular, I focused upon three analytical dimensions. Firstly, I explored the meanings of 
government and governing within a Foucauldian framework, emphasising the role of 
policing as an apparatus, employed to govern through security. The following section then 
explored how liberal forms of government rely upon a set of dividing practices to make 
sense of the subjects of liberal government, thereby  defining more or less fluid categories 
of subjects, each amenable to distinct discourses and practices of rule. This section thus 
allowed me to highlight that, at its core, liberal government is essentially  preoccupied with 
(re)producing a specific kind of subjectivity, deemed appropriate to bear what Kant called 
a kind of well ordered freedom (Guyer 2000: 106). Finally, in foregrounding these dividing 
practices inherent in liberal modalities of rule (including government  through security), 
chapter two allowed me to highlight  the inherently hierarchical relationship  established 
between those doing the policebuilding, and those being – quite literally – built as proper 
liberal subjects via developmental schemes, a feature reminiscent  of liberal modalities of 
colonial rule and trusteeship.
In chapters three and four, I proceeded to examine the history  of American policebuilding. 
As Friedrich Nietzsche once put it, “only something which has no history can be 
defined” (Nietzsche 1994: 57). In following such an insight, rather than creating a 
definition of American policebuilding, I have sought to interrogate the modalities in which 
it has been historically  instantiated, the problems it  was deemed a solution to, and what 
kind of subjectivity it  relied upon/sought to construct. As such, rather than talking about 
discrete historical 'cases' of American policebuilding, chapter three and four posited the 
existence of evolving regimes of American policebuilding. Moreover, both chapters sought 
to underline the trend one could call the growing governmentalisation of American 
policebuilding. Accordingly, American efforts in the field have evolved in the direction of 
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greater civilian institutionalisation (favouring long-term structuring programs, rather than 
ad hoc militarised intervention), greater linkages between technical police assistance and 
wider governmental and biopolitical goals (in particular fostering democratic governance 
and liberal subjectivities), and greater emphasis on building local capabilities, empowering 
local police forces, and aligning American (bio)political goals with a logic of 
responsibilisation of host governments. 
However, such processes were not without internal tensions. As chapter four in particular 
has demonstrated, the transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration brought to the 
fore a series of tensions inherent  in American policebuilding. For one, the trend of 
deploying policebuilding apparatus predominantly in post-military  intervention scenarios – 
a context consolidated through several ‘humanitarian interventions’ in the nineties such as 
Somalia, Haiti or the Balkans – meant that the U.S. Department  of Defense would sooner 
or later have to be heavily involved in policebuilding efforts, at  the very  least in terms of 
better coordination.
Finally, in chapter five I focused on the case study of American policebuilding efforts in 
Afghanistan. Doing so allowed me to demonstrate several things. First and foremost, 
through an analysis of expert discourses on Afghan policebuilding, and daily practices 
thereof, I demonstrated that a liberal governmental logic of biopower is indeed at work in 
contemporary  American policebuilding programs. Through a pedagogy of security  aimed 
at Afghan National Police recruits, complete with its disciplines, American policebuilding 
has sought to reform the subjectivities and practices of the Afghan police, seeking to instil 
in each and every one the necessary skills to perform the right kind of security.
Using the broad framework of governmentality  studies to make this argument, as I have 
already pointed out in the introduction, brings with it a particular set of advantages. 
Throughout the research process, my aim was always twofold: one the one hand, shedding 
light on an important  sub-set of policies and programs – policebuilding programs – which 
have so far received relatively little scholarly  attention, at  least in terms of mainstream 
accounts of U.S. foreign and security  policy. On the other hand, focusing on this policy 
field, and particularly  by doing so through the lens of Foucauldian social and political 
theory, would allow the opening up  of larger issues pertaining to American foreign policy, 
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as well as to security studies in general. In the following pages, therefore, I want to briefly 
concentrate on three key  issues. In the first  place, I want to draw out the politics of 
knowledge and of expertise which are involved in American policebuilding efforts, paying 
particular attention to the purportedly 'neutral' nature of policebuilding defined as a form of 
technical assistance. Secondly, I want to emphasise the issues of hierarchy  and trusteeship 
inherent in liberal security governance through policebuilding, and the parallels than can 
be drawn between contemporary American practices and earlier colonial modalities of rule. 
Thirdly, I want to interrogate what such a governmentality approach can bring to the 
analysis of American foreign and security policy.
Policebuilding and the politics of knowledge – the limits of ‘rendering technical’
One of the central claims developed by Foucault in the course of his investigations is that 
power relations are dependent  on, and in turn constitutive of, specific knowledges. In other 
words, programs and technologies of government rely on the creation and mobilisation of 
particular knowledges of the objects of government (e.g. Foucault  2000a: 59)124. The level 
of dependence and complementarity  between both concepts was such that Foucault sought 
to foreground it by coining the notion of knowledge/power. Knowledge/power – the insight 
that would later lead to the concept  of governmental rationality or governmentality – 
makes intelligible what is to be ruled, and through what mechanisms, and is thus integral to 
the activity of governing individuals and populations (cf. Rouse 2005: 95-122). In keeping 
with this insight, one of the tasks undertaken in the previous chapters was precisely to 
highlight which specific forms of knowledge underpin American policebuilding processes. 
One of the key  ways in which the power/knowledge nexus has historically constituted 
governmental programs and technologies – including those of American policebuilding 
examined here – is by rendering technical certain issues, as discussed in some length in 
chapter two.
Thus, liberal government has evolved to a large extent as a technocratic endeavour – that 
  
124 Nikolas Rose offers a succinct formulation of this: “the activity of government is inextricably bound up 
with the activity of thought” (Rose 1999: 8). He goes on to detail what kinds of thought become integral 
to governmental reason,  how they mobilise truth claims in the process,  and finally how since the 19th 
century these technologies of thought “have paid particular attention to the kind of truthful thought that 
ground themselves in 'veridical' discourses about human beings: discourses organised around scientific 
norms of truth and hence subject to critical correction” (9) – in other words, technical, expert forms of 
knowledge.
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is, by  identifying or constituting the objects of governmental intervention through the 
mobilisation of expert knowledges, and deploying such knowledges as part and parcel of 
legitimate technologies of governing life. There are many examples of this technification 
of government125, and security  – as a key set of technologies of rule – is no exception to 
this. Scholars working within the broad tradition of critical security studies have 
accordingly  done much to highlight what Jef Huysmans refers to as the inherently 
“political nature of security knowledge” (Huysmans 2006a: 155). In the same vein, the 
previous chapters have touched upon several instances where security knowledge was 
integral to framing certain issues as security problems, and developing liberal 
governmental solutions to these problems. This was the case at the more abstract level of 
security discourse – as detailed, for instance, in the discussion about the rise of human 
security (ch. 1), or the modulation of state-failure as a key security concern for American 
policy-makers, and the attending notions of providing security  assistance (in particular 
policebuilding) as a liberal governmental solution, as discussed in chapter four's analysis 
of the Bush administration. But this was also the case when discussing more specific and 
capillary practices of security buttressed by a set  of specific technical knowledges – as in 
the case of the “metrics” developed to asses and improve the efficacy of American security 
assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (ch. 4), or the development of ‘capability 
milestones’ to establish and legitimise the goals of American police assistance to 
Afghanistan's National Police (ch. 5). 
In all of these instances, my  goal was always twofold: on the one hand, to highlight the 
nature and role played by such security  knowledges in American policebuilding programs. 
On the other hand, beyond merely  exposing these as vehicles for liberal government, I 
wished to highlight the inherently political nature of knowledge mobilisation, and of 
technical renderings of government. In light of the latter point, I now wish to discuss some 
of the important limitations of such technical renderings of governmental activity.
As Tania Li notes in a slightly different context, it  would be tempting – but ultimately 
  
125 On a more historical note, several scholars have for instance pointed out the link between modern forms 
of state government and the birth of statistics (cf. Hacking 1984, 1990). More contemporary research on 
the mobilisation of technical,  expert knowledge in the service of liberal government has touched upon the 
psy disciplines (Rose 1998), criminology (Ericson 1994),  the biosciences and genetics (Elbe 2005; Rose 
and Novas 2005), demography and the movement of population flows (Salter 2003, 2004a, 2004b; 
Walters 2002), and technologies of biometrics and surveillance (Amoore 2006; Amoore and Goede 2005; 
Muller 2005) – to name but a few.
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erroneous – to look at the history sketched here of American policebuilding processes and 
to see it as a gradual process of the “improvement of improvement” (Li 2007: 247-278). In 
such a view, the development of better mechanisms – more civilian in nature, better 
designed, more inclusive in their geographic and social reach – would render such 
American policebuilding schemes increasingly effective and benign. However, this would 
be misleading, and for a variety of reasons.
First of all, and to recover a theme treated in chapter two and then illustrated in chapters 
four and five, to look at the evolving regimes of American policebuilding as an example of 
improving development schemes is to render it once again technical. And to render 
policebuilding a technical field of development would seem to stress the neutral and 
apolitical nature of such programs. But this idea has little correspondence with the picture 
painted over the previous pages, where the nature and implementation of policebuilding 
regimes deployed by the U.S. is in powerful alignment with American governmental 
objectives. One clear example of this, which can be gleaned from reading chapters two and 
five, relates to the issue of centralisation. During the post-World War II policebuilding 
intervention in Germany, because the reform and rebuilding of the German police seemed 
inherently  linked to the issue of reforming the undemocratic exercise of state power under 
the Nazi regime, American policy-makers insisted on a policy of decentralisation, whereby 
German police forces would be municipalized. Given Germany’s long historical tradition 
in a model of centralised police linked to the process of state-formation, this was widely 
resisted by the ‘host  nation’. Nevertheless, the U.S. vehemently insisted, and proceeded to 
decentralise the German police. In post-war Afghanistan in 2003, on the contrary – with its 
long-standing tradition of tenuous centre-periphery  relations and a powerful informal 
system of security  governance in place – the U.S. government had modulated the 
‘problem’ of the police as one related to state-weakness, not state despotism. Accordingly, 
it proceeded to promote, foster and defend an extremely  centralised police force, under the 
firm control of the Ministry of Interior, and downplaying any schemes of local, informal, 
community  policing for the most part  of its policebuilding program – a trend again 
partially resisted by some sectors of the Afghan society and the international community.
In both cases, then, a series of expert knowledges were mobilised by American policy-
makers to make policebuilding an intelligible task of government. Rendering the problem 
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technical, based on such knowledge, produced different  solutions on both cases. This 
means that the modulation of an issue of a security problem effectively  constitutes what 
can be devised and implemented as a governmental solution, but it also highlights the 
politics inherent in this process of mobilising security knowledges.
Secondly, such liberal programs of improvement and government through security often 
ignore – or at least downplay  – the sources of instability they  purportedly seek to combat, 
all the while emphasising the capability of foreign intervention, allied to schemes which 
mobilise local participation and empowerment, to achieve security for all parties involved. 
In the case of American policebuilding interventions, this trend is also quite evident. As 
chapter two points out, while intervening in the Caribbean, it was widely assumed by the 
U.S. that the ultimate sources of instability that had prompted American intervention – 
with its attending constabulary strategies – were a lack of civilisation or backwardness of 
the local populations, a claim which had the added benefit of providing a justificatory 
moral high ground. In other words, and as is absolutely apparent in President Roosevelt’s 
infamous Corollary  to the Monroe Doctrine, local peoples were deemed as lacking the 
knowledges, capabilities or will to govern themselves properly, govern and perform their 
own security, or act morally and maturely in international society. As such, local 
governments and populations were construed as in need of appropriate supervision and 
incentive by the intervening American government in order to develop, among other 
things, appropriate security skills which would ultimately allow them to regain autonomy, 
self-government and stability.
However, such an account – which locates the sources of instability and insecurity in the 
character of their populations and the technical backwardness of their governments – is 
silent about the regional sources of insecurity (including the confrontation between the 
receding Spanish Empire and an expanding U.S.), or the legitimate grievances and 
aspirations of locals, or the issue of widespread poverty leading to banditism, or the 
oppression of peasants by landed elites through the police security apparatus as a source of 
social upheaval and rebellion. In summary, then, this was one of several instances where 
security was not framed as an inherently political question – where there are competing 
interests and legitimate grievances that need to be addressed through politics – but rather 
as a technical set knowledges and practices to be taught/inculcated into the locals. In short, 
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the issue of security  governance, at least since those early  policebuilding efforts, becomes 
framed as a governmental problem which merits a governmental intervention, and the 
deployment of a developmental solution – through technical assistance – aimed at the 
'subjects of development', sometimes backed up  by coercive power, or despotism in the 
Millian sense, towards those subjects deemed beyond the pale of liberal improvement.
In examining these examples, it becomes apparent that while the justifications presented by 
the U.S. government were couched in a technical language, the reason for choosing those 
paths is ultimately irreducible to technical issues related to the policebuilding process 
itself, and rather reveal the irreducibly political nature of policebuilding – a technology of 
government that seeks to expand liberal governmentality through a pedagogy of security.
By doing so, such an approach foregrounds issues of power and responsibility inherent in 
the discourses and practices of security experts, who devise, implement and manage very 
specific knowledges of security. Moreover, such knowledges, and the asymmetric power 
relations inherent in them, have very real consequences in the lives of the subjects of 
improvement. As such, to engage in a study of (American) liberal policebuilding – and 
indeed other similar technologies of security  governance - through an analysis not only of 
institutions and policies, but also of knowledge production and the micro-practices of 
security agents, brings up a much richer sociological view of security. In so doing, it 
follows important earlier contributions that emphasise precisely the need for a more 
sociological understanding of the relationships between the effects of structures and the 
practices of agents in defining and instantiating security in the contemporary world (Bigo 
1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2002; Huysmans 2006a; Williams 2007), including – but not limited 
to – the forms of knowledge which underpin, legitimise and enable biopolitical 
intervention.
The governmentalisation of foreign policy?
The picture painted thus far about the nature and implementation of U.S. foreign and 
security policies, especially  as seen through the lens of evolving regimes of policebuilding, 
raises a series of important issues about power, knowledge and subjectivity. In doing so, 
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this dissertation seeks to make a small contribution towards a more sophisticated analysis 
of American foreign policy, especially in the area of security governance that has come to 
occupy  such a prominent place in American 'national security'. Theoretically  informed 
analytical frameworks for understanding issues of power and security in American foreign 
policy have of course evolved greatly over the last decades of scholarship. But even in 
recent overviews on the state of the art  in US foreign policy analysis (cf. e.g. Hogan & 
Paterson 2004), a well-developed governmentality approach to studying American power 
remains a desideratum. Similarly, in academic overviews of American national security, the 
very idea of security  is still treated in fairly unsophisticated terms (cf. e.g. Sarkesian, 
Williams & Cimbala 2008), the many contributions made by  (largely European) critical 
security studies having made few inroads into mainstream security  thinking, especially as 
far as policy-oriented accounts go.
But instead of looking at  American foreign and security  policy in merely negative terms – 
that, is, as the ability to adequately react to threats – it is useful to highlight  the more 
productive aspects of American security policy, as it seeks to effect liberal governance, as 
well as foster and (re)produce specific liberal modalities of subjectivity  abroad. In a sense 
then, all of this seems bears out the working hypothesis that security (understood here as 
effecting liberal government through apparatuses of security) and foreign policy  have 
become heavily  enmeshed, and that the US administration has understood and seeks to 
harness the power of security governance as a tool of a broadly developmental foreign 
policy, thereby seeking to promote, expand and manage liberal regimes of governing 
populations abroad
When reflecting upon the evolving dynamics of this same process in terms of domestic 
forms of government in Western states, Foucault rejects the idea that the driver of such 
liberal processes is the state as it seems to be conceived in so much orthodox security 
literature. Rather, he posited, “maybe what is really  important for our modernity – that is, 
for our present – is not so much the etatisation of society as the 'governmentalisation' of 
the state” (Foucault 2007: 109). Foucault uses this idea – the governmentalisation of the 
state - to refer to a series of complex processes whereby  the relationship between politics 
and the exercise of state sovereignty are gradually  but radically reconfigured (cf. e.g. Dean 
1999: 102-111). As a result, the state becomes a node of governmental practice, rather than 
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its primary enactor. In other words, the role of the state becomes that of a conduit for 
liberal forms of rule, including rule through technologies of security. As Foucault puts it,
the governmentalisation of the state has nonetheless been what  has allowed the state to 
survive. And it  is likely that  if  the state is what  it  is today, it is precisely  thanks to this 
governmentality  that  is at  the same time both external and internal to the state, since it  is 
the tactics of government that  allow the continual definition  of what should or should not 
fall within  the state's domain, what  is public and what is private, what  is and is not within 
the state's competence, and so on. (Foucault 2007: 109)
He goes on to posit that  this process has been at the heart  of transformation in the forms of 
the state, and its “economies of power”, from the state of justice, to the administrative 
state, to the state of government. The latter, as we have detailed in chapter two, is 
essentially  defined not by its relationship to a bonded territory, but by its relation to 
population, “calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, [and] would 
correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security” (110).
This idea of a governmentalisation of the state has led scholars working in the Foucauldian 
tradition to some interesting developments in policy analysis, which one could call, 
tentatively, the governmentalisation of policy (cf. Raco 2003: 76). In other words, the 
governmentalisation of the state opens up  an analytical framework that, in analysing a 
policy field or agenda, focuses attention on “the emergence of new and distinctive 
mentalities of government and governmental rationalities which involve a calculating pre-
occupation with activities directed at shaping, channelling and guiding the conduct of 
others” (Hunt and Wickham 1994: 26, quote in Raco 2003: 76). Therefore, this allows us to 
rethink the nature and role of the state within advanced liberalism. The advanced liberal 
state thus acts upon a series of processes seen as external and independent  from it, as a 
regulator (Dean 1999:194).
Given the latter point, and the focus that this process of governmentalisation is focused 
primarily  on securing populations, it thus becomes possible to apply the framework of 
governmentality  beyond the state's domestic writ, or to unhinge liberal governmentality 
from the relationship between a state and “its” civil society. This has led to an important 
extension of governmentality studies towards studying international, transnational and 
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global aspects of liberal governmentality. In that vein, studies have emerged which 
highlight liberal-governmental processes at play in the global realm, including the working 
of international organisations (Merlingen 2003; Alasuutari 2005), the nature and role of 
NGO's (Sending and Neumann 2006), the concept and practice of global civil society 
(Lipschutz and Rowe 2005; Bartelson 2006), and liberal states’ conduct of war (Reid 2006; 
Dillon and Reid 2007) or building of peace (Debrix 1996, 1999a, 1999b; Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite 2005). It is precisely within this trend that the present study has taken shape, 
by highlighting the processes of liberal governmentality  at work in American 
policebuilding efforts, an important dimension of U.S. foreign and security policy. 
Curiously enough, despite the odd academic attempt to theoretically  analyse American 
foreign and security policy  through a Foucauldian lens (Campbell 1998; Doty 1993; 
Lipschutz 2002; Reid 2009), there is little by way of an analysis that foregrounds and 
systematically  explores the governmentalisation of (American) foreign policy. In other 
words, a sustained and systematic framework to analyse contemporary developments in 
American foreign and security  policy from the vantage point of global governmentality, or 
the “governmentalisation of foreign policy”, has not yet fully emerged. The present study 
has thus tried to further open up this research agenda. Through the examination of 
American policebuilding regimes, the previous chapters have sought to highlight the 
governmentalisation of American foreign policy. This is apparent in its discourses of 
liberal security, America's focus on the security-development of distant populations, its 
discursive strategies to modulate certain issues as amenable to security  technologies, and 
the U.S.’s deployment of police assistance programs.
A new trusteeship? Policing between pedagogy and paternalism
Another limit or tension apparent in American policies of security governance through 
policebuilding is that between the politics of improvement through security assistance 
(what I have term the pedagogy of security) and the limits imposed on it by difference – be 
it cultural, socio-economic or political. In other words, how do contemporary  American 
regimes of policebuilding, intent as they are on instilling a particular performance of 
security, deal with competing paradigms that characterise the objects of intervention? 
In fact, American policebuilding programs retain at their core the inherently  liberal 
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problems of ‘dividing practices’ that make particular groups of subjects amenable to 
governmental intervention and an ethos of development. However, these dividing practices 
also bring to light the ‘tyranny of benevolence’ – Will Bain’s felicitous expression to 
highlight the dangers inherent in liberal forms of trusteeship (Bain 2001). That is to say, in 
dealing with 'otherness' and 'difference', and in perceiving and performing security, 
American foreign policy as instantiated through policebuilding programs has tended to 
oscillate between two poles. On the one end, schemes of development and improvement 
designed to reconfigure subjectivities in the 'right direction' (pedagogy), and on the other 
end more coercive regimes which cover the spectrum from paternalistic tutelage (pastoral 
power), through to more forceful techniques of segregation, internment, or ultimately 
death.
The last  point thus draws out an important link between contemporary practices of 
governing through security immanent in American policebuilding, and previous colonial 
regimes as they sought to mobilise security apparatuses to govern and improve subaltern 
subjects. The main difference may well be, as Hindess describes it (Hindess 2004: 34), a 
shift from conceptualising liberalism’s Others as inherently  and naturally incapable of self-
governance (and, as such, in need of a paternal form of pastoral care and proper 
discipline), towards a post-colonial world where such distant populations are seen in equal 
need of improvement/development, but where the obstacles to their becoming mature, 
responsible and autonomous liberal subjects who perform their security and prosperity 
adequately no longer reside in climate, geography, or biological impediments, but rather in 
the structural limitations imposed on them by  their faulty institutions126. Therefore, what is 
needed is liberal governmental intervention that modifies such structural conditions and 
instils in such populations the skills to properly perform their freedom, and properly secure 
it.
In other words, contemporary liberal discourses about security  – and particular those 
emanating from America – have increasingly  linked conditions of insecurity for 
populations around the world, especially those living in “failed states”, to a resurgence of 
interest in the idea of trusteeship (Bain 2006: 188-205). Noticing that contemporary 
  
126 I thank Andrew Linklater for raising this question and forcing me to think about the lines of continuity, 
but also the limits in establishing the parallel, between colonial and contemporary American regimes of 
security governance.
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policebuilding (and other security sector reform efforts) often occurs in a scenario of 
international administration of war-torn territories (Caplan 2005), a growing amount of 
scholars have prompted policy-makers to learn from and/or re-enact previous arrangements 
of international trusteeship  (Lyon 1993; Pfaff 1995; Caplan 2001, 2005, 2007; Wilde 
2008). In fact, political scientists James Fearon and David Laitin have gone so far as to 
suggest that the international community in general, and the U.S. in particular, should seek 
to establish a regime of “neotrusteeship” (Fearon and Laitin 2004) in many post-conflict 
states. Such a relation of trusteeship, as intimated in chapter two, involves by definition an 
asymmetric power relation between trustees and their charges – it is not a contractual 
relationship  entered into freely by  co-equal partners, as classical liberal theory would 
suggest.
Those in favour of such a move often point out that trusteeship  is not simply a form of 
exploitative and/or oppressive colonialism. As William Bain succinctly  put it, “trusteeship 
is an idea that sanctions the rule of one man over another, in lands that are not his own, so 
long as the power of domination is directed towards the improvement of the incompetent 
and infirm” (Bain 2003: 23). It  was thus a political rationality  couched in ideas of 
responsibility and obligation, although towards subjects that were seen an inherently 
inferior – a theme which echoes with the analysis of (benevolent) despotism in chapter 
two. Others, while noticing the lines of continuity and the difficult  to establish clear 
demarcation between trusteeship and the politics of empire from whence it  emerged, 
nonetheless point out the emancipatory potential that trusteeship brought  along to subaltern 
colonial subjects – to enter an unequal dialogue, but  to enter it  nonetheless, and push for 
self-determination (Crawford 2008: 269-275). 
Certainly, the analysis of American police assistance efforts attempted here – especially in 
its more contemporary, advanced liberal format as deployed in the wake of intervention in 
Afghanistan – shows that there is some validity to the points above. One the one hand, one 
cannot simply bracket out the issues raised by the growing militarisation of American 
policebuilding analysed towards the end of chapter five – as they  powerfully  remind us of 
the underside of liberal biopower, especially as it connects to the more illiberal practices of 
the ongoing 'War on Terror'. On the other hand, however, American police assistance 
remains couched in a language of empowerment, development, and political obligation 
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towards others, as can be seen in continued references in programmatic documents to goals 
of capacity building. Moreover, few critics of American policebuilding would disagree 
with the notion that conditions in post-intervention Afghanistan direly needed 
improvement, or that rebuilding a professional and democratic police force was not an 
absolute need. Afghans themselves have placed great faith in the powers of the 
international community  – the U.S. more prominently - to help them achieve their security 
(Asia Foundation 2008). Moreover, in interviewing large numbers of American policy-
makers involved in policebuilding, the dominant tone was indeed one of concern, 
responsibility and even benevolence. How, then, are we to think critically about the nature 
and desirability of such programs?
It is worth bearing in mind the words of critical development scholar Tania Li. In 
examining similar schemes of liberal improvement of distant populations, she similarly 
highlights that the ultimate objective of trusteeship – regardless of the actual 
implementation, which can be problematic - “is not to dominate others, it is to enhance 
their capacity for action, and to direct it” (Li 2007: 5). When analysing the actual practices 
of governmental experts engaged in such projects of improvement through trusteeship, she 
notes:
Their intentions are benevolent, even  utopian. They desire to  make the world better  than it 
is. Their methods are subtle. If they resort  to violence, it is in the name of a higher good – 
the population at  large, the survival of the species, the stimulation of growth. Often, their 
schemes operate at  a distance. They structure a field of possible actions. They modify 
processes. They entice and induce. They make certain courses of action easier or more 
difficult. Many schemes appear not as an external imposition, but as the natural expression 
of the everyday interactions of individuals and groups. They blend seamlessly into 
common sense. Sometimes they stimulate a more or less radical critique. Whatever the 
response, the claim  of expertise in the optimizing the lives of others is a claim  to power, 
one that merits careful scrutiny” (Li 2007: 5, emphasis added)
Carefully scrutinising the claims to power inherent in American policebuilding, as well as 
the relations of power that are spun by the strategies and practices of experts involved in 
delivering security governance abroad, were precisely the central aims of this study. Thus, 
and in light of the analysis developed in the previous chapters, one must confront the 
critical question that emerges from deploying a governmentality framework to analyse 
American practices of policebuilding: how should we deal with the liberal gift of security, 
especially when it is wrapped in unequal and potentially dangerous power relations?
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Critique and the limits of security
Finally, I wish to conclude by  offering some thoughts on the relationship between scholarly 
critique and the limits of security, articulated against the background of my previous 
analysis of American policebuilding and security governance schemes. In a recent book o 
exactly  this topic of “critique of security”, scholar Mark Neocleous raises the issue that we 
need to critically rethink not only security  itself – what it is, what it does, who is it for – 
but also its very desirability  (Neocleous 2008: 3-4). Ultimately, Neocleous contends, most 
authors – even those working within the broad church of critical security studies – tend to 
agree on the desirability  of security, and the need to maximise it, thereby shifting the 
debate to alternatives in better security provision, such as the Aberystwyth school's 
emphasis on emancipation (Booth 1991; Alker 2005; Wyn Jones 1999), or the Copenhagen 
school's emphasis on de-securitisation (Roe 2004; Weaver 1995). The function of a critique 
of security, which understands security as 'an anti-politics', Neocleous tells us, is to refuse 
it, and 'move beyond security politics' (Neocleous 2008: 185).
While I do not necessarily agree with all (or even most) conclusions Neocleous ultimately 
draws – informed as they are by a sort  of neo-Marxism poorly translated through Foucault, 
caught in the false conceptual dilemmas of the 'real oppression’ that inevitably lurks 
beneath the ‘masks’ and ‘ruses’ of security, a handmaiden to capitalism – I share the view 
that a critique of security through Foucauldian lens must in some way reject any simplistic 
search for better alternatives:
You see, what I want  to do is not  the history of solutions, and that’s the reason  why I  don’t 
accept  the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of 
problematiques. My point  is not  that  everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, 
which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have 
something to do. So, my position leads not  to apathy but  to a hyper- and pessimistic 
activism. (Foucault: 1984: 343)
That said however, and contra Neocleous' simplistic reading of critical security studies, I 
do not think we must 'refuse the gift' of security, or 'move beyond' security politics – rather 
we must, as an exercise in reflexive pessimistic activism, to borrow Foucault's own 
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intimation, illuminate the politics inherent  in security: in its discourses, its ethics, its 
technologies, its inclusions and exclusions, the micro-practices of its agents and experts. 
Indeed, perhaps the ultimate purpose of this dissertation is precisely to foreground the 
intrinsically and unavoidably  political nature of governmental interventions, especially 
those enabled by discourses and practices of security governance, such as the 
policebuilding programs examined over the last five chapters..
As such, rather than classifying such security  interventions as good or bad, or offering 
better alternatives, I would finish by  echoing Foucault in pointing out that defining 
governmental problems, and devising the corresponding solutions, through the lens of 
security – in this case, liberal concepts of security as a form of pedagogy and improvement 
that allows for the formation and management of appropriately mature and moral subjects 
– is always inherently dangerous. More than offering (equally dangerous) alternatives to 
American practices of policebuilding, then, the dissertation has ultimately sought to 
underline their indeterminate nature, the contradictions inherent in them, and the spaces for 
hybridity and resistance that naturally open up as such programs are translated from the 
corridors of power 'into the field'. 
In other words, a critique of security does not entail running away from a label and its 
consequences, nor ethically  re-defining it. Rather, one should historicise more than 
(re)define, and insist on a better political sociology of security  as a technology of power. A 
critique of security, in my view, is at its most productive when it  entails three simple 
principles laid out by Foucault in one of his last interviews. First of all, it must embody 
“the refusal to accept as self-evident the things that are proposed to us”, secondly “the need 
to analyse and to know, since we can accomplish nothing without reflection and 
understanding” and finally “the principle of innovation: to seek out in our reflection those 
things that have never been thought or imagined. Thus: refusal, curiosity, 
innovation.” (Foucault 1980)
As an exercise in my own hyperactive pessimism, this dissertation has sought all along to 
exercise a critique of security  by  opening up such thinking space – primarily in the small 
field of American policebuilding, but with important implications for thinking about 
American foreign policy and its relation to global liberal governmentality, especially in its 
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manifestations as interventions abroad to rule and improve distant populations. The will to 
improve inherent in liberalism, as well as the attending techniques of governing through 
security, may well be inescapable features of our contemporary liberal world – they 
certainly seem ubiquitous in American policebuilding as analysed in the previous pages. It 
may  well be that each new technique and programme to govern through security  is 
benevolent in its origin, it may even bring ‘better’ ways of securing liberal life – but 
ultimately, as such governmental calculations translate into actual interventions in the field, 
they  will generate hybrids suffused with unforeseen consequences, engender resistance, 
cause new problems and open up space for renewed governmental intervention.
Ultimately, however, one must bear the political responsibility  of living, and participating 
in, such a world of liberal security. Without ‘refusing the gift of security’ – as Neocleous 
would have us do – one should instead strive to remain constantly aware of the nature and 
consequences of that gift, and insist on our ability to think and enact security differently.
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Appendix 1
WHITE PAPER
The Clinton Administration's Policy on Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support 
of Peace Operations
February 2000
Contemporary peace operations and other complex contingencies, though aimed at 
mitigating military conflict, often confront considerable civil disorder, violence, and crime. 
Time and again, we have seen that as military conflict ends (and armies demobilize), a 
security vacuum develops that indigenous law enforcement organizations cannot fill, at 
least initially. These institutions usually have been destroyed, rendered ineffective by the 
conflict or corruption, or become part of the conflict due to partisan behavior. In Somalia, 
for example, the police simply left their posts in 1991 when a new government failed to 
emerge after the Siad Barre government was deposed. In Haiti and Bosnia, the police were 
involved in the conflict and consequently  were viewed as biased combatants rather than 
public servants by  large segments of the population. Even before the conflict arose, the 
public safety forces in Haiti, as in many areas where peace operations are conducted, were 
the primary instrument for state-sponsored repression of the citizens.
The phenomenon of nonexistent, inept, or partisan police forces is not unique to peace 
operations. Similar problems occurred following the U.S. interventions in Grenada and 
Panama during the 1980s. Furthermore, in all these situations the other aspects of the 
indigenous criminal justice system, the judicial system, the penal system, and the law code, 
were in disarray and needed substantial reform.
Effective indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are necessary for a 
society to achieve and maintain durable peace. Therefore, helping to reestablish an 
indigenous criminal justice system is often, and appropriately, a fundamental aspect of a 
successful peace operation or other complex contingency operation. The experience of the 
U.S. Government and the international community has demonstrated the difficulty and 
complexity of this task. In spite of the difficulties that have been faced, our experience also 
demonstrates that participating in both bilateral and multilateral efforts to reconstitute 
indigenous criminal justice systems, promoting public safety in the short term and 
developing responsive criminal justice institutions over the long term, can successfully  and 
economically support American interests.
In addition to helping bring peace operations to successful completion, an effective and 
just criminal justice system in countries emerging from conflict serves other very important 
U.S. interests. In particular, it helps to deter the presence of criminals who seek to base 
their operations in areas where they can operate without fear of arrest and prosecution. 
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Such wrongdoers often include organizers of terrorism, illicit drug and arms trafficking, 
and international criminal syndicates.
Intent
The intent of PDD 71 is that the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government improve its 
capacities to participate in rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems by 
implementing the directives described in this white paper. Furthermore, together with U.S. 
allies the Executive Branch shall seek to improve the capacities of other organizations to 
participate in these activities. By enhancing U.S. capabilities and helping others to do the 
same, the U.S. will be better prepared to advance its national interests when those interests 
require the reestablishment of a criminal justice system overseas.
Scope of the PDD
PDD 71 is the third in a series of PDDs designed to promote U.S. interests by improving 
our ability to effectively manage or resolve inter and intra-state conflict. The other two 
documents, PDD-25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations and 
PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, and this new directive should be 
applied together. This directive amplifies guidance given in PDD-25 concerning police and 
judicial dimensions of peace operations.
PDD 71 applies to U.S. Government processes dealing with peace operations and other 
complex contingency operations as defined in PDD’s 25 and 56 respectively. The 
Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG) as described in PDD-25, under the review of the 
Deputies Committee, shall remain the primary interagency policy development body  for 
peace operations, including the issues related to public safety and criminal justice 
addressed in this directive. Further, when an Executive Committee (ExCom) as described 
in PDD-56 is established, it shall be the primary interagency  mechanism to conduct 
political-military planning and to coordinate the day-to-day management of U.S. 
participation in a specific operation.
This white paper is organized in four sections: improving U.S. Government organization 
and capabilities, improving capabilities of other organizations, activities at the operational 
level, and general policy guidance.
Improving U.S. Government Organization and Capacities
Create a Lead Agency: The State Department shall create an office, or modify an existing 
one, to assume lead agency responsibility for the full spectrum of issues related to U.S. 
Government involvement in the reform of criminal justice systems during peace operations 
and complex contingencies. This office shall be responsible for policy development, all 
aspects of provision and oversight of U.S. CIVPOL to field operations, development and 
implementation of training and technical assistance plans and programs for foreign police 
forces, and priority  setting and coordination among other U.S. activities relating to the 
criminal justice system, among other tasks. Consolidation of these functions within the 
agency that has primary responsibility  for foreign policy will enable the U.S. Government 
to be more responsive by clarifying responsibilities among the Departments of State, 
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Justice, and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
When the integrated planning processes described in PDD-56 are used, the lead agency 
shall normally lead development of the portions of the political-military  (pol-mil) plan 
dealing with public safety  and restoration of the criminal justice system. When related 
issues fall under the purview of another part of the Government, such as reform of the 
judicial system, which has traditionally  been accomplished by USAID and the Department 
of Justice, the lead agency shall normally organize and lead an interagency working group 
of the various governmental organizations to coordinate and prepare products for the pol-
mil plan. When the lead agency is developing policies and long-range plans for future 
programs and contingencies, it shall involve the Department of Justice and other interested 
agencies.
At the request of the Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG) or ExComm, the lead agency shall 
be responsible for developing and providing pol-mil planning advice and liaison on public 
safety  and criminal justice issues in peace operations and complex contingencies to other 
organizations and countries.
At the request of the PCG or ExComm, the lead agency shall organize and lead an 
interagency criminal justice assessment team for a specific operation. The purpose of such 
a team shall be to gather information and facilitate development of a comprehensive plan 
for reform. Assessment teams could also be used to help develop  benchmarks, measure 
progress against those benchmarks, and develop advice for mid-course corrections. An 
assessment team will normally  be composed of a full range of criminal justice experts from 
throughout the U.S. Government, including persons from the Department of Justice, 
USAID, and federal law enforcement agencies. The Departments of State, Defense, 
Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Agriculture, Interior, and any law enforcement agencies 
under their auspices shall be prepared to participate in these assessment teams as needed.
It is appropriate for the lead agency to use contractor support to assist in its duties when 
cost effective, reasonable, and consistent with laws and regulations. Furthermore, the other 
Departments and Agencies shall consider providing various types of support to the lead 
agency, including seconding personnel to serve in the responsible office.
Since our efforts to help rebuild foreign criminal justice systems are usually a multiyear 
activity, the lead agency and other responsible agencies shall seek adequate, designated 
funding in subsequent years of a particular operation until our foreign policy goals are 
accomplished. Further, the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget shall work together to ensure that programs conducted by or 
through the lead agent are funded at a level that reflects the high priority I give to these 
activities.
Enhance U.S. Government Capacity to Provide CIVPOL to Field Operations: Since 1994, 
which marked the initiation of the operation in Haiti, the United States has steadily 
increased its contributions of civilian police officers to peace operations. In 1996, the U.S. 
contribution was 154 officers in an average month; in 1997 the average was 275. By the 
end of 1999, the U.S. had more than 600 CIVPOL deployed. These contributions have 
been to operations in Haiti, the Former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. It will be in the U.S. 
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interest to continue to participate in and support CIVPOL activities. As always, future 
decisions on U.S. involvement in CIVPOL activities will be coordinated on a case-by-case 
basis through the Peacekeeping Core Group, as described in PDD-25.
The current process used by our Government to recruit, prepare, train, and deploy civilian 
police officers to CIVPOL operations is not adequate. The lead agency  shall place special 
emphasis on making immediate improvements. Improvements should focus, in part, on 
improving the speed with which the U.S. is able to provide personnel for specific CIVPOL 
operations and enabling the U.S. to participate in UN Standby Arrangements with 
CIVPOL. The lead agency  also should develop mechanisms to improve the discipline and 
accountability of U.S. CIVPOL officers deployed in UN missions, to include the 
possibility of a more formal affiliation with the lead agency. The lead agency  shall identify 
any new legislative authorities that would be necessary  to implement such improvements. 
Another broad area for improvement relates to the recruitment and preparation of U.S. 
CIVPOL.
In this regard, the lead agency, or another agency operating under its supervision, must 
develop training programs for U.S. CIVPOL that incorporate all aspects of service in a 
CIVPOL field operation. To further enhance the law enforcement expertise of the lead 
agency, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Park Police shall consider providing, if 
requested, an individual with appropriate law enforcement and technical expertise to the 
lead agency to serve within the office responsible for the management of U.S. CIVPOL 
contributions.
The lead agency shall specify funds within its budget submissions to cover the costs 
related to the provision of U.S. CIVPOL to field operations, including reimbursement to 
the state and municipal law enforcement agencies for their participation and seek any 
additional implementing legislation, if necessary. Necessary  reimbursement procedures 
shall be negotiated between the federal government and the law enforcement agencies. 
Given the organization of the U.S. law enforcement system, the majority of U.S. CIVPOL 
will likely come from state and municipal law enforcement agencies. Members of the 
federal law enforcement agencies should also be available for CIVPOL service on a 
voluntary basis similar to municipal officers, or via another appropriate method.
Enhance U.S. Government Capacity to Provide Training and Developmental Assistance to 
Foreign Police Forces: The U.S. Government should enhance its capability to train and 
develop foreign police forces during peace operations and other complex contingencies. 
The agencies involved in implementation must work from a common set of goals and must 
receive adequate institutional support, especially at the headquarters-level. Furthermore, 
they  must devise programs that include mechanisms to ensure that human rights issues 
receive adequate attention and oversight.
To carry this out, the Secretary of State and the Attorney  General, within four months of 
the signing of PDD 71, shall prepare a plan to implement this guidance and present it  to the 
President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In the plan, 
the Attorney General should specifically address measures by  the Department of Justice 
which are necessary to broaden and strengthen ICITAP's capacity  to engage in long-range 
planning to support the policy and planning development work of the lead agency, as well 
as ICITAP's capacity  to both provide training and coordinate with CIVPOL activities in 
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support of peace operations and other complex contingencies.
Create an Interagency Partnership  in Judicial, Penal, and Legal Code Developmental 
Assistance: In the increasingly global world, U.S. national security and other interests are 
inescapably  linked to the effectiveness of foreign criminal justice systems. When such 
systems break down or are destroyed, the damage is felt in a variety of ways, ranging from 
economic interests, to humanitarian concerns, to the physical safety of American citizens. 
We must therefore continue to expand and improve cooperation and development activities 
with other countries, especially  those emerging from periods of instability  where havens of 
criminal impunity might otherwise develop.
To respond rapidly and effectively  to emerging contingencies, the Secretary of State will 
call upon relevant departments and agencies to participate in operations pertaining to 
urgent and immediate interventions in the criminal justice sector. The Department of State, 
as lead agency, will harmonize and assure rapid response assistance, training and other 
necessary  support to strengthen judicial and penal systems and legal code reform during 
complex contingencies and in their aftermath.
The Attorney General and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency  for International 
Development shall establish a partnership that will include subordinate offices, including 
ICITAP, OPDAT, and the USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, to improve the 
capability of the U.S. Government to develop and assure delivery  of rapid response 
assistance. Working through the Center for Democracy and Governance, these offices will 
conduct contingency planning and develop emergency assistance programs, relying on 
analyses of ongoing and past assistance programs and resulting lessons learned to guide 
future actions. The Center will draw upon the expertise of USAID's Office of Transition 
Initiatives as well as the expert  resources available within other departments and agencies 
as necessary.
During the planning and execution of peace operations and complex contingencies, the 
Center for Democracy and Governance shall coordinate its developmental assistance 
activities with the lead agency, which will retain overall responsibility for planning, 
overseeing, and coordinating U.S. actions to rebuild the criminal justice sector. Programs 
must be developed that  enable the U.S. to respond quickly to help establish rudimentary 
judicial and penal capacity  during peace operations and complex contingencies. These 
programs must  at the same time lead to sustainable, credible, and legitimate state 
institutions necessary for long-term stability. Therefore, they  should be implemented in the 
context of a broader criminal justice reform strategy.
The Secretary of State, the Attorney  General, the USAID Administrator, and the Director 
for the Office of Management and Budget shall work together to ensure this initiative 
receives authority and funding that is commensurate with the high priority  that I place on 
it. The operating costs of the Center shall continue to be borne by USAID while costs of 
DOJ's participation in the Center's contingency  planning and program development shall 
be borne by the Department of Justice. The field operations conducted through it should 
normally be funded from foreign assistance appropriations and other sources as 
appropriate. None of these funds shall be used by other USAID or USG elements for 
judicial, penal, or legal code developmental assistance unless coordinated through the 
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Center.
Improving the Capacities of Other Organizations and Countries
Despite the critical importance of U.S. enhancements in these areas, U.S. Government 
capabilities should not become the international community's instrument of first resort 
whenever CIVPOL-related requirements arise. Many other countries and organizations 
have similar interests and responsibilities and should share the burden of these activities. 
Therefore, the U.S. Government shall seek to enhance the capacities of non-U.S. entities 
including those of other countries, international organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations. Furthermore, the U.S. Government shall seek to build and sustain the will of 
other countries and organizations to be involved in this type of activity and develop 
mechanisms for greater cooperation and coordination.
The UN is the international body with the most extensive experience and dedicated 
mechanisms focused on peace operations. Indeed, until the recent advent of the police role 
for the OSCE in Eastern Slovenia and Kosovo, the UN had been the only international or 
regional organization to mount a significant CIVPOL operation. Among international 
organizations, the U.S. Government shall focus its reform efforts for CIVPOL activities on 
the UN, just as we did for general peacekeeping reforms following PDD-25. At the same 
time, the United States shall continue to support efforts to improve regional organizations' 
peace operations capabilities, including those related to criminal justice systems. In 
particular, the U.S. will work to further develop the capacities of the OSCE to conduct 
these operations.
Because we can only  advocate, rather than direct, specific policies and processes of 
international organizations, PDD 71 outlines general policy objectives. During the 
implementation phase, specific proposals and a strategy for achieving them shall be 
developed. To facilitate these policy objectives, the State Department shall seek like-
minded states and organizations to serve as partners in our efforts to improve the capacities 
of the UN and other regional organizations.
Within the UN Secretariat staff, greater emphasis should be placed on matters related to the 
criminal justice system during peace operations. The current staff devoted to CIVPOL 
matters in DPKO is insufficient to accomplish the planning, coordination, and conduct of 
these operations. The United States shall advocate that DPKO strengthen its capabilities by 
installing an appropriate, senior-rank individual, with appropriate staff support, to oversee 
criminal justice matters. The United States will consider providing individuals with 
criminal justice expertise to serve within DPKO. Furthermore, criminal justice functions 
should be fully  integrated with other peacekeeping functions in DPKO. Adequate planning 
capacity within DPKO should account for CIVPOL requirements, including a criminal 
justice element, before a new operation is initiated or a mandate renewed. Criminal justice 
planners should be integrated into UN assessment teams that deploy to sites of potential 
peacekeeping operations and CIVPOL capabilities of more member states should be 
entered into the UN Standby Arrangements system. The Standby Arrangements system 
enables the international community to respond more quickly  to crises through rosters of 
pre-identified, screened and trained police experts from around the world who can be 
deployed on very short notice. Finally, other organizations or UN specified agencies should 
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develop means to take over the longer-term aspects of criminal justice development once 
the peacekeeping phase of a complex contingency is completed and peace-building 
activities have begun.
The U.S. Government will advocate that UN missions make use of a suitable mix of 
military and paramilitary forces to accomplish the assigned tasks of any new peace 
operation. Constabulary forces, that is, paramilitary  forces that train for and conduct a law 
enforcement function in their home countries, should be deployed by the UN in 
appropriate circumstances. Such forces bring specialized skills, such as crowd control 
capabilities, that are not common to traditional military or civilian police organizations. 
These forces are most  effective when deployed as units rather than individuals. Generally, 
constabulary and other paramilitary  units should be placed under the operational control of 
the military force commander, like the Multinational Support Units (MSU) that have been 
part of the military forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. In some circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to place a constabulary-type force under the operational control of the UN 
police commissioner. When under the operational control of the military force commander, 
and when feasible and allowable under existing statutes, these elements should receive 
logistic, intelligence, and other types of support in the same manner as the regular military 
units.
The lead agency shall develop methods to provide specialized training to foreign civilian 
police and foreign gendarme or constabulary forces in order to enhance their preparedness 
for service in peace operations and other complex contingencies. The lead agency  shall 
seek new legislative authorities, if required, and adequate funding to allow such activity. 
This new capacity  will provide the U.S. Government a means to improve the overall 
performance of CIVPOL operations, by enhancing the quality  of CIVPOL participants. 
The training should include standard operating procedures for field operations, which may 
need to be developed in concert with other countries, the United Nations, and other 
international organizations. Given the high priority the President places on human rights 
issues and risks involved in training foreign police forces, the U.S. will ensure appropriate 
mechanisms to guarantee that human rights issues are fully considered.
Improving Activities at the Operational Level
U.S. experiences in recent operations have shown that a number of operational level 
activities related to rebuilding the indigenous criminal justice system can be improved. The 
aim should be to have an indigenous public security and law enforcement network with 
trained, certified, and equipped police -- all of which are firmly embedded in a system of 
legitimate and credible justice sector institutions. A key measure of progress would be to 
assess the extent to which a self-sufficient and impartial law enforcement system is being 
established.
Enhance CIVPOL Headquarters Capacities: Currently, operational-level headquarters 
capacities for CIVPOL are generally  deficient. If field activities are to be improved, this 
shortfall must be corrected. Ideally, the CIVPOL component  should be capable of 
operating independently, since CIVPOL will not always be deployed with military forces, 
as was the case at the end of the Haiti operation. Headquarters capacity  becomes even 
more important if the CIVPOL component is controlling some sort of special security unit 
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or a constabulary force. At a minimum, the headquarters should have the ability to conduct 
current operations, plan future operations, collect and assess field information, and manage 
its logistical support. The headquarters element should also have the ability  to conduct 
liaison with elements of the host state and the other components of the peacekeeping force 
as well as other actors involved in rebuilding the criminal justice system.
Where appropriate, the CIVPOL headquarters should be capable of assuming 
responsibility to coordinate and oversee the overall reform process for the criminal justice 
sector. As more outside agencies become involved with this sector, the importance of 
coordination increases. The CIVPOL operational headquarters should incorporate a 
coordination mechanism akin to the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) used by the 
military and civilian agencies to synchronize their activities. When the United States is 
participating in a peace operation involving CIVPOL, but is not leading it, the PCG shall 
give special consideration to contributing qualified U.S. personnel to the operation to serve 
in the planning and coordination roles of the CIVPOL headquarters. Enhance Coordination 
and Synchronization: Just as CIVPOL and other peacekeeping functions should be 
coordinated at the strategic level, they must also be coordinated fully  at the operational 
level. The United States Government shall advocate that military  peacekeepers and 
CIVPOL shall, as feasible, coordinate activities to ensure maximum support of the overall 
objectives of the operation. Past operations have been successful by collocating 
headquarters, or colocating with the CMOC, or developing other effective liaison 
processes, to allow sharing of information on planning and execution processes. In 
addition, in every recent peace operation involving CIVPOL, the conduct of joint and/or 
parallel patrols consisting of indigenous police, CIVPOL monitors, and military 
peacekeepers has proven valuable in maintaining public safety and raising the 
effectiveness of the indigenous police. The first source for CIVPOL communications and 
logistic support should be from commercial sources; however, since the military 
component of a peacekeeping operation is more likely to have effective communication 
systems, logistic support systems, and intelligence or information structures throughout the 
area of operations, the military commander should consider providing the CIVPOL 
component access to and mutual use of these capabilities when feasible and allowable by 
law and when it  will not interfere with execution of the mission of the military  component. 
Independent CIVPOL support systems should be developed as soon as possible to 
minimize the dependency on military systems and allow full withdrawal of military forces 
as soon as the military mission is completed.
In some instances, military support to the CIVPOL component has proven essential to 
successful accomplishment of the overall mission. Such support might take the form of 
technical assistance resident in the civil affairs, psychological operations, military 
intelligence, or military police elements of armed forces. At the same time, we must avoid 
situations in which the CIVPOL component is completely  dependent upon the military 
peacekeeping component. Such military support may not always be feasible, or allowable 
under existing statutes, and the military-unique aspects of the mission will likely  be 
completed prior to the public safety related tasks. Any U.S. military equipment, services or 
supplies should normally be provided to CIVPOL on a reimbursable basis.
Enhance CIVPOL Competence: The United States will advocate that  whichever 
organization is organizing a particular peace operation, be it the UN or a regional grouping 
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like the OAU or the OSCE, a military alliance such as NATO, or a lead state, will develop 
specific job descriptions and other standards for the various individual experts required in 
an operation, e.g., police monitor and mentor, police operations planner, penal system 
advisor, judicial system advisor, etc. The United States will urge that the organizing body 
abide by the highest standards for recruitment and have the authority  to dismiss CIVPOL 
that fail to perform adequately. The U.S. lead agency will prepare template job descriptions 
and other standards that would speed the process of recruiting a CIVPOL force and share 
them with potential CIVPOL organizing bodies.
Training and preparedness of individuals and units being supplied to coalition peace 
operations should remain a national responsibility. However, international organizations or 
other organizing bodies may  need to supplement national training from time to time. The 
U.S. lead agency shall maintain the capacity  to provide tailored training packages to U.S. 
and international CIVPOL when requested by the organizing body or the contributing state 
and when appropriate U.S. funding or appropriate reimbursement is available.
General Policy Guidance
Constabulary Activities: As already described, in some cases indigenous police forces are 
unable to provide adequate public safety when peacekeepers arrive. In these cases, outside 
agencies may  need to assist in ensuring basic public safety until this function can be 
accomplished effectively by newly strengthened indigenous police. Generally, outsiders 
should not be tasked to conduct law enforcement as there are significant complications to 
using outsiders to enforce the law of the country in crisis, with which outsiders may not be 
familiar. Furthermore, ultimate responsibility to conduct law enforcement should not be 
taken away from local police forces as this may breed dependency. Rather, outsiders may 
be given responsibility to carry out a more narrow range of activities to create and maintain 
a reasonable measure of public safety. Such tasks may include actions to regulate 
movements which may be necessary for the cause of safety; intervene to stop civil 
violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes; stop and deter 
widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots, or other mob-type action; and disperse 
unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances, among other tasks. For the 
purposes of PDD 71, this general category of tasks shall be termed constabulary activities.
Military or paramilitary forces are best suited to accomplish constabulary tasks. 
International civilian police officers (CIVPOL) as they have been traditionally deployed to 
peace operations do not have the unit  cohesion, training, or equipment to conduct 
constabulary functions. Generally, the United States shall prefer that constabulary 
functions, when they  are necessary, be conducted by a paramilitary force such as exists in 
many other countries. However, suitable partners may not always be available, or a short 
lag time may occur before a civilian, paramilitary  force becomes operational in a specific 
situation. Therefore, U.S. military forces shall maintain the capability to support 
constabulary functions abroad, and if necessary carry out constabulary functions under 
limited conditions for a limited period of time. For example, in Haiti, in operation 
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the U.S. military contingent temporarily conducted 
constabulary functions and other law enforcement-like activities until civilian 
organizations were able to conduct  these tasks. Maintaining a constabulary capability in no 
way obligates the U.S. military to conduct these tasks in any particular operation or to 
  
238
develop specialized constabulary units dedicated to this mission. As always, specific 
missions and tasks of any  U.S. military elements serving in peace operations will be 
developed and approved by the National Command Authority.
Executive Authority: Generally, the U.S. Government shall advocate that CIVPOL not be 
given responsibility to enforce local law (executive authority) -- the responsibility for local 
law enforcement will remain with the indigenous police forces. In some instances, it may 
be appropriate to give monitors the authority (if not the responsibility) in their mandate to 
respond to local crimes when indigenous police are unable to take action. This authority 
may include the right to use detention and deadly force, for example, in an instance where 
there is a risk of death or serious bodily harm. In these situations, which place them at 
greater risk, CIVPOL officers should be given sufficient discretion over whether or not to 
exercise their authority. Where CIVPOL officers are granted such authority, their activities 
must be thoroughly coordinated with the military  force commander to avoid the potential 
for conflict between elements of the overall peace operation force.
In some exceptional circumstances, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor where the 
international community is responsible for administration of a territory, CIVPOL might 
appropriately be tasked with full law enforcement responsibility and authority.
Protection of CIVPOL: CIVPOL, as other peacekeepers, have the right to self-defense. 
Appropriate measures therefore must  be taken to ensure that monitors are adequately 
protected. In many cases, the prestige and respect imbued to monitors because of their 
affiliation with the overall peacekeeping operation provides sufficient safety. In the 
instances where monitors have been at risk, they were able to call upon the military 
component of the operation for support. Recently, in Haiti, this type of support was 
transferred from the military component of the operation to a civilian, paramilitary unit. 
Generally, this method of protecting CIVPOL monitors has worked well. However, in 
some instances, this method may be insufficient. In these cases, the United States shall 
consider advocating that the CIVPOL monitors be armed in order to facilitate their self-
defense. The U.S. will generally not consider sidearms alone to constitute adequate defense 
for the monitors, as they often will be significantly  "outarmed" by the civilian population 
and, in particular, criminals and other rogue elements. We must recognize that if CIVPOL 
monitors are armed, their training and preparation needs will increase. Nonetheless, in 
addition to increasing the personal security  of CIVPOL, experience in Haiti suggests that, 
in some situations, an armed CIVPOL monitor is better able to mentor indigenous police if 
by being armed they are allowed to be present in the dangerous situations indigenous 
police face. Obviously, in those situations where CIVPOL are tasked to conduct law 
enforcement, they must be armed appropriately.
The Role and Limits of Military Support: Actions related to criminal justice are primarily 
civilian in character: military forces are not police officers. U.S. armed forces do not 
normally have inherent law enforcement authority overseas. Furthermore, using military 
forces for law enforcement tasks over an extended period may send inappropriate signals 
to civil authorities and the local population, may place U.S. forces in situations for which 
they  have not been thoroughly trained, and may detract from other purposes of the military 
forces. We should use democratic civilian policing models as the basis for rebuilding and 
training indigenous police forces, and that  is what we hope to build in recovering societies. 
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Nonetheless, the military  component of a peace operation does have a vital role to play in 
the overall recovery of criminal justice capacities. Unless basic public safety is provided, 
the civilian organizations will be unable to conduct their tasks. If public safety is not 
maintained, the social fabric will not be ready for the assistance to be provided by the 
civilian agencies. In addition to the task of contributing to public safety, there are a number 
of supporting tasks that  the military can conduct  to hasten the progress of the civilian 
agencies dealing with criminal justice, as described above in the section on operational 
level improvements.
U.S. military personnel shall not provide formal training to foreign criminal justice 
systems unless authorized under existing authorities. However, this does not restrict U.S. 
military personnel from interacting with or conducting joint operational activities with 
elements belonging to the indigenous criminal justice system. In accordance with laws and 
regulations, the U.S. military may provide training and assistance to host state security 
elements that are part of the host state's defense establishment. Furthermore, DOD shall, if 
appropriately directed and on a case-by-case basis under appropriate legal authorities, 
provide assistance and support to the agencies providing training and developmental 
assistance to foreign police forces. Such assistance and support may include, inter alia, 
logistics, communications, transportation, and selected technical expertise.
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